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Multiple analytic methods are used to provide an 
analysis and evaluation of specific economic and neighborhood 
development policies undertaken by and continued by the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky, the City of Louisville, and 
Jefferson County since the early to mid-1980s. Such policies 
were initiated under the 1982 Kentucky Revised Statute 154.45 
(KRS 154.45), which introduced enterprise zones to the 
Commonwealth and its urban areas. The policy goals of KRS 
154.45 that are examined include: 1) the improvement of the 
quality of life of individuals that reside within the 
Louisville and Jefferson County Enterprise Zone (EZ); 2) the 
encouragement of economic activity through business formation, 
job creation, and job retention within the EZ; and 3) the 
elimination of blighted and deteriorated areas within the EZ. 
Several primary and general methods of analysis are 
utilized: direct comparisons of descriptive statistics, 
surveys, shift-share analysis, cost-benefit analysis and 
quasi-experimentation. The politics and history surrounding 
Louisville and Jefferson County's Enterprise Zone will also be 
discussed and examined. Political considerations appear to 
have played a key role in the evolution of the EZ program. 
The study shows that the EZ program cannot be considered 
a total success based upon the goals and objectives of KRS 
154.45. It is estimated that nearly $218 million in foregone 
tax revenues and fees were used to create jobs and investment 
iv 
that would probably have been generated regardless of 
incentives. In fact, job and investment growth in the EZ did 
not come close to the growth experienced in other parts of 
Jefferson County that did not have EZ incentives as well as to 
that experienced by Jefferson County as a whole during the 
same time period. This is true even when controlling for 
government incentives that may have existed in other parts of 
Jefferson County. 
This study addresses the issues of local economic 
development policies and planning. A lack of planning and 
focus is identified as one reason why the EZ did not meet 
expectations. Other reasons why the EZ did not fully succeed 
will be discussed as well as possible alternative economic 
development programs that could have benefited the area 
targeted by the EZ program. 
v 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction and Overview 
This dissertation evaluates the efficacy of the 
Louisville and Jefferson County Enterprise Zone since its 
inception in 1983. No previous comprehensive evaluation of 
the Enterprise Zone (EZ hereafter) has been attempted despite 
the fact that the program is now over 13 years old. The 
importance of doing such an evaluation is critical because of 
the enormous potential costs and benefits of the EZ as a local 
economic development tool. The central questions that need to 
be addressed are whether the program achieved its stated 
goals, and whether the program had any other un-predicted or 
unanticipated effects on the local economy. 
The EZ evaluation is important because of the continuing 
use of and emphasis on state and local initiatives to solve 
urban problems, and to encourage local economic growth. This 
is a trend that was started in the 1980s and continues to this 
day. Despite the fact that the federal government has again 
become a partner in urban and community development through 
such initiatives as Empowerment Zones and Enterprise 
Communities, these programs still leave much, if not most, of 
local economic development planning and promotion in the hands 
of local officials, with the federal government providing 
mostly financial assistance. This dissertation topic is a 
timely one because localities are still trying to generate 
solutions to their problems by promoting homegrown economic 
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growth and prosperity in order to solve urban problems and to 
encourage local economic growth. 
There have been previous evaluations of enterprise zones 
throughout the nation. This study is unique in that the 
Louisville and Jefferson County EZ is the largest in the 
nation, encompassing 45.7 square miles. In 1983, the zone 
originally only covered 3.75 square miles and was designed as 
an urban economic development program for disadvantaged and 
low income residents and the long-term unemployed. However, 
the zone grew twice over the next three years and took in many 
residential and commercial areas that would not normally have 
been considered distressed or economically depressed. Why the 
size of the zone was changed and why its focus changed will 
also be addressed in this dissertation because of the impact 
that such changes had on EZ goals as well as EZ benefits and 
costs. 
This dissertation includes a narrative history of the EZ 
and will show the EZ's evolution in terms of both size and 
goals. National and local political and economic events 
preceding the birth of the EZ are examined. The history of 
the EZ shows the motivation for its origin and growth. 
Political factors are shown to be important in explaining the 
expansion of the EZ. 
This study discusses the theoretical underpinnings of 
the EZ concept and the reasons why such programs were 
conceived and implemented. The frustration of national and 
local policy makers with traditional economic development 
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programs is discussed along with the attractiveness of the EZ 
concept to those in the economic development community as a 
potential and viable alternative. 
Since EZ programs and policies have varied from state to 
state and from locality to locality (there was not a national 
enterprise zone policy developed in the 1980s), no one program 
evaluation stands out as the definitive study of EZ success or 
failure. Around 37 states and the District of Columbia have, 
or have had, EZ programs. Since each jurisdiction has used a 
different mixture of tax and regulatory incentives in their 
EZs, a national study of the effectiveness of EZs has 
virtually been impossible because of a lack of comparability 
among state and local programs. 
This dissertation cites and uses findings from previous 
EZ evaluations done throughout the nation. This is helpful 
since the dissertation takes a multi-method approach in 
evaluating the Louisville-Jefferson County EZ. There exists 
an abundance of literature on EZ evaluation that dates back to 
the early 1980s. Most evaluations take different approaches 
(surveys, shift-share analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, 
etc.). All these methods are used to assess the performance 
of the Louisville-Jefferson County EZ. 
A multi-method approach is used to provide a policy 
analysis and program evaluation of specific economic 
development policies undertaken and continued by the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky and Jefferson County, Kentucky since 
1983. Such policies were initiated under the 1982 Kentucky 
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Revised Statute 154.45 (KRS 154.45), and thereby introduced 
EZs to the Commonwealth's urban areas. The policies examined 
and evaluated include improvement of the quality of life of 
individuals that reside within Louisville and Jefferson 
County's EZ; encouragement of economic activity within the EZ; 
and elimination of blighted and deteriorated areas within the 
EZ. 
The following methods of analysis are utilized to 
evaluate the success of EZ policy interventions: direct 
comparisons of descriptive statistics, survey results, 
shift-share analysis, cost-benefit analysis and 
quasi-experimentation. The politics and history surrounding 
Louisville and Jefferson County's Enterprise Zone is also 
discussed and examined. It is shown that political 
considerations played a key role in the development, evolution 
and implementation of Louisville's EZ program. 
The evidence shows that the EZ program was at best 
marginally successful. It is estimated that nearly $218 
million in foregone tax revenues and fees were used to create 
jobs and investment that, for the most part, would probably 
have been generated regardless of incentives. In fact, job 
and investment growth in the EZ did not come close to the 
growth experienced in other parts of Jefferson County that did 
not have EZ incentives as well as to that experienced by 
Jefferson County as a whole during the same time period (1983 
to the present). 
The dissertation concludes with an analysis of local 
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economic development policies and planning. Why the EZ has 
not been a full success will be discussed as well as possible 
alternative economic development programs that could have 
benefited the area targeted by the EZ program. The 
implications for future development policy are discussed. A 
central policy question that needs to be addressed is the 
efficacy of placing economic development into the hands of 
local government. Finally, recommendations for future 
research about EZs and their effectiveness is also discussed. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Emergence of Enterprise Zones as an Urban Po1icy 
1. Background 
There is an abundance of literature on the fate of U. s. 
cities after the end of World War II. The late 1940s 
throughout the 1950s saw people leaving neighborhoods that 
were close to central business districts in favor of newer 
neighborhoods and homes that were some distance from downtown 
areas. As post-war prosperity and government legislation 
(assisted by VA and FHA loans, and home mortgage interest tax 
deductions) encouraged a housing boom on the outskirts of most 
major cities, suburbanization swept across America. 
With rising incomes, middle-class families could not 
only afford newer and larger housing, but also the automobiles 
that would allow them to travel back and forth to work. New 
federal and state highways as well as the beginning of the 
federal interstate system facilitated the suburbanite's 
ability to travel. Because location was critical to retailing 
success, shopping centers developed along the major 
thoroughfares of most new suburban areas. 
At the same time, because of a growing economy, 
manufacturers needed more space in order to expand production. 
The horizontal layout of assembly-line work and mass 
production meant that larger parcels of land were needed. 
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Such land was not readily available in the already developed 
inner cities. Plant expansion was often hindered and made 
impossible by a fixed and already built environment. On the 
other hand, the open and undeveloped land near suburban 
locations was ideal. The land was cheap, and many current 
employees had already moved into the outlying areas, or new 
employees could be recruited from nearby neighborhoods. 
What happened to cities during this time period? 
History points out that disinvestment on a deep and wide-scale 
basis occurred (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Ames, Brown, 
Callahan, Cummings, Smock, and Ziegler, 1992; and Wilson, 
1966). With manufacturers, retailers, and residents leaving 
town, space and facilities that had at one time enjoyed 
extensive and intensive use now became abandoned and 
undesirable. With the exception of professional and technical 
jobs, many forms of work simply "disappeared" from the inner 
city and there began a spatial mismatch between available 
employment and those who wanted to work (Wilson, 1987, 1996). 
Those who could not afford new housing and those without 
transportation and/or certain skills and education would be 
left behind in quickly deteriorating neighborhoods (Wilson, 
1987). Particularly hard-hit by these trends were minorities, 
especially African-Americans. 
The fiscal coffers of America's cities were also hard-
hit. As more and more property owners left the city for 
unincorporated areas around the city, property tax revenues 
began to decline (Mikesell, 1982; Stiglitz, 1988; and Rosen, 
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1992, pp. 543-545). The property tax had always been the 
backbone of municipal finance. As the revenues shrank, so did 
the ability of cities to finance day-to-day operations and 
services as well as big ticket projects such as infrastructure 
improvements, maintenance and replacement. 
In an attempt to remedy this situation, urban renewal 
was started during the Eisenhower Administration. 
Deteriorated neighborhoods with dilapidated housing were 
replaced with new public housing facilities and roadways that 
connected the inner city to interstate highways (Ames, et ai, 
1992). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, one blighted 
neighborhood after another succumbed to massive rebuilding 
projects that completely changed the urban landscape for 
better or worse (Anderson, 1964). Yet poverty still remained 
a problem in America's urban areas. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government tried to 
rehabilitate ailing cities through President Johnson's Great 
Society programs and President Nixon's New Federalism. The 
expansion of the social safety net for the poor and the 
elderly as well as federal revenue sharing were basically 
redistribution programs aimed at providing relief for urban 
poverty and their symptomatic problems-crime, crumbling 
infrastructure, etc. There were also attempts to provide job 
training for inner city residents through the Comprehensive 
Employment Training Act (CETA). Presidents Ford and Carter 
pretty much continued and maintained these policies despite 
increasing political pressure for federal fiscal restraint. 
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The amelioration of economic hardship along with increasing 
the skills of urban residents were seen as a two-pronged 
strategy for revitalizing cities and their neighborhoods. 
However, despite the support for various urban programs 
throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, there were many critics 
of American urban policy during this time period. These 
critics spanned the political and ideological spectrum. They 
observed that, despite best efforts, cities were still filled 
with pockets of poverty and high unemployment. In fact, some 
claimed that a new "underclass" had developed within America's 
urban areas (Wilson, 1987). Most of all, according to Ames, 
et al (1992): 
Community development programs, many 
contended, were implemented in an uncoordinated 
and sporadic manner. In the face of long-term 
urban development trends, neither the Community 
Development Block Grant program nor Urban Develop-
ment Action Grant funds could alter the growing 
polarization between city and suburb. Nor could 
they reverse the outward migration of people and 
capital to the suburbs. Federal revitalization 
programs were poorly oonceived in Washington, 
badly coordinated between various governmental 
jurisdictions, and inadequately monitored at the 
local level (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1980). Funds 
often were spent on questionable projects or 
maneuvered into programs not initially authorized 
by federal legislation (Tabb and Sawers, 1978). 
(p. 208). 
2. The Rise of Supp1y-Side Po1itics and Economics, and 
the Emergence of Enterprise Zone Po1icy 
During the 1970s, many local and national American 
leaders were challenged by gloomy economic conditions: 
periods of high unemployment and high inflation. Along with 
the continuing problems of urban areas, many leaders felt that 
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something new had to be tried in order to solve declining u.s. 
economic growth, especially declining growth in American 
cities. It was believed by many that previous government 
programs had failed to revive both national as well as local 
economic vitality and that new policies were in order. The 
1980 elections seemed to confirm these sentiments as 
conservative Republicans captured the White House and the u.s. 
Senate. 
The 1970s saw Keynesian and activist government policies 
fall into disfavor. The federal government was seen as the 
cause of U. S. economic problems, not the solution (Friedman, 
1962; Feldstein, 1969 and 1977; and Laffer, 1979). This view 
was also held by those who were critical of federal efforts to 
help cities and the poor (Anderson, 1964; and Murray, 1984). 
Like the U. S., Great Britain was also experiencing 
economic hardship, especially in its older, urban centers. In 
the late 1970s, under the Thatcher regime, an attempt to 
revive urban economic growth was already underway. A British 
planner, Peter Hall, put forth the idea that perhaps the only 
way to revitalize deteriorating urban areas and to reduce 
urban unemployment was to create urban "enterprise zones" 
(Hall, 1977). An urban enterprise zone would be a specific, 
targeted area within a city where businesses would be exempt 
from many taxes and regulations--"freeports" (Hall, 1977) of 
trade in the inner city. In theory, these zones would be 
attractive to new firms because the costs of doing business 
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would be greatly reduced. 1 According to Hall, much of the 
success of Pacific-Rim countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Malaysia was due to the fact that such nations had low 
taxes and little business regulation. The solution to urban 
stagnation and decline was not more government programs, but 
fewer government programs and less government interference in 
both business and local government decision making. However, 
Hall did warn that such policies should only be relied upon as 
a last resort (Hall, 1977). 
Hall was well aware that what was applicable to far 
eastern nations may not be applicable to western nations whose 
people had experienced unionization and some form of welfare 
state. Advanced industrial nations had already gone through 
the extreme laissez faire conditions of the 19th century that 
now existed in 20th century Asian miracle economies. 
However, because many inner city residents lacked the 
skills and training for newly emerging high-tech and service 
jobs, Hall's ideas did not seem too far-fetched to many 
economists and politicians. After all, many of the developing 
economies of the far east had an ample number of low to 
un-skilled workers. Urban areas were desperate to replace 
employers who had moved to suburbia (Hall, 1982). Given the 
severely depressed level of economic activity of the inner 
city, Hall felt it unfeasible for cities to attempt economic 
development that required a lot of high technology, such as 
1 It should be noted that Hall had some initial reservations 
about his ideas. He later declared the implementation of his 
theory to be insufficient for urban regeneration. 
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science based industries and research and development 
facilities. The costs of retraining un-skilled and 
low-skilled inner city residents also seemed prohibitive given 
the fiscal constraints that faced national, state and local 
governments. On-the-job training done by the private sector, 
however, was feasible if businesses were given the right 
incentives to provide it. 
Hall (1982) envisioned the enterprise zone concept as 
one way of possibly bringing inner-city residents into the new 
world of technical jobs. If taxes, tariffs, and government 
regulation were removed from an area, entrepreneurs would 
invest there. The first employers to invest in the EZs would 
need the services of un-skilled workers. One obstacle to 
hiring such workers would be the minimum wage, so therefore, 
these freeports would have to be exempt from minimum wage 
laws. The removal of the minimum wage would also make it much 
cheaper to train these workers. 
Hall's ideas were adopted by many British economic 
development advocates who saw his proposal as an alternative 
to the urban policies of that time period. The British 
experiment with EZs also did not go unnoticed by U. s. 
proponents of supply-side economics. Even before Ronald 
Reagan's election to the presidency, proposals for U. S. urban 
enterprise zones had been introduced in the Congress (Butler, 
1991). The newly elected President made enterprise zones his 
major, if not his only, urban initiative. Traditional urban 
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programs, such as revenue sharing, Community Development Block 
Grants (CDBGs) and Urban Development Action Grants (UDAGs) 
would either be dramatically curtailed or eliminated. Other 
programs that affected urban constituencies--summer jobs for 
youth, welfare and food stamps--were also targeted for 
dramatic spending reductions. Enterprise zones would then 
have to provide employment and new sources of local government 
revenues in order to mitigate the decline of federal programs 
(Tabb, 1984). 
Despite achieving victories in rolling back the role of 
the federal government in urban areas, the Reagan 
Administration was unsuccessful in getting a federal 
enterprise zone program approved by the Congress. Much of the 
resistance was based upon doubts about how effective such a 
program would be and about how much it would cost the federal 
government in lost tax revenues. The federal budget deficit 
had increased dramatically after the 1981 tax cuts and the 
1981-82 recession. More importantly the fairness of the 
program was questioned by Democrats and moderate Republicans 
since the Administration proposed either abolishing the 
minimum wage or creating a sUb-minimum wage in the zones so as 
to make labor cheaper and more attractive to employers. 
Congress and the public were not ready for such proposals 
( T abb , 1 98 4) . 
Despite critics and reservations, Britain's experiment 
with EZs would soon be imported into the U. S. Given the 
severity of the 1981-82 recession (the worse since the Great 
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Depression (Ruffin and Gregory, 1994, p. 104)) and the 
inability of the Reagan administration to enact a national 
enterprise zone policy, many states decided that something had 
to be done to stem the decline of their urban areas. The 
1980s, whether by design or by default, saw the federal 
government become more and more disengaged from urban policy. 
Federal tax cuts, an increase in military expenditures and 
business deregulation became the central pieces of the Reagan 
administration's macroeconomic policies. But as far as local 
and regional policies were concerned there were really none in 
existence (Ames, et ai, 1992; Gaffikin and Warf, 1993). 
Because the Reagan enterprise zone proposals were never 
enacted, many state governments decided to take independent 
initiative on the enterprise zone concept. With the nation 
suffering a severe recession in 1981 and 1982, and with some 
states not yet fully recovering from the recession's 
aftermath, the 1980s saw many states trying to solve their own 
economic and urban problems. Since Washington had decided to 
play a smaller role in local economic development and public 
welfare (Ames, et ai, 1992; Gaffikin and Warf, 1993; and Tabb, 
1984) most states decided to undertake these tasks. By 1988, 
over 37 states and the District of Columbia had implemented 
some form of an enterprise zone program. Many states had 
multiple EZ locations. EZ incentives varied widely across and 
within these states (Green, 1991). 
14 
3. Critics of Enterprise Zone Po1icy 
Despite widespread implementation, the political and 
economic criticisms of the EZ concept, both in the U. K. and 
the U. S., were many. The biggest issue was whether 
development incentives would be effective in arresting and 
reversing urban decay. Proponents of EZs argued that such 
development incentives were necessary to encourage investment 
in areas perceived as poor risks (Hall, 1977, 1982; Butler, 
1981, 1992; U. S. Chamber of Commerce 1981; Kemp 1982, 1989, 
1992; Weiner 1984; Congressional Digest 1985; and Cowden, 
1992). However, even Hall (1982) admitted that deregulation, 
low taxes and low wages would not by themselves solve urban 
unemployment and underemployment. Some type of public 
reinvestment in blighted communities would also be necessary 
to make EZs work (Gunther and Leathers, 1987). 
Additionally, other critics pointed out, EZs would not 
necessarily attract high-tech industries. If Hall had 
fashioned his model after emerging Asian economies, why would 
sweatshops or other exploitative economic arrangements that 
developed in these economies not arise in the inner cities of 
the U. S. and Europe as well (Harrison, 1982)? In other 
words, what guarantees were there that companies locating in 
an EZ would be high-tech? What if EZs only attracted 
low-tech, low-wage, dead-end jobs? 
Also there was the potential problem of EZs creating a 
zero-sum competitive climate among EZ-designated areas as well 
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as EZ versus non-EZ designated areas (Peirce, Hagstrom and 
Steinbach, 1979; Clarke, 1982; Massey, 1982; and Blair, 1995, 
pp. 174-181). That is, EZs could lead to the spatial 
redistribution of existing jobs from one EZ to another or from 
a non-EZ region to an EZ-designated area rather than create 
new jobs and businesses. EZs could place companies outside of 
the designated area at a competitive disadvantage compared to 
firms in the area through lower costs of production (cheaper 
labor, tax breaks for capital investment, etc.). Firms that 
found themselves in direct competition with EZ firms could 
decide to relocate into an EZ that offered them less 
regulation and lower taxes than the jurisdiction in which they 
were currently located. Or a firm in an existing EZ could 
still move to another EZ if the latter promised even better 
tax incentives and deregulation for business firms. 
The possible migration of firms could be from either one 
location in a city to another location that had EZ status in 
the same city, or firms could migrate into the EZ from even 
greater distances. Either way, although there could be the 
potential for the creation of new jobs in an EZ, the potential 
for the redistribution of existing jobs seemed to be stronger 
because of cut-throat competition among regions (Massey, 
1982). As O'Sullivan (1993, pp. 68-69) and Bartik (1991) 
point out, most new jobs created in metropolitan areas are 
filled by newcomers to the region. Therefore, if new job 
creation did occur, there could be no guarantee that the 
people for whom the EZ was to benefit would actually be helped 
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in finding employment. 
Another group of critics seriously questioned whether 
incentives such as tax and regulatory relief would have any 
impact at all on investment or business location decisions, as 
well as job creation and retention efforts (Harrison and 
Kanter, 1978; Peirce, Hagstrom and Steinbach, 1979; Vaughn, 
1979; Jacobs and Wasylenko, 1981; Schmenner 1982; Hawkins, 
1984; Rubin and Zorn, 1985). These critics argued that the 
limited savings provided by incentives were too small in 
proportion to the overall costs of a firm in order for them to 
affect employment and investment decisions. According to this 
line of thought, those jobs that would be created by EZs would 
probably be low-paying and provide little job security 
(Clarke, 1982; and Goldsmith, 1982). 
Another school of thought on EZs focused upon the direct 
and indirect costs associated with them. It is argued that 
their incentives in the form of foregone tax revenues and 
possibly more public capital spending increase the tax burdens 
for nonzone firms and residents by shifting these higher tax 
burdens onto the non-EZ firms and residents (Armstrong, 1981; 
Humberger, 1981; Mounts, 1981; Clarke, 1982; and Hawkins, 
1984). Also, according to critics, the zones might only tend 
to transfer capital investment from one location to another, 
rather than creating new investment (Peirce, Hagstrom and 
Steinbach, 1979; Clarke, 1982; Massey, 1982; and Blair, 1995, 
pp. 174-181). Finally, some critics argued that EZs 
indirectly lower government aid in distressed communities, and 
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that more resources, not less, should be focused on programs 
such as education and job training for urban residents 
(Birdsong, 1989; Estes and Hamond, 1992; and Levitan and 
Miller, 1992). 
Additionally, political and economic arguments for and 
against EZs were developed by critics centering around the 
appropriate roles of the federal, state and local governments. 
Public choice advocates generally argued that local 
jurisdictions, not the federal government, should be the 
driving force behind local economic development and quality of 
life issues (Buchanan, 1960 and 1965; Tiebout, 1956; Butler 
1991; and Peterson, 1981). Federal programs that focused on 
redistribution policies (e.g., UDAGS, CDBGS, and revenue 
sharing) were seen as encouraging cities and other 
underdeveloped regions not to change. That is, similar to 
conservative arguments made against AFDC, food stamps and 
other forms of welfare to individuals and families, these 
programs did nothing to encourage localities to become self-
sufficient. If anything, these programs were seen as 
encouraging cities not to promote economic development and 
revitalization. 
The alternative was to either cut back or end these 
programs, and by doing so, promote competition among 
localities and regions. A competitive environment among local 
jurisdictions, just as with a perfectly competitive 
environment among business firms, would make cities stronger 
and more self-reliant. Otherwise, cities that did not strive 
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to better themselves and "pull themselves up by the 
bootstraps" would wither away. According to this logic, by 
competing against each other, state and local governments 
would be forced to offer the appropriate levels of taxation 
and services necessary to promote economic growth and a high 
quality of life for their residents. Local governments that 
failed to satisfy local constituents--residents and businesses 
alike--might suffer the consequences of constituents "voting 
with their feet" and moving to another jurisdiction within the 
same region. No longer would the federal government subsidize 
city and local government spending. Local governments would 
be forced to offer better services at lower costs (due to 
having to lower their taxes) if they wanted to attract capital 
and to bring back middle class residents. Cities would have 
to become leaner yet stronger when it carne to fiscal and 
service delivery matters. Lastly, it was believed that local 
officials could better handle economic redevelopment because 
they were in more direct contact with their constituencies 
than the federal government. It is easy then to see how EZs 
could become the tools of local governments trying to enhance 
their competitive advantage vis a vis other local governments. 
In an age of federal fiscal austerity, the public choice view 
became an attractive philosophy. 
Nevertheless, there are still many who believe that 
exclusively putting economic development into the hands of 
local governments is still a bad idea and that the national 
government can still best pursue policies that are in the 
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interests of distressed urban and rural areas (Ladd and ' 
Doolittle, 1982; and Gaffikin and Warf, 1993). 
Counter to public choice ideas, many advocates took the 
view that economic development and economic growth for 
depressed regions (whether urban or rural) is and always 
should be a task for the federal government. According to the 
advocates of an activist federal government role, the 
historical record of local governments trying to encourage 
economic development and trying to help depressed and 
impoverished areas was always substandard at best (Musgrave, 
1959, pp. 181-182; Oates, 1977; and Hughes and Cain, Ch. 25, 
1994). Even some public choice advocates admitted that it was 
not in the best interests of state and local governments to 
help their poor (Peterson, 1981). It was for this reason (and 
others) that President Roosevelt's New Deal policies put 
regional economic development and poverty relief into the 
hands of the federal government (Brock, 1988; Spulber, 1989; 
and Stein, 1996). In an advanced industrial society, state 
and local governments did not have the power, information, 
capacity and in many cases the inclination to plan and produce 
a national economic recovery much less the capability to 
improve their most impoverished areas (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 
1977; Galbraith, 1976; Schlesinger, Jr., 1958, Ch. 16; 
Stiglitz, 1988; Ladd and Doolittle, 1982; Gaffikin and Warf, 
1993) . 
At the heart of federal activist policies was the 
influence of Keynesian economics. John Maynard Keynes (1936) 
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believed that economic growth and prosperity could best be 
achieved by national economic policies. It was felt by Keynes 
and other "Keynesians" (Musgrave, 1959; Heller, 1966; Hicks, 
1967; Solow, 1970; Samuelson, 1975; and Okun, 1981) that the 
national government could stabilize the extreme "ups and 
downs" of the national business cycle as well as provide 
assistance to those areas of the nation that were structurally 
depressed (e.g., the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Works 
Program Administration, etc.) either through direct federal 
programs or federal grants. Local governmen'ts would have 
input on local economic development, but the federal 
government would provide leadership. 
Those who held the belief that the federal government 
should be the leader in assisting underdeveloped cities and 
regions argued that EZ programs would lead to zero-sum 
competition among localities (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; 
and Harrison, 1982). Jurisdictions that were already poor to 
begin with could not compete against wealthier ones no matter 
how many incentives the poorer areas offered to potential new 
residents and businesses. Besides, these jurisdictions had 
very little money to offer substantive incentives anyway. 
Wealthier localities would continue to become wealthier while 
poorer areas would continue to become poorer. It was also 
argued that many families and businesses made location 
decisions based on more than just tax considerations. The EZ 
experiment was seen as a band-aid approach for cities that 
needed intensive care because of their critical condition 
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(Massey, 1982). 
On a different front, some argued that it has never 
been, and never should be, the job of local government to be 
in the arena of economic development. Instead, according to 
some legal scholars (Rubin, 1993 and 1994), from a legal and 
constitutional point of view, it has been the duty of states 
and municipalities to offer basic government services (police 
protection, sanitation, schooling, etc.) and not to embark on 
what some policy critics label "smokestack-chasing" and 
industry recruitment activities. Such activities do not meet 
the legal criteria of either a public purpose or public 
benefit. That is to say, tax dollars paid at the local level 
have always been, from a traditional legal point of view, 
solely for the purpose of carrying out basic and essential 
public services--no more, no less. 
4. The Performance of Enterprise Zones 
In light of various criticisms of EZ policy, numerous 
evaluations of their performance have been initiated. 
Generally, the literature on U. S. EZs seems to show wide 
variation as to whether EZs are successful (Rubin and Wilder, 
1996). The growth in employment and capital investment due to 
EZs shows a record of uneven performance. Among the most 
important issues in the evaluation literature is whether 
increases in the number of jobs created or retained as well as 
the capital formation that takes place in an EZ can be 
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ascribed to the incentives offered to companies located 
within them or to companies considering the move into an EZ. 
Unfortunately, the literature does not have as much to say 
about the evaluation of EZs when it comes to private business 
and capital formation as it does with regard to employment 
(Rubin and Wilder, 1996). Incentives that encourage capital 
formation are not as carefully scrutinized as those that are 
supposed to promote job creation. Perhaps this is because it 
is assumed by EZ proponents that capital formation leads to 
job creation. Therefore, evaluating the ability of EZs to 
create jobs becomes an indirect way of evaluating capital 
formation (Rubin and Wilder, 1996). That is, if an EZ program 
was successful in creating or retaining jobs, then it must 
have been successful in creating or retaining capital in a 
targeted area. 
With regard to job creation, the provisions of the 
Maryland statewide enterprise program, examined over the 1983 
to 1984 period, were not seen as helpful to businesses hiring 
new employees. Because of the way the Maryland state 
enterprise zone was written, there was a two year time delay 
between the reporting of a business income tax credit for 
hiring a new employee and the business receiving the tax 
credit (Funkhouser and Lorenz, 1987, p. 68). This made the 
tax credit pretty much ineffective when it came to job 
creation. Moreover, the authors found that few workers 
remained on the job permanently and that the cost per job 
created was approximately $57,000 (Funkhouser and Lorenz, 
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1987, p. 75). 
In the same way, Dabney (1989, p. 135) found that 
financial incentives in the Texas EZ program had very little 
impact on job creation because the incentives did not address 
the most important concerns of firms: transportation, 
insurance, and access to raw materials. Any decrease in costs 
from the EZs was offset by an increase in the costs of these 
factors. Other research measures changes in employment through 
the number of unemployment claims or the unemployment rate. 
Some research indicates that enterprise zones actually lower 
unemployment in EZ designated areas. Papke (1994) found that 
the business income tax credit incentive for hiring new 
employees decreased the number of unemployment claims 19%, or 
1500 claims, in Indiana over the 1981 to 1989 period. Also, 
Sridhar (1996) found that Illinois' EZ program helped to 
reduce unemployment in moderate and high unemployment areas in 
most EZ designated areas. 
However, another article by Papke (1993) that compared 
enterprise zones to similar non-enterprise zone control areas 
found virtually no difference in changes in the unemployment 
rates among the areas. Data were presented on the differences 
between zones (15) and non-zones (24) through an analysis of 
1980 and 1990 Census block group data. Though there was an 
improvement in zones compared to non-zones with regard to 
unemployment, the differences were very small. 
Rubin and Wilder (1989) utilized the method of 
shift-share analysis in order to assess the effectiveness of 
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Evansville's (Indiana) EZ program in creating new jobs. Their 
study found that of the 1,430 jobs created in Evansville over 
the 1983-1986 period, only 327 would not have been created 
without the enterprise zone. However, the authors note that 
the remaining 1,193 jobs would have probably been created 
somewhere in the Evansville metro area anyway, but not in the 
enterprise zone. Shift-share analysis is a tool which has 
limitations, and these limits, as well as shift-share's 
pluses, will be discussed later in the dissertation because it 
is used in analyzing Louisville and Jefferson County's EZ. 
An econometric study of EZs in Indiana (Seyfried 1990) 
similarly found that the incentive packages of EZs had very 
little impact on employment. Seyfried found that the 
elasticity of employment with respect to the tax credits of 
EZs is highly inelastic, and hence have little impact on job 
creation. 
Two studies provide an analysis of the impact of EZs on 
employment growth across the U. S. (O'Huallachain and 
Satterthwaite, 1992; Glover 1993). Examining 100 EZs across 
the country, Glover (1993, p. 98) found that EZs created or 
retained an average of 559 jobs per zone. In an examination 
of job growth in some 264 MSAs over the 1977 to 1984 period, 
O'Huallachain and Satterthwaite found that the presence of EZs 
had very, very little impact on job growth. Instead, results 
indicated that localization economies, urbanization, and local 
labor market conditions (how skilled is the local labor force) 
are the most important determinants of job growth. 
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One study that sought to isolate the impact of EZs by 
asking businesses the primary or exclusive reason for their 
new location or expansion decisions found mediocre results 
(Rubin 1990). In an examination of New Jersey EZs over the 
1987 to 1988 period, Rubin found that 3,948 jobs were created 
because of the characteristics of the EZs. This was at a 
total cost of $51.6 million, or $13,070 per job. The 
cost-effectiveness of this was that $0.70 "was generated in 
New Jersey state and local taxes for every $1.00" in EZ 
incentives received. However, the study was done for an 
entire state, and in addition to business income tax credits, 
EZ incentives included a rebate on unemployment insurance 
taxes. 
Sridhar's (1996) study of Illinois EZs found that 
program costs were greatly outweighed by program benefits. 
Using a concept of a "reservation wage" for unemployed 
workers, she found that even in cases where EZs had caused 
firms to relocate from one locality to another (rather than 
cause new firms to open in the EZ), tax incentive costs were 
small in comparison to the net benefits yielded by EZ economic 
development and job creation. However, Sridhar's strict set 
of assumptions could be said to bias her conclusions. One of 
her assumptions is "[I]t is assumed that employment generated 
in these zones is attributable to zone incentives. There is 
also an assumption that jobs created in such zones will be 
filled by the local unemployed, primarily to justify local 
expenditure" (Sridhar, 1996, p. 70). Sridhar, therefore, 
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automatically assumes that all zone incentives would have a 
direct and positive impact upon employment and investment. 
An empirical study of Indiana's EZs showed that the 
largest increase in jobs occurred in services, retailing, 
wholesaling, finance, insurance and real estate and 
transportation (Papke, 1993). So far this is the only U. S. 
study of the effects that EZ incentives have on types of 
employment. Papke noted that during the course of his 
research, manufacturing employment declined considerably while 
employment in these other sectors rose (as was the case 
throughout most of the U. S. during the 1980s). Despite the 
fact that many proponents of EZs saw the programs as leading 
to the revitalization of manufacturing within inner cities, 
Indiana's EZ programs do not seem to have stemmed the decline 
of manufacturing in the state. 
Rubin and Wilder (1989) found that the largest increases 
in employment in the Evansville, Indiana EZ were in 
transportation, wholesaling, retailing and services. There 
was a decline or stagnation in each of eight categories of 
manufacturing. One common element among the sectors with the 
greatest growth was the "presence of generally high levels of 
finished product inventories" (Rubin and Wilder, 1989, p. 
422). Since the biggest incentive in the Evansville EZ 
program was an inventory tax credit, this is not surprising. 
In fact, much of the job growth in the zone was attributed to 
the opening of a new warehouse and distribution center. 
More recently, Dowall (1996) found that most of 
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California's 13 Enterprise Zone programs did not even come 
close to producing the jobs that state development officials 
had hoped for. Instead, most of the 13 EZs suffered job 
losses between 1986 and 1990 even when controlling for 
national and industry-specific economic trends. Dowall's 
method of using County Business Patterns data at the zip code 
level was useful in his analysis and will be used in this 
dissertation to assess the Louisville EZ. Further elaboration 
on this method will be provided in a later chapter. 
What very little research there has been on EZs with 
regard to capital formation, creation and/or retention seems 
to be focused on whether EZs cause firms to relocate from one 
area to another because of EZ incentives. As mentioned 
earlier, opponents of the EZ concept argue that EZs will 
simply relocate businesses, either from within or outside a 
local region with no new business expansion, in a zero-sum 
manner. An EZ located in one part of a city, it is argued, 
will simply attract capital and jobs away from other parts of 
the city. There does seem to be some empirical evidence on 
the impact of EZs in Great Britain that support this argument 
(Bromley and Rees, 1988; Bromley and Morgan, 1985; Talbott, 
1988). According to this evidence, about half of the jobs 
created were the result of relocation. However, relocation 
seemed to occur more because of abundant and cheap commercial 
real estate in the zone area than because of financial 
incentives. Bartik (1991) also shows that firms in the U. s. 
are less sensitive to the costs of intra-metropolitan 
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movements than to the costs of inter-metropolitan movements, 
thereby giving some credence to the relocation argument. 
Many critics (Jacobs and Wasylenko, 1981; Clarke, 1982; 
Mier, 1982; Walton, 1982; Glickman, 1984; and Hawkins, 1984) 
have argued that EZs would favor capital formation over job 
creation, and that the biggest winners with regard to EZ 
incentives would be large, national and/or multinational firms 
with few loyalties to local communities. Yet Erickson and 
Friedman (1991) found that in 35 states EZs helped to create 
many new jobs by encouraging the start-up and growth of many 
small, newly formed, businesses. Very few firms in their 
study were large, capital-intensive establishments that had 
located from outside of the zone because of zone incentives. 
Jones (1985 and 1987) compared the number of property 
transfers and building permits issued within the Bridgeport, 
Connecticut and Decatur, Illinois EZs to those in similar but 
non-EZ areas and found either marginal differences in transfer 
and building activities between the EZ and non-EZ areas or 
found that differences could easily be explained due to 
factors other than EZ incentives. 
In 1986, the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) conducted interviews with over 200 state and 
local officials in an effort to gauge EZ effects on 
communities in nine states. Survey results revealed that 263 
EZ firms were deemed to be responsible for the creation or 
retention of 7,348 jobs and over $147 million in new 
investment by new and expanding firms. EZ incentives had some 
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influence on the expansion decisions of existing firms, but 
played less of a role in the location decisions of new firms. 
However, HUD declared that it had had difficulty in getting 
good data on EZ impact effects and concluded that the study's 
outcomes for jobs and investment could not be attributed 
solely to EZ incentives. Critics of the HUD study also 
maintain that simply relying upon interviews with state and 
local officials who have a vested interest in EZ successes 
potentially biased and diminished the results of the HUD 
report. Incidentally, one of the zones examined was 
Louisville's EZ. 
A 1985 study done by the state of Connecticut (done 
independently of Jones (1985)) claimed that in addition to 
4,300 new jobs created and 4,200 jobs retained due to the 
state's 6 EZ areas, over $113 million in new investment was 
brought into the EZs through mostly existing firms. 
Nelson and Whelan (1988) found through surveying firms 
that Louisiana's EZs were supposed to have created $27.4 
million in investment and 1,036 new jobs. In contrast to 
previous studies, the majority of respondents said that 
incentives were more important in location decisions than in 
expansion or new capital investment decisions. However, only 
19 firms participated in the survey. Erickson, Friedman and 
McCluskey (1989) used data from the 1986 HUD study and found 
that in 357 zones across 17 states, EZs created an average of 
333 new jobs and $23.4 million in new investment per zone. 
This was done mostly by new or existing firms. Also, Rubin 
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and Armstrong (1989) did a survey of EZ firms in 10 New Jersey 
zones that claimed that 9,193 jobs had been created in the 
zones between 1985 to 1988 and that $803 million of new 
investment had taken place during the same time period. The 
majority of the 478 New Jersey firms surveyed said that 
incentives had influenced location or expansion decisions 
(approximately 70%) . 
Litster (1990) did a survey of California businesses in 
EZs from 1986 to 1988. Of the 137 firms surveyed, Litster 
estimated that 2,518 new jobs were created and that 54% of the 
new jobs created were generated by new, start-up businesses. 
However, 55% of business owners did not regard incentives as 
important in making location decisions. Two years later, a 
report released by the Indiana Department of Commerce showed 
that from 1989 to 1990, 12 Indiana EZs created 2,024 new jobs 
and generated $199 million in investment and $272 million in 
new state and local tax revenues for only $20.6 million in 
program costs (Rubin, Brooks, and Buxbaum, 1992). 
Overall, studies of EZ incentives with regard to job 
creation or retention and capital formation and movement 
appear incomplete and often contradictory. As Rubin and 
Wilder (1996) write in regard to the effectiveness of most 
EZs: 
... [P] rogram experience has made two realities 
clear: enterprise zones have not lived up to 
the broad panacea-like imagery conjured up by 
early federal proposals and rhetoric.; neither, 
however, have they brought about the massive 
dislocations and dominance of large industries 
predicted by enterprise zone critics. The 
answer to the enterprise zone riddle is far 
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more complex than either its promoters or 
detractors suggest. (pp. 473-474). 
The authors believe that the conflicting evaluations of 
EZ efficacy is due to the poor planning and oversight that 
most states have done in creating and implementing EZs. That 
is, because state and local governments often failed a priori 
to specify EZ goals and objectives as well as to put together 
data bases to monitor the progress of EZs, it is not 
surprising to find studies that when taken as a whole are 
contradictory and inconclusive. 
Kentucky's experience with EZs is similar to those of 
other states. The history of the Louisville zone is examined 
in the following chapter. Political issues and controversies 
affected the design and implementation of the Louisville EZ 




A Narrative History of Louisvi11e's Enterprise Zone 
1. Louisvi11e's Urban Prob1ems 
Prior to the national economic problems of the 1970s and 
1980s, the Louisville area's economy was very robust. Like 
many other metro areas in its region of the country, 
Louisville and its home county, Jefferson, had a high 
concentration of jobs in manufacturing. In fact, Louisville 
probably had a higher than the national average percentage of 
jobs concentrated in manufacturing--25 to 33% locally compared 
to the nation's 22% (Massey, 1985). Most of these jobs were 
high paying and required very few skills. A few 
manufacturers were very large employers--General Electric's 
Appliance Park, Ford Motor Company's two vehicle assembly 
plants as well as International Harvester. In fact, during 
the early 1970s, General Electric at one time had over 22,000 
employees (Ward, 1996). It now only employs approximately 
7,000 workers. 
But there were also deep underlying problems that were 
developing during these times. The city and Jefferson County 
had many residents who were labor union members. Because of 
frequent "wildcat strikes" (those not authorized by national 
union headquarters) and because of continuous labor-management 
conflicts, Louisville and Jefferson County became labeled 
"Striketown USA," a nickname that stuck for quite some time 
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(Koebel and Remington, 1988). Because unions were so 
prevalent in the area, many existing businesses either did not 
expand or left town. Many potential new businesses, 
especially manufacturers like Toyota, decided against locating 
in Louisville because of its reputation as a strike-prone city 
(Shafer, 1985). 
There were also tensions between the city and the 
county. These tensions were not just between the leaders of 
each government, but among the people of each jurisdiction. 
During the late 1950s and 1960s, western Louisville 
experienced a massive amount of "white flight" with many 
residents moving out of the city and into various parts of the 
county. According to Cummings and Price (1990, p. 6), the 
percentage of Louisville residents who were African American 
remained fairly static from 1870 to 1950. Then from 1950 to 
1980, the percentage of blacks living in the city grew from 
15.6% to 28.2% as the population of the city declined from 
390,639 in 1960 to 298,451 in 1980. Also from 1950 to 1960, 
the percentage of whites living in the City of Louisville fell 
from 84.3% to 71.1% whereas Jefferson County outside of 
Louisville's boundaries saw its population increase from 
220,308 in 1960 to 386,553 in 1980 (Cummings and Price, 1990, 
p. 9). During this time, one reason why the city's minority 
population went up percentage wise as well as numerically was 
because of the migration of Southern blacks into the community 
who had hopes of finding better job opportunities. Such was 
the case in many "border" states and Midwestern states during 
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this period (Hughes and Cain, 1994, Ch. 29). Later in 1975, 
racial hostilities exploded with the advent of forced busing 
throughout Jefferson County. 
Around the same time that racial realignments were 
occurring within the city and county, many businesses left the 
city in favor of other locations in the region. New suburbs 
and small incorporated cities also began to proliferate in the 
county. Large, new suburban shopping centers, industrial 
parks and office complexes developed in Jefferson county. 
These developments took income and sources of capital away 
from many downtown Louisville businesses. 
With many middle and upper income whites leaving the 
city and taking their business elsewhere, the city's fiscal 
health began to suffer. Meanwhile, Louisville's minority 
population could not find enough jobs, partially because of 
discrimination and because many businesses were leaving the 
city just at the time that the minority population was 
increasing. Since many blacks who had migrated to Louisville 
were poor to begin with, their situation did not improve. All 
these events promoted conflict and competition between city 
and county governments, an issue that continues at the present 
time (Savitch and Vogel, 1996). 
Many in the city began to blame the county for the 
city's problems (Schulman, 1987). City leaders saw the county 
as draining its people and businesses away while at the same 
time using its central business district as a major employer 
and provider of governmental administrative services. In the 
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1960s and 1970s, the City of Louisville had some success in 
annexing adjoining parts of the county. However, most attempts 
at annexation were met with hostility and defeat. Finally in 
the early 1980s, city and county leaders decided that a merger 
between city and county government should be attempted. 
However, two referendums were narrowly defeated. For the 
city, the future did not look bright. 
When "deindustrialization" hit the Louisville area, the 
results were very harsh (Norman and Hershberg, 1984). 
According to the Kentucky Department for Manpower Services, 
plant closings and permanent layoffs contributed to a loss of 
35,000 jobs in the metro area from 1974 to 1983 (Norman and 
Hershberg, 1984). In 1974, the Louisville area had around 
120,000 manufacturing jobs. By 1983, it was down to around 
85,000, a level which has since fallen over the last 12 years. 
For every heavy manufacturing job lost, probably 2 to 4 other 
jobs were lost (Norman and Hershberg, 1984). This meant that 
the total number of jobs eliminated could have ranged from 
105,000 to 175,000 throughout the metro area (which would 
include surrounding Kentucky counties and counties in Southern 
Indiana) . 
Unemployment levels in the area were above those of the 
national average throughout most of the 1980s, a period that 
saw an outward migration of over 50,000 people from Jefferson 
County (1980 and 1990 Census of Population and County-City 
Data Book, 1983 and 1988 editions). Overall employment for 
Jefferson County reached a peak in 1979 (304,068 jobs). After 
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taking a tumble, that employment peak was not surpassed until 
eight years later--in 1987 total employment reached 304,082 
(County Business Patterns for Kentucky, 1970 to 1990 
editions) . 
Some factory jobs such as those at the Brown and 
Williamson cigarette plant were moved out of town because of 
the city's bad labor climate even though the company's 
headquarters remained behind (Norman and Hershberg, 1984). 
Millions of dollars in local tax revenues were lost thereby 
straining the ability of the city to fund many services. 
In summary, Louisville and Jefferson County suffered 
from several maladies. A fragmented government structure made 
economic development decisions cumbersome and difficult. The 
local area was divided along class, geographical, and racial 
lines. Because of a high reliance upon manufacturing 
employment, the Louisville economy was hit hard by recessions 
and plant relocations. Outward migration was becoming a 
problem. The challenge for local leaders was coming up with 
local economic development tools to fix the problem. 
2. Louisvi11e's EZ: The Po1itics of EZ Deve10pment 
Events in Kentucky mirrored national economic trends. In 
1979, John Y. Brown, Jr. was elected Kentucky's Governor on a 
platform of making the state more hospitable to business. 
Since his administration coincided with the trough of the 
recession, there was a feeling of urgency in the state capitol 
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to do something about the state's suffering economy. Governor 
Brown appointed a task force to look into enterprise zone 
ideas. Other states had already started their own zones as an 
economic development tool for urban areas, although some of 
the targeted areas were not actually urban (Bartik, 1991). 
In 1982, the Kentucky General Assembly passed House Bill 
505 (which later became KRS 154.45), a law allowing for the 
creation of enterprise zones in Louisville as well as other 
cities throughout the state. Zones were to be created 
geographically by using contiguous census tracts. Under the 
law, the average unemployment rate in a proposed zone had to 
be at least 1.5 times greater than the national average for an 
18-month ·period. Also, seventy percent of the people in the 
zone were to have incomes below 80 percent of the city's 
median income, or the area must have lost 10 percent of its 
population between 1970 and 1980 (Stewart, 1983). 
House Bill 505 allowed tax breaks for businesses in a 
zone that met specific criteria. To be certified as a "new to 
the zone" EZ business and in order to qualify for tax breaks, 
a new EZ firm had to draw at least 25% of its work force from: 
1) residents in the zone, 
2) individuals unemployed for 90 days or more, 
3) individuals receiving public assistance for 
90 days or more, or 
4) a combination of the above. 
Firms already in the zone and conducting business in the 
EZ prior to its designation could be certified by making 
capital investments of at least 20% on net fixed assets (land, 
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buildings, machinery, equipment or lease hold improvements), 
or by increasing its total number of employees by at least 20% 
with 25% of those employees coming from the targeted 
workforce-people falling into one or all of the categories 
listed above. Firms already in the zone were to complete any 
"new activity" within 18 months after the date of filing an 
application for certification. The law also stated that 
subsidiaries or franchises of a new or existing business may 
be certified if their new site was within the zone and they 
maintained separate bookkeeping for business activity 
conducted within the zone. 
In return, certified businesses were to be exempt from 
paying state taxes on profits from the sale of property in the 
zone, and exempted from all state taxes on interest payments 
on loans to qualified businesses in a zone, including mortgage 
loans. This latter provision was designed to encourage 
lending and capital formation. Also certified businesses 
would not have to pay motor-vehicle usage taxes, and they 
would not have to pay sales or use taxes on building materials 
if they remodeled. Sales and use taxes were also exempt on 
new and used equipment bought by businesses in a zone, and the 
businesses could carry forward a "net operating loss" against 
its current income for as long as the zone existed. In 
Louisville, many city fees and permits would be discounted 
while some local regulations were streamlined. Louisville's 
zone was scheduled to start in June 1983 and would terminate 
in July 2003 (House Bill 505 and Stewart, 1983). 
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Mayor Harvey Sloane and the Louisville Board of Aldermen 
ultimately decided that the EZ would initially cover only 3.75 
square miles west and south of Louisville's central business 
district. The EZ would consist of nine census tracts based on 
1980 census tract boundaries and would comprise western 
Louisville's Station Park industrial complex, over 100 
industrial employers, and 12,396 residents in about eight 
neighborhoods where about half of the available housing was 
public housing. The area was bounded by the Ohio River to the 
north and by portions of 15th and 21st streets as well as 18th 
Street/Dixie Highway on the west. The southern boundary was 
composed of the Algonquin Parkway area (up to Shively), 
Colorado Avenue and over to a portion of L & N railroad tracks 
leading down to Dakota Avenue in south central Louisville. 
Its eastern boundaries varied but included Crittenden Drive, 
Interstate 65, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Streets and Roy Wilkins 
Boulevard (Figure 1, next page, shows approximately the 
geographic area initially included in the Louisville EZ using 
1990 census tract boundaries).2 This area lost more than 
18.8% of its population between 1970 and 1980, and its 
unemployment rate between June 1981 and December 1982 was 
estimated at 24.5% (Stewart, 1983). 
2 Between 1980 and 1990 census tract boundaries changed with 
some of the 1980 tracts being combined with others because 
many parts of Louisville and Jefferson County lost population 
between 1980 and 1990. 
40 
Original Enterprise Zone (1983) 





Source: Kentucky State Data Center 
41 
According to Bendick and Rasmussen (1986), in an early 
appraisal of the original EZ, the Louisville EZ had spent or 
was committed to spending more than $57 million in physical 
rehabilitation, land clearance and upgrading, and 
infrastructure development in the zone. The city was also to 
create a $30 million investment pool of long-term financing in 
order to help businesses located within the zone (Bendick and 
Rasmussen, 1986, pp. 115-116). 
Clearly, under the definitions of the law, and according 
to the original intentions of enterprise zone advocates, 
this part of the City of Louisville would seem to have been a 
good candidate for enterprise zone designation. It was clearly 
an economically disadvantaged area in need of help. But 
concentration on this area would only last until 1985. 
Ironically, the praise that Bendick and Rasmussen gave to 
Louisville's EZ was based on the compactness of its size and 
its focus on a blighted area (Bendick and Rasmussen, 1986). 
The initial focus, however, shifted radically as the 
geographic area encompassed by the zone changed twice over the 
next few years. 
In February 1984, Louisville officials received 
permission from the Kentucky Enterprise Zone Authority to 
expand the zone (Davidson, 1992). The new EZ would take in 
the previous 9 census tracts but also add enough new tracts so 
that roughly 10 percent of the entire city's land would be in 
the new EZ (Shafer, 1984). The size of the EZ went from 3.75 
square miles to 6.7 square miles as more of western Louisville 
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and Standiford Field (now Louisville International Airport) 
were included. The only businesses that would absolutely not 
be allowed to obtain EZ certification would be junkyards, 
hazardous waste operations such as refineries, and 
adult-entertainment establishments. The Kentucky General 
Assembly approved the expansion, and preliminary plans for the 
new zone were released in October 1984. The full EZ expansion 
would be finalized in early 1985. Figure 2 on the next page 
shows a fairly accurate map of the expanded and modified EZ.3 
After County Judge-Executive Mitch McConnel became a U. 
S. Senator in January 1985, Governor Martha Layne Collins 
appointed County Clerk Bremer Ehrler to take McConnel's place 
until the Fall 1985 election. Ehrler was expected to be a 
caretaker of the EZ until the next county-judge assumed 
office. He was not the caretaker everyone assumed, and 
apparently had an EZ agenda of his own. 
To the dismay of city leadership and at the urging of 
state legislators whose districts did not participate in the 
initial Louisville EZ, Ehrler proposed creating a separate 
enterprise zone in southern and southwestern Jefferson County 
(Shafer, 1985). Along with several local banks, 
Ehrler also put together a $5.5 million package to buy and 
develop land in eastern Jefferson County that would later 
3 Figures 1 to 3 come very close to replicating EZ boundaries. 
There may be some error in these maps due to the fact that EZ 
boundaries were often drawn at a level below census tract 
boundaries, such as block groups and actual blocks. Because of 
the limitations of the mapping system utilized, 1990 census 
tract boundaries had to be used without further detail being 
possible. 
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become Anchorage Industrial Park (Shafer, 1985). Ehrler' 
wanted enterprise zone designation for this area as well. 
Both moves were considered a threat to the growth and survival 
of Louisville's EZ, and much political infighting occurred 
over attempts to create a County EZ. If Jefferson County 
created its own separate EZ, then having two EZs in the same 
county would violate state law. The City of Louisville would 
lose its EZ and Jefferson County would not 
be able to establish one on its own. 4 
Around the same time ~n 1985, the City of Shively, after 
suffering several years of fiscal hardship, tried to annex 
portions of adjacent unincorporated areas of southwestern 
Jefferson County. The annexation attempt failed, but Shively 
got both the city's and the county's attention. In an attempt 
to pacify Shively officials, a portion of the small suburban 
city would be allowed to join Louisville's EZ. Shively would 
be helped by both the city and the county so as to prevent any 
further annexation attempts (Shafer, 1985). 
As an overall compromise, local officials decided to ask 
the 1986 General Assembly to expand Louisville's EZ into two 
of the three areas that Ehrler wanted to turn into a separate 
enterprise zone. A large share of southern and southwestern 
Jefferson County, including a portion of the City of Shively, 
would join Louisville's EZ (Shafer, 1986). These new areas 
4 Recall that census tracts within an EZ must be contiguous 
and meet certain criteria to be economically distressed and 
blighted. The areas that Ehrler wanted to form into a county 
EZ would not be contiguous with city tracts nor would they be 
considered economically distressed or blighted (Shafer, 1985). 
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would include an area south of Standiford Field stretching 
down to the Gene Snyder Freeway, bordered by Old 
Shepherdsville Road on the east and an area surrounding 1-65 
on the west. This area included Fern Valley Road and its 
chief resident the Louisville Ford Assembly Plant, one of the 
area's largest employers. Also, to be included were the 
Rubbertown industrial area in Lake Dreamland and the Riverport 
Industrial Park located in Pleasure Ridge Park. As a small 
token of appreciation to the city, some of the eastern side of 
Louisville's downtown as well as the Phoenix Hill and 
Butchertown neighborhoods were included in the EZ (see Figure 
3, next page, and Figure 4, following page, which shows the 
full-size EZ's relative size to the rest of the county). 
Some local political figures argued that Ehrler and 
Shively officials blackmailed the city into giving them what 
they wanted in the first place--another tool for economic 
development. While this interpretation may be incorrect, it 
is only rational that Shively and county officials would want 
to promote the interests of their constituents by helping 
their jurisdictions to create a business friendly 
environment. 
Nevertheless, the city would get something substantial 
in return. In 1986, Mayor Jerry Abrahamson and the new 
County-Judge Executive, former Mayor Harvey Sloane, agreed to 
a City-County Compact that included revenue sharing 
between the city and the county as well as greater cooperation 
in running local government services and promoting local 
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economic development. In return for sharing in its rapidly 
growing occupational tax revenues, the county would now be 
able to participate in the Louisville EZ. The Compact, along 
with the EZ expansion, were approved by the 1986 General 
Assembly with both scheduled to go into effect July, 1986 
(Shafer, 1986). 
If compromises and new government relationships were 
necessary to start bringing together a divided community, then 
the expansion of the Louisville EZ could be justified upon 
social and political grounds. The city was no longer as 
desperate as it once was for revenues. Even though 33% of 
occupational tax revenues come from city residents, the city 
was now going to receive 55% of these revenues. In return, 
the county would get something to help it with economic 
development. However, in the process of expanding the zone, 
local leaders abandoned general EZ theory and principles: 
keeping the zone focused on economica11y distressed and 
pbysica11y b1igbted areas. The new zone was so large, 
according to critics of the compromise, that the chronically 
depressed areas that the enterprise zone was supposed to help 
would probably get lost in the overall growth of the county's 
economy. 
The new EZ would consist of 45.7 square miles and over 60 
census tracts mostly sprawling over portions of western, 
southwestern and southern Jefferson County. Many of the new 
areas were not economically disadvantaged as defined in House 
Bill 505. However, if one took all the new census tracts 
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added to the zone and lumped them together with all of the old 
census tracts, then the average of all the census tracts met 
the standards put forth in House Bill 505 (Davidson, 1992). 
In order to observe the law's mandate that all the 
census tracts had to be contiguous and adjoining, the 
University of Louisville's main campus was included in the 
zone, even though it is a non-profit institution and has no 
permanent year-round residents consistent with the enabling 
legislation (Davidson, 1992). U of L had to serve as a 
connection between the eastern and western sides of the EZ. 
Just as with the University, Louisville's airport could 
not legitimately be considered an economically distressed 
area. Yet because the airport was at one time surrounded by 
low income neighborhoods, United Parcel Service and other 
firms doing business near or at the airport, were able to 
obtain enterprise zone certification (Davidson, 1992). Most 
importantly, in the rush to provide an economic development 
program for Louisville and Jefferson County, no real 
monitoring and evaluation system was set up for Louisville's 
EZ program. There was no real tracking of the program's costs 
and benefits. By 1990, the failure to evaluate the EZ program 
had become a serious political issue in the local press. 
3. The Zone Comes under Scrutiny 
In 1990, the Louisville and Jefferson County Office for 
Economic Development (OED) distributed a press release titled 
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"The Louisville Enterprise Zone: Louisville's $1 Billion 
Success Story." The report touted the accomplishments of 
Louisville's EZ by stating that "over 9,000 jobs have been 
created and over 24,000 jobs have been retained" and that 
Louisville'S EZ "became the first Enterprise Zone in the 
country to reach the $1 billion capital investment mark." 
(Office for Economic Development, 1990, p.1). Despite these 
impressive numbers, the report did not disclose how they were 
calculated or arrived at. 
On December 1, 1991, the EZ received a scathing review 
in an article published in Louisville's Courier-Journal 
(Heath, 1991). Reporter David Heath uncovered abuses in the 
use of the EZ's motor vehicle usage tax exemption. Some 
business owners were purchasing luxury cars and registering 
the cars under the business's name, but using the vehicles for 
purely personal reasons, thereby escaping any personal 
property tax liability for the automobiles. Heath's 
investigation concluded that many of OED's numbers on jobs 
created and retained as well as dollar figures for investment 
in the EZ were greatly inflated. OED never subtracted from 
their totals firms that went out of business or relocated 
outside of the zone. 
Heath's investigative reporting, also came up with other 
disturbing revelations. OED record keeping never disclosed 
whether some jobs would have been created regardless of the 
presence of the EZ. Some firms locating in the EZ after its 
creation in 1983 were not even aware of EZ incentives until 
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after being in the zone for a period of time. Also, there was 
no monitoring of how many disadvantaged workers were actually 
being hired. One of the goals of the EZ was to help these 
workers gain employment, but OED could not verify the total 
number of disadvantaged workers hired. The state's Department 
for Employment Services did not then, and does not now, check 
or verify EZ company records. 
Finally, in a survey of OED's listings of the top ten 
companies that had created the most jobs and investment, Heath 
found that OED records were greatly in error. Of the top ten 
companies credited with creating jobs, Heath found that OED 
overreported the actual number of jobs created by 2,210. Of 
the top ten companies credited with creating capital 
investment, he found that OED overreported by $132.7 million. 
Heath simply called and spoke to company officials in 
order to find the actual numbers. One of Heath's most 
interesting conversations was with Humana, Inc. officials. 
OED credited Humana with creating 1,100 jobs at a new office 
location on 101 East Main Street. When asked if that number 
was accurate, Humana stated that only around 100 new jobs had 
be~n created due to the new downtown offices. The other 1000 
new jobs were actually existing employees who were brought in 
from other offices throughout Jefferson County. Additionally, 
when asked if the company would have undertaken the 
renovation of the building necessary to create the new office 
building regardless of EZ tax incentives, a company spokesman 
said "yes." Even though the renovations would have been made 
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in any event, over $600,000 in sales taxes were lost to the 
state treasury. 
Around the same time, hearings were being conducted in 
Frankfort on the efficacy of enterprise zone programs 
throughout the state (Legislative Research Commission (LRC) 
Memorandum No. 460, 1991). In 1990, the Kentucky General 
Assembly's Cities Committee created the Subcommittee on 
Enterprise Zones because of press reports throughout the state 
that chronicled abuses of EZ incentives. According to the 
Subcommittee's report, after eight meetings over two years, 
the Subcommittee "was unable to determine how effective the 
enterprise zone program has been in creating new economic 
activity, or how the program's tax exemptions have affected 
state revenues. The statutes that govern enterprise zones 
(KRS 154.650 to 154.705) have had little review or amendment 
since they were enacted" (LRC Memorandum No. 460, p. 2). 
Because of these findings, the 1992 General Assembly 
mandated stricter monitoring and reporting on enterprise zone 
activities throughout the state beginning the in 1992-1993 
Fiscal Year. The State Enterprise Zone Authority (part of the 
Cabinet for Economic Development) was required to submit 
annual reports on the number of new jobs and investment 
created within each zone. The Kentucky Revenue Cabinet was 
also to begin submitting annual reports on the fiscal impacts 
of enterprise zone tax breaks and incentives. 
There were also changes made in EZ incentives. The 
exemption of usage taxes on automobiles was limited to just 
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the first $20,000 of value whereas the usage tax exemption for 
trucks was allowed to stay at 100% of value. Exemptions for 
net operating losses were eliminated as well as exemptions on 
income earned from loans to certified EZ companies. The loss 
of these incentives were substituted with one that put more 
emphasis on hiring employees from a targeted workforce--those 
receiving public assistance for at least 90 days before being 
hired by a certified company. For each worker hired from this 
group, EZ companies could claim a tax credit of 10% of such a 
worker's annual wages, up to a maximum of $1500 per worker. 
Any unused tax credits could be carried forward for up to five 
years. 
Additionally in 1992, Kentucky's Enterprise Zone program 
got an unpleasant surprise from the state's Attorney General 
Office. Assistant Attorney General Ross T. Carter issued an 
opinion that said Kentucky's zones were chosen arbitrarily in 
violation of the Kentucky Constitution's ban against special 
legislation favoring certain jurisdictions over others (Heath, 
1992). The opinion further claimed that the EZ law was 
specia1 1egis1ation because the zones were not necessarily in 
the most depressed areas of the state, but simply areas which 
have applied for special tax benefits; the benefits are given 
on a "first-come, first-served" basis which arbitrarily denies 
some needy areas tax relief; and even if a zone becomes a 
thriving area, businesses in a zone will continues to receive 
tax breaks for 20 years. Attorney General opinions do not 
carry the force of law and thus far no one has challenged the 
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constitutionality of Kentucky's EZ program. In the meantime, 
state legislators began to work on refining EZ legislation so 
that its constitutionality would be difficult to challenge 
(Heath, 1992). Some legal scholars, however, were 
increasingly alarmed at how state and local economic 
development policies were being used by local governments to 
justify a public purpose (Rubin, 1993 and 1994). In the past, 
state and local government intervention into the private 
sector had to be justified by a public purpose--either markets 
did not provide certain goods (such as roads, bridges, etc.) 
or markets had to be regulated (health and safety standards, 
etc.). During the 1980s, state and local tax breaks to 
businesses were seen as necessary in order to promote economic 
development since the federal government had decided to play a 
smaller roll in community development. Many tax incentives 
and subsidies given to private enterprises were justified 
legally under the public purpose doctrine. In other words, in 
many jurisdictions local economic development had attained the 
same status as providing police and fire protection. In 
Rubin's (1993 and 1994) opinion, this was not an appropriate 
use of the public purpose doctrine. Private businesses, it is 
felt, should not be subsidized or favored in any way through 
the spending or sacrificing of public tax revenues, such as 
was done when a new General Motors plant was built in Poletown 
within the Detroit metropolitan area (Wylie, 1989). 
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4. Summary 
Consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and 
the issues raised in it, the Louisville EZ experience is very 
similar to others in that the EZ was not carefully planned, 
implemented or monitored either for job creation and 
retention, as well as for capital formation and business 
creation. In reality, political compromises and 
considerations seemed to drive the evolution of the EZ. The 
original goals of economic development and community 
revitalization for a depressed urban area suddenly became just 
one part of a program that tried to achieve many different 
goals and objectives. During the entire history of the 
Louisville EZ, there has never been a comprehensive evaluation 
of the program's effectiveness in terms of costs and benefits. 
Nor has anyone really tried to establish the number of jobs 
that would have been created had the EZ not been in existence. 
Despite this, the State Enterprise Zone Authority announced on 
August 13, 1996 that it was considering another expansion of 
Louisville's EZ from 45.7 to 63 square miles. The main reason 
given for expanding the zone was that the new area to be 
included now met the definition of a distressed area (Shafer, 
1996) . 
All of this is not surprising. According to Rubin and 
Wilder (1996): 
One weakness in the base of knowledge about 
state enterprise zones is the lack of attention 
to the planning process as an element in program 
implementation. The failure to include planning 
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process requirements in state legislation that 
authorizes enterprise zones may critically 
influence program outcomes; yet this issue is 
generally not addressed in major studies of the 
effects of enterprise zones. The omission of 
planning elements from state enabling legislation 
for enterprise zones and from subsequent program 
evaluations should be of special interest to 
planners (p. 474). 
According to the authors, Louisville's EZ would be no 
different from other EZs in that a plan to implement the goals 
and objectives of KRS 154 was never created. Without a 
strategic plan for EZ implementation, it is not surprising 
then that the program changed its focus over time. Absent a 
plan for implementation, it is also not surprising that there 
never was any real monitoring of program outcomes (Rossi and 
Freeman, Chapter 4, 1985). 
Rubin and Wilder (1996) also note that EZs were created 
during a time when strategic planning had not yet caught on in 
the public sector at the state and local level (p. 485). Also 
given the severity of the recession of the early 1980s as well 
as the federal government's withdrawal from state and local 
matters during the 1980s, it is conceivable that many EZs were 
created in a rush to do something, or anything, to address 
local economic and fiscal problems. That is, EZs could have 
been created in a vacuum that did not allow for strategic 
planning or implementation. 
In the next chapter, a detailed plan for evaluating the 
accomplishments of the Louisville zone will be presented. The 
evaluation plan will utilize cost benefit and shift-share 
analysis. A quasi-experimental and time-series design will 
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allow estimation of whether or not the various incentives 
produced the results intended by the enabling legislation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Methodo1ogies for Eva1uation 
1. Introduction 
Similar to prior studies, the research design used to 
evaluate the Louisville EZ case uses a multi-method approach. 
Consistent with Rossi and Freeman (1985, 3rd edition) and 
Haveman and Margolis (1983, 3rd edition), this dissertation 
follows the basic principles of program evaluation and policy 
analysis. The main issue here is whether the EZ accomplished 
any of its goals and objectives and how well it accomplished 
them. The basis for generating the hypotheses to be tested 
will come from the goals that were to be achieved by the EZ as 
articulated in KRS 154.45. 
KRS 154.45 begins as follows: 
154.45.001. Purpose of Enterprise Zone Program.-
The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that 
the purpose of the Enterprise Zone Program is to 
revitalize economically depressed areas of the 
state. It is the intent of the General Assembly to 
achieve this purpose by adhering to the following 
goals: 
(1) Improve the qua1ity of 1ife of individua1s 
that reside within an enterprise zone by 
providing emp10yment opportunities, job training, 
and neighborhood ~provement programs; 
(2) Encourage economic activity by assisting and 
maintaining existing business within an 
enterprise zone; 
(3) Encourage economic activity by st~u1ating the 
inf1ux of new business within an enterprise 
zone; and 
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(4) Eliminate blighted and deteriorated areas 
within an enterprise zone that feature chronic 
abandonment or demolition of residential or 
commercial structures or property. (p. 412 of 
Kentucky Revised Statues, emphasis added). 
The rest of the legislation includes definitions of what 
constitutes an EZ, what is a "targeted workforce," etc. (refer 
back to chapter 3, pages 37-38 and see Appendix). The 
enabling legislation also specifies what application processes 
must be undertaken for a locality to become an EZ, as well as 
identifies the types of incentives that can be offered to 
firms (see chapter 3, pages 37-39 and Appendix). KRS 154.45 
also defines what type of area is eligible for EZ designation: 
"(1) Any area of a local government may be 
designated an enterprise zone that: 
a) Has a continuous boundary, and 
b) Is an area of pervasive poverty, unemployment, 
and economic distress. 
(2) An area meets the requirements of subsection 
(1) (b) of this section if: 
a) The average rate of unemployment in the area for 
the most recent eighteen (18) month period for 
which data is available was at least one and 
one-half (1.5) times the average national rate 
of unemployment for that eighteen (18) month 
period; and 
b) At least seventy percent (70%) of the residents 
living in the area have incomes below eighty 
percent (80%) of the median income of the 
residents of the local government requesting 
designation of an enterprise zone; or 
c) The population of all census tracts in the area 
decreased by ten percent (10%) or more between 
1970 and 1980 and the local government 
requesting designation establishes in writing, 
to the satisfaction of the authority, that 
either: 
1. Chronic abandonment or demolition of 
commercial or residential structures exist 
in the area, or 
2. Substantial tax arrearages of commercial or 
residential structures exist in the area." 
(p. 416 of Kentucky Revised Statutes, 
emphasis added). 
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Additionally, the legislation created the Enterprise 
Zone Authority of Kentucky, which was to oversee the 
administration, implementation and evaluation of Kentucky's 
enterprise zones. However, the Authority was never given any 
funding to do an adequate job of overseeing Kentucky's EZs 
(interview with Sarah Bell, 1996). The Kentucky Revenue 
Cabinet is also mentioned in KRS 154.45 as being responsible 
for collecting data on Kentucky's EZs. However, the Revenue 
Cabinet claimed that it was never given the money to 
adequately collect data (LRC Memorandum No. 460, 1991). 
Therefore, there was no real monitoring of the Louisville EZ's 
performance until amendments were added to KRS 154".45 in 1992, 
and additional funding was given to various state agencies 
(interview with Sarah Bell, Deputy Secretary of Kentucky 
Cabinet for Economic Development, 1996). 
In order to evaluate the impact of the Louisville and 
Jefferson County EZ program, program outcomes and impacts will 
be assessed by answering the following questions. The 
questions are posed as general research hypotheses, and were 
derived from the goals and objectives identified in KRS 
154.45. This method of deriving research hypotheses and 
questions directly from the enabling legislation is consistent 
with the fundamentals of policy evaluation and impact analysis 
(Rossi and Freeman, 1985; and Haveman and Margolis, 1983). 
1). Did the EZ increase employment at a greater level 
than what would have been the case had no incentives or 
regulatory relief been offered to businesses? 
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2). Did the EZ stop or s10w outward popu1ation 
migration from the zone area? 
3). Did the EZ increase emp10yment among disadvantaged 
and 10ng-ter.m unemp10yed workers who 1ived in the EZ area? 
4). Did the costs of the EZ program outweigh its 
benefits? If so, could money used for the EZ have been used 
more effectively in other economic development programs? 
5). Was the wea1th and income of residents within the EZ 
increased over the years? 
6). Did the EZ increase emp10yment and attract capita1 
at a rate greater than those portions of Jefferson County or 
Jefferson County as a whole that were not in the EZ? 
7). Were the 90a1s and objectives of the state 
legislation which allowed the creation of the EZ accomp1ished? 
If they were not accomplished, then why not? 
The language appearing in bold print stresses the 
relationship among the research hypotheses and to the goals 
and objectives identified in the enabling legislation (KRS 
154.45) . 
2. Methods to be Used 
Several methods will be used to assess the effectiveness 
of the EZ. The primary research design used is a quasi-
experiment as discussed by Cook and Campbell in 
Quasi-Experimentation (1979). Quasi-experimentation will play 
a key role in this study because it is essential to compare 
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and contrast similar areas within Jefferson County. Areas 
that received the economic development stimulus of EZ 
incentives will be compared to counterpart areas in Jefferson 
County that did not receive the advantages of EZ incentives. 
These counterpart or comparison or control areas were chosen 
because of their similarity either to the entire EZ or its 
sub-areas. If the economic incentives accomplished their 
mission, then one would expect to see changes occurring within 
the EZ or its component areas that were not occurring in the 
control areas over a given time period. 
For example, if EZ incentives were successful, then one 
would expect that unemployment and blight would decrease in 
the EZ at rates higher than comparable areas not eligible for 
incentives. Also according to the logic of the legislation, 
one should see substantial job and business growth as well as 
new construction in the EZ over time, but not in the control 
or comparison communities. Such incentives would be expected 
to reverse the decline previously experienced in an EZ 
designated area. Perhaps the EZ area could even be expected 
to overtake those portions of the county not included in the 
EZ as far as growth rates of job and business creation as well 
as growth rates of residential and commercial investment. 
Finally, one would expect to see a stop to the outward 
migration from an EZ designated area over time. 
On the other hand, if incentives did not work, one would 
expect to see continued economic decline and outward migration 
from EZ neighborhoods at a rate greater than or equal to that 
63 
experienced by control or comparison areas. Similarly, one 
would expect to see job and business growth within the EZ to 
continue to at least remain flat if not continue to decline 
when compared to other areas of the county which did not 
receive EZ incentives. 
In order to implement the quasi-experiment, it is 
necessary to have a pre-test and a series of post-tests, and 
control communities that are identical in all respects save 
for the presence of the EZ incentives. In this study, 
numerous outcome measures spanning the years 1980 to 1996 will 
be used to evaluate the EZ program. The next few pages give 
an outline of the outcome measures, data sources and 
analytical methods to be used in the EZ program evaluation. 
Job Creation Ana1ysis 
As mentioned earlier, a shift-share analysis of job 
creation within the EZ was conducted. Job growth in the EZ 
was analyzed by controlling for national economic and specific 
industrial shifts that would influence changes in sectoral 
employment within the EZ. An important consideration in this 
analysis was to try to estimate the job growth that would have 
occurred. in the EZ over the last 13 years regardless of local 
incentives, but instead due to national and specific industry 
trends that were occurring throughout the area. 
Sectoral job growth in the EZ was compared to job growth 
in Jefferson County over two equivalent time periods--1980 
through 1990 and 1981 through 1994. The approach taken was 
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similar to that used in Rubin and Wilder (1989) and Dowall 
(1996). Also, the rate of growth for the two control areas to 
be analyzed (the Newburg Area as well as the Bluegrass 
Industrial Park-Jeffersontown Area) was compared to the job 
growth of Jefferson County over the same two time periods. 
Job creation was analyzed by comparing job creation 
within the EZ to the number of jobs created throughout the 
county and control group communities over the periods of 1980 
to 1990 and 1981 to 1994. Job creation was measured by 
examining Louisville and Jefferson County Office for Economic 
Development (OED) records, surveys done by the Urban Studies 
Institute (USI), County Business Patterns data at the zip code 
level from 1981 to 1994, and from the manipulation of census 
tract data from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses of Housing and 
Population by University of Louisville researchers (Coomes and 
Price, 1994). The last two data sources were used in a shift-
share analysis of EZ job creation following Dowall (1996), and 
are considered to be the most accurate sources available for 
estimating net changes in job numbers and industrial 
composition over a given period of time. 
Neighborhood revitalization 
Demographic, employment and occupational changes in the 
EZ were analyzed and compared to changes in the rest of 
Jefferson County by looking at data from the 1980 and 1990 
Bureau of the Censuses Housing and Population Survey. Data at 
the tract level were aggregated for the EZ and were compared 
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to data at the tract level aggregated for two control group 
communities within Jefferson County, the rest of Jefferson 
County outside of the EZ, and Jefferson County as a whole. 
The purpose of such a comparison was to see if EZ incentives 
and the geographic enlargement of the EZ had any effect on the 
neighborhoods and residents of the EZ during the first 7 years 
of the program. Changes in demographic patterns in the area 
of Jefferson County outside of the EZ served as a 
non-equivalent control communities to see if EZ program 
interventions had any impact on slowing the decline of 
neighborhoods within the EZ. The 1980 and 1990 dates served 
as the pre-test and post-test dates, and were used for time-
series estimates of possible changes. 
The two most important control group areas within 
Jefferson County that were used was the Newburg Area in 
southeastern Jefferson County and the Jeffersontown-Bluegrass 
Industrial Park Area in eastern Jefferson County. The Newburg 
Area was selected because its socioeconomic conditions closely 
parallel those of EZ neighborhoods, yet this area received 
none of the same incentives that the EZ received in order to 
help the area develop economically. The Jeffersontown-
Bluegrass Industrial Park area was selected because it too 
received none of the incentives that the EZ received and 
because it was felt that the development and expansion of 
Louisville's airport within the EZ was similar to creating an 
industrial park within the EZ. The Jeffersontown-Bluegrass 
Industrial Park area grew from a mostly rural, underdeveloped 
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portion of Jefferson County to an affluent and job-generating 
edge-city within the county. 
Neighborhood revitalization can be best examined by 
looking at the results of 1980 and 1990 Census data (1980 and 
1990 Censuses of Housing and Population). By aggregating data 
from tracts within the EZ, changes in the data from 1980 and 
1990 were compared to demographic and socioeconomic changes 
that occurred in the control group communities, the rest of 
Jefferson County as well as Jefferson County in general. This 
comparison served as a pre- and post-test evaluation with the 
aggregation of data at the census tract level for the EZ 
compared to aggregate data at the census tract level for the 
control communities, the rest of Jefferson County and then 
compared to Jefferson County as a whole. 
Usefulness of EZ incentives to Firms within EZ 
A critical component of many program evaluations is to 
ask program participants if the interventions used in the 
program actually made a difference in participants' behavior 
or decisions. In order to ascertain program usefulness, a 
survey was administered to 851 firms located within the EZ in 
July and August of 1996. Among the items included in the 
survey were questions that asked respondents if they had used 
any EZ incentives, and if so, to what degree did the 
incentives make a difference in making hiring and capital 
investment decisions. The results of the survey conducted by 
USI during 1996 will indicate how EZ firms evaluated tax 
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incentives and their importance. The survey data are used 
extensively in the cost-benefit analysis of EZ incentives. 
Changes in Residential Property Values 
One way to measure any increase in community well-being 
within the EZ is to measure any increase~ in the value of 
residential property. If property values within the EZ did 
not appreciate at the same rate as property outside of the EZ, 
or worse, if property values declined, then this would be 
taken as a sign that the EZ incentives did not help with 
neighborhood revitalization or development. Changes in 
residential wealth within the EZ were compared to the control 
communities, the area of Jefferson County outside of the EZ, 
and Jefferson County in general. The sources of data utilized 
for this comparison were the Jefferson County Property 
Valuation Administrator's (PVA) Office and the 1980 and 1990 
Censuses of Housing and Population. 
As a way to gauge whether there has been an increase in 
the wealth of residents in the EZ, records from the Property 
Valuation Administrator's office were examined to see if 
property values within the EZ significantly increased when 
compared to the two control areas, and to all of Jefferson 
County over the same time period. If there is shown to be no 
significant difference, then the argument that EZ status 
helped EZ neighborhoods will be weakened. 
Another way to test for possible increases in community 
wealth or community revitalization within the EZ is to look at 
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the rates of residential and non-residential construction and 
home mortgage lending within the EZ compared to the control 
areas and to Jefferson County. Data from the St. Louis 
Federal Reserve's report for the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA data) were used to see if the rate of home lending in 
the EZ area differed substantially from the control 
communities and the county.s Again, any significant 
differences in home lending or new construction undertaken 
within the EZ compared to other areas over the same time 
period was used as a possible measure of EZ program success or 
failure in revitalizing EZ neighborhoods. This is important 
to assess because one of the primary purposes of the original 
EZ legislation was to help impoverished, blighted urban areas. 
Residentia1 Investment within the EZ 
This part of the EZ evaluation attempted to determine 
whether EZ incentives played any role (whether directly or 
indirectly) in creating any new residential construction and 
development within the EZ when compared to the control 
communities, the rest of Jefferson County outside of the EZ, 
and Jefferson County in general. If the EZ incentives had any 
role in community revitalization, one would expect that 
mortgage lending activity would have shown an increase greater 
than that of the control areas, the rest of Jefferson County 
and Jefferson County in general during the time periods 
considered. 
5 The HMDA data bank will be explained in greater detail in 
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The HMDA data bank should show if there was a 
significant difference between the EZ and the other 
communities when it comes to home mortgage lending from 1981 
to 1994. Increases or decreases in home mortgage lending 
would also be an indirect indication of construction and 
reinvestment activity as well. 
EZ Costs and Benefits: Job Creation and Capita~ Investment 
and Creating Jobs for Disadvantaged Workers 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the costs and the 
benefits of the EZ program were estimated and calculated. Tax 
losses over the last 13 years due to EZ incentives were 
estimated and weighed against all possible EZ benefits derived 
(tax withholdings from workers employed due to EZ incentives; 
investment undertaken as a result of EZ incentives, etc.). 
The cost-effectiveness analysis of the EZ program is a 
critical component of the dissertation, for even if the EZ 
program did cause an increase in investment and job creation 
beyond what would have been the case in the absence of EZ 
incentives, and if program costs outweigh program benefits, 
then one must question the financial success of the program 
and whether tax dollars could have been put to better use in 
an alternative economic development initiative. 
Obviously, program efficacy has to be gauged according 
to how cost-effective the program is. If program costs and 
costs per job created outweigh program benefits and benefits 




Using records from OED, the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet 
(KRC) , the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission (LRC) , and 
the USI survey, estimates of EZ costs and benefits from 1983 
to 1996 were calculated to see if program costs were offset or 
outweighed by program benefits. The costs per job created 
were weighed against the estimated payroll tax revenues 
generated per job. In doing these calculations, it was 
important to control for jobs that would have been created 
regardless of EZ incentives. The shift-share analysis and 
survey results mentioned earlier was used to control for this 
possibility. 
The benefits of more capital investment within the EZ 
were not easily quantified. Often new plant and equipment can 
lead to the creation of more jobs, or new plant and equipment 
can lead to labor-saving techniques that can actually 
eliminate existing jobs. Only a cost per dollar of investment 
figure can be arrived at using the data available. If we 
assume that all new investment is beneficial (i.e., it 
generates jobs), then a low cost per dollar of capital 
investment could be taken as a sign of EZ incentives 
accomplishing their goals. This cost per dollar of 
investment, however, must be tempered by what businesses would 
have done had EZ incentives not been in place. To make 
adjustments for that, one must look at survey results. Also, 
rates of capital investment in the EZ were compared to the 
control communities and to Jefferson County. The benefits of 
71 
attracting more capital cannot be estimated as easily as that 
for labor. With labor, one can estimate a certain amount of 
payroll tax revenue that the state will receive. With capital 
investment, one can only assume that firms undertake 
investment because of either increased profitability or the 
possibility of increased profitability due to future 
expectations. 
Other Methods and/or Sources of Data and/or Information 
It should be pointed out that many sources of 
information interspersed within the methods to be used for 
program evaluation came from interviews with various 
government officials, a newspaper reporter, and corporate 
public relations directors. These interviews will be cited 
throughout the dissertation. Records, annual reports and 
press releases from the Louisville and Jefferson County Office 
for Economic Development (OED) were used as a source of data 
and information. Finally, information and data from news 
articles in Louisville's The Courier-Journal were used 
extensively. 
3. Summary 
The following chapters will evaluate the efficacy of the 
Louisville-Jefferson County EZ by using the methods and data 
sources discussed above. The next chapter examines how well 
the EZ program promoted neighborhood revitalization. 
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Following that, the next two chapters will assess, through the 
shift-share method, how well the EZ did in creating jobs. 
Following the shift-share analysis, the costs and benefits of 
the EZ program are analyzed. 
Finally, in the cost-benefit analysis chapter, data from 
the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet will be used to determine how 
many people previously on "public assistance" found jobs due 
to the EZ program, and how much were the costs per job. A key 
question here is not so much one of method but whether this 
component of the program was ever an important one. 
Preliminary results seem to indicate that this incentive was 
the least used among the others. 
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CHAPTER V 
Louisville EZ Performance Evaluation: 
Neighborhood Revitalization 
1. Overview 
KRS 154.45 declared the purpose of EZs was to 
"revitalize economically depressed areas of the state" (p. 
412). To accomplish this, the law set forth the goal of 
improving ~'the quality of life of individuals that reside 
within an enterprise zone by providing employment 
opportunities, job training, and neighborhood improvement 
programs" and by eliminating "blighted and deteriorated areas 
within an enterprise zone that feature chronic abandonment or 
demolition of residential or commercial structures or 
property" (p. 412, emphasis added). 
As the literature review in a previous chapter noted, 
and as the above quote indicates, neighborhood revitalization 
has been a central and important goal of almost all EZ 
programs. This chapter of the study looks at how well the 
Louisville EZ accomplished neighborhood revitalization and 
improvement by looking at Census Bureau data, residential 
investment data and changes in property values within the EZ 
compared to another part of Jefferson County, Jefferson County 
outside of the EZ, and Jefferson County as a whole. 
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2. Eva1uating Neighborhood Revita1ization 
using Census Data 
Neighborhood revitalization and quality of life are 
terms that can be interpreted broadly. Using data from the 
1980 and 1990 Censuses of Housing and Population, Tables 5-1 
through 5-6 show how the original EZ (3.75 square miles), the 
first addition to the original EZ (which made it 6.75 square 
miles), the third addition to the EZ (which made it 45.7 
square miles) and the total EZ (referred to as the current EZ 
in this dissertation) compare to three comparison or control 
areas: (1) the Newburg area or Newburg, the control 
community; (2) Jefferson County outside of the EZ; and (3) 
Jefferson County as a whole. 6 This was done to make the 
analysis as close to a quasi-experiment as possible using pre-
test (1980 Census data) and post-test (1990 Census data) times 
series data (Cook and Campbell, 1979). 
The Newburg area was selected as a control community and 
is compared to all versions of the EZ because it is one of the 
poorest areas of Jefferson County, because of its 
socioeconomic similarity to the EZ areas, and because Newburg 
received none of the economic development assistance that the 
EZ communities received. It would not be fair or accurate to 
directly compare any portion of the EZ to the rest of 
Jefferson County or to the county as a whole because of the 
6 Data for each area were aggregated from census tracts that 
existed within each area by Dr. Ken Singleton of the 
University of Louisville's Urban Studies Institute. 
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large differences among the three areas with respect to key 
socioeconomic variables. However, utilizing both the portion 
of Jefferson County outside of the EZ and Jefferson County as 
a whole as comparison communities is necessary. This is 
because of the need to find out whether any changes in EZ 
areas simply mirrored changes in the county. That is to say, 
by comparing the EZ to these two larger areas, one could 
ascertain as to whether any changes in the EZ could be 
ascribed to EZ economic development incentives or simply to 
trends that were occurring throughout the rest of Jefferson 
County, if not Jefferson County in its entirety. Finally, it 
must be pointed out that the data come from Census 
questionnaires administered or completed by place of 
residence. 7 
In looking at Table 1 on the next page, one notices that 
between 1980 and 1990, the original EZ and the separate census 
tracts added during the first and second expansions of the EZ 
(columns 2 and 3) as well as the total/current EZ suffered a 
decline in the number of census respondents reporting an 
occupation (see bottom line, "N"). The comparison 
communities--the Newburg area, the county outside of the EZ, 
and the county overall--reported increases in the number of 
respondents reporting an occupation. For specific 
occupational categories, the EZ communities had the most 
significant declines (5% or more) in certain occupations than 
7 The data in Tables 1 through 6 differ from the Census data 
in the next chapter in that the Census numbers were derived by 




ORIGINAL ENTERPRISE ZONE 
1980 /1990 / ' 
Executive/Admin 3.6 2.8 -0.8 
Professional 5.1 7.0 +1.9 
Technical 1.4 1.8 +0.4 
Sales 5.2 9.4 +4.2 
Admin/Clerical 17 .8 -12.3 -5.5 
Private Service 2.1 2.6 +0.5 
Protective 1.3 2.4 +1.1 
Service 
Other Service 25.0 27.3 +2.3 
Farming/Forestry 0.8 0.8 0.0 
Craftsmen 8.0 8.6 +0.6 
Machine-Operators 14.0 11.1 -3.1 
Transportation 6.9 4.5 -2.4 
Laborers 8.8 9.2 +0.4 
N 3425 2596 -24.2 
Tabla 1 
Occupations 
ENTERPRISE ZONE COMMUNITIES 
ENTERPRISE ZONE ENTERPRISE ZONE TOrN. ENTERPRISE ZONES 
EXPl\IISION, 1985 EXPl\IISION, 1986 
1980 / 1990 / , 1980 / 1990 / , 1980 I 1990 I , 
6.1 3.2 -2.9 4.4 5.4 +1.0 4.4 5.1 +0.7 
3.6 5.2 +1.6 6.4 6.6 +0.2 6.1 6.6 +0.5 
1.9 3.2 +1.3 1.9 3.0 +1.1 1.9 3.0 +1.1 
5.2 7.4 +2.2 6.5 8.8 +2.3 6.3 8.9 +2.6 
12.4 15.9 +3.5 15.1 15.1 0.0 15.2 15.2 0.0 
1.1 0.0 -1.1 1.9 0.7 -1.2 1.9 0.9 -1.0 
0.4 1.6 +1.2 1.7 1.7 0.0 1.6 1.8 +0.2 
20.3 14.1 -6.2 19.1 19.7 +0.6 19.6 20.1 +0.5 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 +0.2 0.6 0.8 +0.2 
13.2 17.0 +3.8 10.9 11. 6 +0.7 10.7 11.5 0.8 
23.1 16.4 -6.7 17 .0 12.0 -5.0 17 .0 12.0 -5.0 
5.1 8.6 +3.5 6.6 6.5 -0.1 6.6 6.4 -0.7 
7.7 7.3 -0.4 7.8 8.0 +0.2 7.9 8.0 +0.1 
1603 941 -41. 3 34227 31610 -7.6 39255 35147 -10.5 
"NOTE: 'i. raw change whare there i. change in percent.; , - '(90) - '(80) 
, i. percentage change ~or valu •• that ara not percent.: ,_ (valu. 90 - Value 80) x 100 
Value 80 
COMPARISON COMMUNITIES 
COMPARISON COMMUNITY JEFFERSON COUNTY JEFFERSON COUNTY TOTAL 
loutside 
enterprise zone) 
1980 I 1990 I , 1980 I 1990 I ' 1980 I 1990 I ' 
8.5 7.3 -1.2 11.3 12.8 +1.5 10.4 12.0 +1. 5 
8.4 7.1 -1. 3 13.3 14.7 +1.4 12.3 13.8 +1.5 
2.7 3.7 +1.0 2.9 3.8 0.9 2.7 3.7 +1.0 
10.0 9.7 -0.3 11. 4 13.5 +2.1 16.7 13.0 2.3 
19.8 18.9 -0.9 18.4 17.5 -0.9 18.0 17 .2 -0.8 
0.8 1.0 +0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.6 0.4 -0.2 
1.1 1.5 +0.4 1.5 1.5 0.0 1.5 1.6 +0.1 
12.7 18.5 +5.8 10.4 10.2 -0.2 11.6 11.3 -0.3 
0.4 0.6 +0.2 0.6 0.8 +0.2 0.6 0.8 +0.2 
10.0 10.0 0.0 11.5 10.6 -0.9 11.4 10.7 -0.7 
15.0 10.7 -4.3 10.2 6.5 -3.7 11.1 7.0 -4.1 
5.2 5.2 0.0 4.2 3.7 -0.5 4.5 4.0 -0.5 
5.1 4.9 -0.2 4.0 4.0 0.0 4.5 4.4 -0.1 




did non-EZ areas (e.g., administrative and clerical, machine 
operators, and other services). On the other hand, when 
compared to the Newburg area, EZ communities did see modest 
increases in the percentage of its labor force working in 
professional, technical, sales and craftsmen occupations. Had 
EZ incentives been fully effective, however, one would expect 
to see an increase in all occupational categories as well as 
an expansion in the total labor force in EZ communities when 
compared to the Newburg area. By 1990, the EZ incentives 
would have been in effect for at least six and one-half years. 
The mediocre performance of the EZ when compared to the 
Newburg area indicates a short-run failure of the EZ to 
accomplish the goals of KRS 154.45. 
Table 2 shows horne ownership profiles and housing stock 
statistics for the EZ areas and the four control areas. The 
numbers do not reflect favorably upon the EZ when compared to 
the three control and comparison areas. In regard to total 
occupied housing, owner occupied housing, and renter 
occupied housing, the EZ communities show percentage decreases 
in all these areas. There were also declines in both white 
and black occupied households as well as a decline in overall 
housing stock for all EZ communities. These numbers seem to 
support the fact that western, southern and southwestern 
Jefferson County lost population during the 1980s (Coomes and 
Price, 1994). 
Jefferson County outside of the EZ as well as Jefferson 
County overall show the reverse of EZ trends during the 1980s. 
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,. Table 2 
Housing Ownership Profiles 
------ ---
ENTERPRISE ZONE COMMUNITIES 
OUTCOME 
MEASURES 
ORIGINAL ENTERPRISE ZONE ENTERPRISE lONE ENTERPRISE ZONE 
EXPANSION, 1985 EXPNfSION, 1986 
198011990 J , 1980 11990 1 , 1980 11990 1 , 
Housing Stock 5586 4133 -18.3 1611 1058 -36.1 39303 36151 -6.5 
Tot.1 Occupied 5043 4113 -17 .8 1586 893 -43.1 35618 32133 -9.5 
Housing 
owner Occupied 1526 1088 -28.1 1041 482 -54.0 18900 16968 -10.2 
, White n/. 59.1 n/. 90.0 n/. 55.6 
, Bl.ck n/. 40.1 n/. 9.1 n/. 44.4 
Renter Occupied 3517 3055 -13.1 539 411 -23.7 16118 15265 -8.1 
, White n/a 12.8 n/. 93.7 n/. 41.7 
, Bl.ck n/. 86.9 n/. 5.1 n/. 56.5 
White Occupied 1517 1033 -31. 9 1451 819 -43.6 18419 15198 -14.2 
, Owners n/. 62.2 n/. 53.0 n/. 59.7 
, Renters n/. 31 .8 n/. 47.0 n/a 40.3 
Bl.ck Occupied 3515 3099 -11.8 127 65 -48.8 17004 16091 -5.3 
, Owners n/. 14.4 n/. 67.7 n/. 46.4 
, Renters n/. 85.6 n/. 32.3 n/a 53.6 




*lIOft: , h raw cha.nqe wher. tMra 1_ chanp 1Jl pez:cenu; , - \e9O) - "aO) 
(
Value 90 - Value 10) 
, i. percentage chan9- for valu •• that are not percent.: ,-
Value 80 
TOTAL ENTERPRISE ZONES 
1980 1 1990 1 , 
46560 42548 -8.6 
42241 31269 -11. 3 
21413 18538 -13.1 
n/. 38.2 
n/. 60.3 
20114 18731 -9.8 
n/. 38.2 
n/. 60.3 
21381 17650 -17.5 
n/. 59.5 
n/. 40.5 
20646 19255 -6.7 
n/. 41.3 
n/. 58.7 
48.9 51.1 +2.8 
• 100 
COMPARISON COMMUNITIES 
CCf1PARISON CCMruNlTY JEFfERSON COUNTY (ouutde 
ent •• pct •• Ion_I 
1980 1 1990 1 , 1980 11990 I , 
10940 11519 +5.8 219222 240030 +9.5 
9930 10162 +8.4 205322 226869 +8.9 
4940 4918 -0.4 143996 151852 +5.4 
n/. 65.3 n/. 92.9 
n/a 34.5 n/. 6.4 
4990 5844 +17 .1 64326 75017 +16.6 
n/. 53.5 n/. 81.7 
n/. 45.3 n/. 17.2 
6111 6339 190582 202435 +6.2 
n/. 50.7 n/. 69.7 
n/. 49.3 n/a 30.3 
3106 4344 +39.2 16250 22698 +39.7 
n/. 39.0 n/. 43.1 
n/. 61. 0 n/. 56.9 
31.3 40.4 +9.1 7.8 10.0 +2.2 
JEfFERSON COUNTY TOTAL 
1980 11990 I , 
265182 282518 +6.3 
250569 264118 +5.4 
165469 110390 +2.9 
n/. 89.0 
n/a 10.4 
85100 93748 +10.2 
n/. 73.0 
n/. 25.8 
211969 220085 +3.8 
n/. 68.9 
n/. 31.1 
36896 41953 +13.7 
n/. 42.3 
n/. 57.7 
14.7 15.9 +1.2 
()') 
r--
The Newburg area, despite being considered a depressed area, 
showed an increase in total occupied housing, renter occupied 
housing, black occupied housing, and an increase in the 
overall housing stock. The amount of owner-occupied housing 
in this area remained virtually the same between 1980 and 
1990, although the area did see less white occupied housing 
than it did in 1980. Therefore, the EZ failed to see 
improvements in home ownership and neighborhood revitalization 
despite program incentives, whereas the Newburg area, which 
did not receive the EZ economic development stimulus, faired 
much better. 
Table 3 shows that housing conditions in all EZ 
communities were, in general, either inferior to those of the 
Newburg area and comparison communities or basically the same. 
The percentage of housing units vacant is somewhat higher in 
the EZ areas than in the others, and the EZ areas have older 
housing stock than their control and comparison counterparts. 
Most of the EZ housing stock was built before 1940 whereas 
most of the control and comparison communities housing stock 
was built from 1960-69. Reflecting the older (and perhaps 
less desirable) housing stock in the EZ areas, average housing 
values are lower in EZ areas than in the comparison 
communities. Also, for the current EZ or total Enterprise 
Zone, housing values appreciated 51.1% between 1980 and 1990 
whereas Newburg was not far behind at 43.9%. The rest of 
Jefferson County and the county as a whole experienced greater 




ENrEllPkISE ZONE COHINITIES 
OUTCCME 
MEASURES 
CllUGlNAL Dl!'llU'RUI 10lIl IIfI"Uf1UII &mra DMlfSI<*, IDI'l'DrIUII 1<*1 IXPMSIOl, 1986 TOTAL PfTPPItU& IC»IU 
1985 
1980 11990 I , 1980 I 1990 I , 1980 I 1990 I , 1980 I 1990 I 
, Vacant 9.1 12.5 +4.3 5.1 15.6 +10.5 9.4 12.3 +2.9 9.2 12.4 
, Rentals 69.1 13. '7 H.O 34.0 46.0 +12.0 46.9 45.3 -1.6 49.2 50.3 
, Public Water 99.9 99.5 -0.4 100.0 100.0 0.0 99.1 99.5 +0 .• 99.3 99.5 
, Without Heat 4.2 0.9 -3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.2 -0.5 2 0 1.1 
, IncOIIIplete Kitchens 2.2 2.3 +0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.4 2.2 2.1 -0.1 2.2 2.1 
, No Telephone 11.6 23.5 5.' 6.9 12.3 +5 .• 12.8 ll.O +0.2 ll.1 14.2 
, Incomplete PIWllblng 1.2 1.0 -0.2 1.2 1.0 -0.2 2.2 1.1 -1.1 1.1 1.1 
, No Bedroom. 2.0 2.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 2.3 +1.1 1.3 2.2 
, One BedrOOl1l. or Less 36.1 34.5 -1.6 20.2 11.3 -2.9 26.5 23.3 -3.2 27 . .. 24.4 
, Public Sewer 98.5 99.1 ).2 91.1 98.1 +1.0 89.6 89.9 +0.3 90.9 91.3 
Period Most Housing a4-40 a4-40 84-40 a4-40 a4-40 84-40 60-69 60-69 
Built 
, Built before 1940 41.9 29 .• -12 .5 52.0 53.1 +1.1 45.3 38.4 -6.9 45.0 31.1 
Avg. House Val ue $16511 $26951 +62.1 $26009 $50ll6 +93.5 $19883 $29840 +50.1 $19911 $)0180 
AV9. Gron Rent $100 $114 +7 •. 0 S111 S3U +8).0 $161 $281 +14. S 
(utilities included) 
*RO'D: ,1e .... obaave ....... tbere J.. cbaDge i.a ~tel , • '(10) - '''0) 
















+1 •. 8 
cctlPARISON C<HtONITIES 
CXMPMIION cotMIIIITY ~ COWT't (outside 
enterprhe zone) 
1980 I 1990 I , 1980 I 1990 I , 
9.2 1.1 -2.1 5.0 5.5 +0.5 
50.3 54.3 +4.0 30.9 38.1 +2.2 
100.0 99.9 -0.1 99.1 9B.3 +0.6 
0.0 0.2 +0.2 1.1 0.2 +0.9 
1.0 O.B -0.2 1.1 0.5 -0.6 
1.4 1.2 -0.2 3 .• 3.4 -0.5 
0.5 0.1 +0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.4 
0.6 1.5 +0.9 1.0 1.2 +0.2 
22.5 21.7 +0.8 15.3 14.4 -0.9 
98.2 98.5 +0. ) B2.5 85.0 +2.5 
60-69 60-69 60-69 60-69 
2.4 1.4 -1.0 17.9 15.1 -2.8 
$)1))] $45084 +43.9 $4S88fi $74670 +62.7 
$232 S3" +62.1 $228 Sl84 +68.2 
.n:f'RIlSCM aMn"Y TOTAl. 
1980 I 1990 I ' 
5.1 6.5 +0.8 
34.0 35.5 +l.!t 
98.0 98.5 to.S 
1.3 0.3 -1.0 
1.3 0.1 -0.6 
5.5 4.9 -0.6 
0.' 0.4 -0.5 
1.1 1.4 +0.3 
11.4 15.9 -1.5 
B3.9 88.9 +2.0 
60-69 60-69 
22.1 18.5 -4.2 
$42641 $69949 +6 •. 0 




this same period. Therefore, appreciation in housing values 
was pretty much a common trend throughout most of the county 
during the 1980s with the EZ neighborhoods being no exception. 
With this in mind, the ability of EZ incentives to raise 
residential wealth and to revive neighborhoods is very 
doubtful. 
One unusual number appearing in the table is the 
increase of 93.5% in the value of houses in the census tracts 
taken in during the first EZ expansion. Perhaps one 
explanation for this unusual climb in value is due to the 
condemnation and removal of several lower middle class and 
lower income neighborhoods during the late 1980s and early 
1990s in order to expand Standiford Field, now known as 
Louisville International Airport. a If mostly higher priced 
homes were left remaining in these tracts, then that would 
explain such a large jump in average house value between 1980 
and 1990. Recall that the first line of Table 2 showed a 
36.7% decline in the housing stock of this area and that the 
second line of Table 2 showed a 42.7% decline in occupied 
housing for these tracts between 1980 and 1990. This 
aberration could skew the results for the full-size EZ by 
helping to overstate the rate of home appreciation for the 
full-size EZ. Appreciation for the full-size EZ may have 
actually been less than 51.1%. 
Note that all four columns under Enterprise Zone 
a According to Professor John P. Nelson of the Urban Studies 
Institute, the demolition of Louisville's Highland Park 
neighborhood began in early 1989 and was nearly finished by 
82 
Communities in Table 3 show increases in the percentage of 
households without telephones whereas the comparison 
communities show decreases in this same indicator of 
substandard living conditions. If owning a telephone is 
considered a basic component of "quality of life" then the EZ 
experiment did not seem to accomplish the goal of increasing 
the quality of life for EZ residents during most of the 1980s. 
Table 4 is perhaps the most telling table of this 
chapter in regard to EZ incentives and EZ performance during 
the 1980s. Note that while comparison communities lost 
population during this time period, the loss of population 
within the EZ communities was even greater. 
In looking at the category of education one can see one 
of the possible reasons why the EZ area was at a comparative 
disadvantage relative to the control/comparison communities. 
Between 1980 and 1990, the percentage of high school and 
college educated people living within the EZ communities went 
up. Yet, the percentage of those with at least a high school 
diploma or college degree was still well below that of the 
control or comparison communities. For example, during the 
1980s, the full-size EZ saw an increase in the percentage of 
its population of high school graduates from 44.5% to 54.7% 
and saw an increase in the percentage of its population of 
college graduates from 3.6% to 4.9%. However, each control 
area had an even higher level of its population classified as 
high school or college 
the time of the 1990 Census. 
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Table 4 
Demographics and Education 
ENTERPRISE ZONE COMMUNITIES 
OUTCOME 
MEASURES 
ORIGINAL ENTERPRISE ZONE ENTERPRISE ZONE ENTERPRISE ZONE TOTAL ENTERPRI SE WlfES 
EXPANSION, 1985 EXPANSION, 1986 
1980 I 1990 I \ 1980 I 1990 I , 1980 I 1990 I , 1980 I 1990 I \ 
Population 13241 10811 -11.9 3990 2303 -42.3 101265 86844 -42.3 118502 100024 -15.6 
White 3189 2166 -21.0 3113 2102 -44.2 50652 41110 -11.1 58154 46458 -20.0 
Black 9398 8019 -14.0 246 183 -25.6 49943 43884 -12.1 59581 52146 -12.5 
, Black 10.9 14.3 +3.4 6.1 1.9 +1. 6 49.3 50.5 +1.2 50.2 52.1 +1. 9 
Age 
Distribution 
0-16 36.1 36.7 +0.6 22.5 23.5 +1.0 29.3 27.3 -2.0 29.9 28.3 -1. 6 
11-24 14.7 12.0 -2.1 13.6 10.9 -2.1 16.4 13.1 -3.3 16.1 12.9 -3.2 
25-34 12.8 14 .6 +1.8 12.1 19.9 +1.8 14.3 11.0 +2.1 14.0 16.3 +2.8 
35-54 14.6 18.9 +4.3 22.8 22.4 -0.4 18.9 21.8 +2.9 18'r 21.5 +3.0 
55-64 9.1 1.4 -2.3 13.2 10.2 -3.0 9.1 8.6 -0.5 9.3 8.5 -0.8 
65-16 8.0 8.0 0.0 10.0 1.0 -3.0 7.3 1.1 -0.2 1.4 7.1 -0.3 
75+ 4.1 3.8 -0.3 5.7 5.9 +0.2 4.7 5.0 +0.3 4.7 4.9 +0.2 
Education 
, High 40.9 43.5 +2.6 42.0 53.8 +11.8 45.0 55.9 +10.9 44.5 54.1 +10.2 
School 
, College 2.6 1.7 -0.9 2.5 6.3 +3.8 3.8 5.2 +1. 4 3.6 4.9 +1. 3 
Grad 
Sex 
, Male 43.2 43.9 +0.7 49.0 48.1 -0.9 46.9 47.5 +0.6 46.6 47.1 +0.5 
, Female 56.8 56.1 -0.1 51.0 51.9 +0.9 53.1 52.5 -0.6 53.4 52.9 -0.5 
- - - - -
*1IO'n: "1. ra. cbaDve whee. tbeftI 1. ~ 1n pezoeDta; " • '(to) - "10, 
, 1. percenUge aa...o.,. t'or valu •• that an DOt percenU: ,,- • 100 ( 
Value 90 - Value 10) 
Va1u. 10 
COMPARISON COMMUNITIES 
CatPMISON CCHIUNITY JEFFERSON COUNT'! IOl,ltUdII 
•• t.lprhe ,one' 
1980 I 1990 I , 1980 I 1990 I , 
26119 26439 -1.0 566502 564913 -0.3 
16111 13585 -15.1 511522 491853 -2.1 
10350 12581 +21.6 50340 61134 +21. 4 
38.7 47.6 +7.9 8.9 10.8 +1. 9 
27.6 25.8 -1.8 25.0 22.2 -2.8 
18.5 14.1 -4.4 14.5 10.5 -4.0 
lB.7 lB.6 -0.1 11.5 17.1 +0.2 
23.9 27.8 +3.9 22.2 26.4 +4.2 
10.4 10.7 +0.3 10.0 9.5 -0.5 
5.1 8.8 +3.1 6.6 8.0 +1.4 
3.0 4.4 +1.4 4.2 5.1 +1.5 
67.8 12.2 +4.4 69.3 17 .1 +3.4 
9.4 8.5 -0.9 15.3 20.0 +4.2 
46.8 45.8 -1.0 47.7 47.3 -0.4 
53.2 54.2 -0.5 52.3 52.7 +0.4 
JEffERSON COUNTY TOTAL 
1980 I 1990 I , 
685004 664931 -2.9 
569616 544401 -4.4 
109921 113280 +3.1 
16.0 17.0 +1.0 
25.9 23.1 -2.8 
14.7 10.8 -3.9 
16.9 17 .5 +0.6 
21. 6 25.7 +4.1 
9.9 9.4 +0.5 
6.7 1.9 +1.2 
4.3 5.6 +1. 3 
65.2 74.5 +9.3 
13.8 11.9 +4.1 
47.5 41.2 -0.3 
52.5 52.8 +0.3 
'<I' 
(X) 
graduates in both 1980 and 1990. In fact, even though the EZ 
saw an improvement in its "human capital" (more high school 
and college graduates living in the area), all of the control 
communities experienced increases as well. These areas were 
already ahead of the EZ in human capital in 1980 and had 
stayed ahead by 1990. 
With regard to unemployment, Table 5 shows that although 
unemployment declined throughout most of the EZ and 
comparison communities during the 1980s, the overall level of 
unemployment in percentage terms was still higher in the EZ 
areas than in the control areas as of 1990. This was pretty 
much the case whether one was black or white, male or female. 
The highest levels of unemployment still exist in the original 
EZ area, the area that was initially targeted for urban 
redevelopment. For all EZ areas, their unemployment rates of 
1990 were still anywhere from one and one-half times to three 
times the rate of those in the comparison communities despite 
drops in the unemployment rates from 1980 to 1990. However, 
the decreases in the unemployment rates in the EZ communities 
were not that different in magnitude than those in the 
comparison/control communities. 
Finally, Table 6 shows that while average household and 
family income rose in the EZ communities, the rates of 
increase for the comparison communities were even higher. Not 






DlTERPRISE ZOIIE COtHlIIITIES 
ORIGINAL ENTEIlPIUSE zaiE IllTEltPl\I S£ ZONE £llTDPRISE ZONE rorAL EllTERPRISE ZOIIES 
EXPJ\NSIOII, 1985 EXPJlNSIOII, 1986 
1980 I 1990 I • 1980 I 1990 I , 1980 11990 I • 1980 I 1990 I , 
Unemployment Rate 26.1 22.9 -l.2 1.6 8.l +0.1 lS.2 ll.0 -2.2 16.l ll.1 -2.6 
Males 21.1 2l.0 -4.1 10.l 1.l -2.S lS.1 12.8 -2.9 16.S ll.S -l.O 
Females 25.5 22.8 -2.1 3.6 9.0 +5.4 14.8 13.2 -1.6 16.0 14.0 -2.0 
White Unemployment 11.1 16.1 +4.4 9.2 6.6 -2.6 11.6 8.1 -2.9 11.6 9.0 -2.6 
Males 15.0 18.3 +l.3 11.8 4.0 -1.8 12.2 8.9 -3.3 12.3 9.2 -3.1 
Females 6.0 13.1 +7.1 4.1 9.4 +4.7 10.8 8.4 -2.4 10.4 8.1 -1.1 
Black Unemployment 30.2 26.5 -3.1 0.0· 31.1 +31.1 19.3 11.5 -1.8 20.9 18.5 -2.4 
Males 32.8 26.7 -6.1 0.0 44.2 +44.2 20.1 11.8 -2.3 21.6 18.3 -2.3 
Females 28.6 26.4 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.4 11.2 -1.2 20.3 18.3 -2.0 
--
--
*.:>D, '10 nw ___ ~ i. __ ia _a, , - 'Itol - ,,10' 
( val ... to - Val- 10) , 1. pe~tage oUnge foE' wat ... that. &Ee DDt ~u: ,. • 100 
v.l .. 10 
*Jfot .any AfZ'loaa ,..rlOUl. reelde 1a tbMe ..-.iU_. 
COMPARISON COMMUNITIES 
cotPARlSON CCM4UNITY JEFFERSON COUNTY 
(_til'" .. terprhe a_e' 
1980 I 1990 I , 1980 I 1990 I • 
8.1 8.4 -O.l 6.6 S.l -1.S 
9.4 9.1 -O.l 6.9 S.4 -1.5 
1.9 1.9 0.0 6.3 4.8 -1.5 
6.6 5.1 -0.9 6.2 4.5 -1.1 
1.3 6.0 -1.3 6.5 4.8 -1.7 
5.1 5.4 -0.3 S.8 4.2 -1. 6 
11.8 11.7 -0.1 11.9 10.3 -1.6 
14.1 13.5 -0.6 12.7 11.6 -1.1 
9.9 10.3 +0.4 11.1 9.2 -1.9 
JEFFERSON COUNTY rorAL 
1980 I 1990 I • 
1.9 6.1 -1.8 
8.l 6.l -2.0 
1.5 5.9 -1.6 
6.6 4.8 -1.8 
6.9 5.1 -1.8 
6.1 4.5 -1.6 
16.2 13.6 -2.6 
16.9 14.5 -2.4 
16.5 12.8 -2.1 
\0 
(X) 
in both 1980 and 1990 when it came to the levels of household 
and family income. Poverty was worse in the EZ communities in 
1980 than in the comparison communities and grew worse during 
the 1980s as the 1990 census data show. The comparison 
communities only showed negligible increases in poverty during 
the 1980s (with the exception of Bluegrass) whereas the EZ 
areas showed larger gains in poverty on average. 
In general, Table 6 points out that the EZ communities 
saw their civilian labor force shrink significantly in 
comparison to the control communities. Not only did work seem 
to disappear from these areas but so did workers. Finally, 
Table 6 shows that the EZ communities had both in 1980 and 
1990 a much higher proportion of their population not in the 
labor force than in the control areas. These six tables do 
not indicate that any real neighborhood revitalization was 
taking place in the EZ communities by 1990. In many ways, 
according to Census data, the EZ communities had fallen behind 
their non-EZ counterparts. These results imply that EZ 
incentives were not working as far as helping these targeted 
areas to grow and prosper much less helping them to hold their 




Di'rERPR15E ZOIII. CCHIUIIITIU 
OOTCOHE 
MEASURES 
(1) OIUGIIW. IIItUIRJI& &ellS (2) III'tINJUSI &mit (3) 1NI'IIlf1U'1 1IWI 1OtIU. an'UI,ItUIt IQISI •• 
a.MIION, 1985 P,M.ION, 1986··· 
1980 I 1990 I , 1980 I 1990 I , 1980 1 1990 J , 
Avq Household Income 8296 11132 +34.2 14710 2160~ +46.9 12290 19849 +61.B 
AVI) Faaily Income 93~4 12134 +36.1 16850 25851 +53.4 14290 22621 +58.3 
, Below Poyerty Line 48.8 64.4 +16.4 11.0 26.3 +9. ) 28.9 34.3 +5.4 
, Below 15' of Poverty 39.3 ~~.4 +16.1 10.9 22.2 +11.3 21.3 26.2 +4.9 
Line 
, Female Headed 4~.2 42.2 -3.0 4.9 16.1 +11.2 21.6 11.8 -3.8 
Households with 
Dependent Children 
Civilian Labor Force 4393 3621 -23.4 1128 1026 -40.6 4028~ 36331 -9.8 
Potenthl Chic Labor 8130 1024 -19.0 3122 176~ -H.~ 13~01 64421 -12.4 
Force 
Females i~ Labor Force 2323 1839 -20.8 689 469 -31.9 18423 11~31 -4.8 
I\) 1~2. 9) 1~4 .1) 1·1.8) 139.9) 14~.11 1·5.6) 14~.11 148.3) 1·2.6) 
, Hales not in Labor 
Force in the Potential 39.4 45.9 +6. S 30.3 32.4 +2.1 34 .8 36.8 +2.0 
Labor Force 
, Females not in Labor 
Force in the Potential 56.2 ~6.2 0.0 57.9 50.0 -1.9 53.1 49.2 -4.5 
Labor Force 
~: 'ia Ea. crbaDpi ..... :1:'8 tbeEe 1a obaDp in puoenu; , • '(to, - '(10' 
, 1a perC8D~ cbaDp tOE valuea that U. DOt peEoeftte: ". (Yal .. to - Value 10, • 100 
Value 10 
•• Sua of fiEet thr .. colu.ne ".Inclw:t.4 1n 3Ed Col.-
1980 1 1990 1 , 
11891 1B91J +59.0 
13820 2163~ +56.6 
30.8 31.4 .6.6 
23.0 29.3 +6.3 
23.1 20.2 -3.~ 
46406 40121 -12.3 
8~3~3 13260 -141.2 
21H~ 1984~ -1.4 
(46.21 (48.1) ('2.5) 
35.1 31. S +2.4 
54.1 50.0 -4.1 
<DIPAI\ISOH CCIIMUIIITIES 
CClCtNllICII CCMUltft .J&n'DICII CXUITY (outSide 
enterprise zone) 
1980 I 1990 J , 1980 -'- 1990 1 , 
1693~ 23987 H1.6 21491 31115 +75.4 
18613 213~3 +47.0 24609 44162 +19.5 
14 .9 23.4 +8.5 8.3 9.9 +1.6 
10.6 16.8 +6.2 5.7 ~.9 +1.2 
lB.~ lB.3 -0.2 8.1 7.8 -0.3 
134~3 13499 +0.3 218663 296043 +6.2 
1939~ 19946 +0. J H490~ 44691~ +2.8 
6435 104' +9 .• 121036 140~~~ +16.1 
(41.81 (~2.8) (.5.0) (H.41 (41.51 (+4.11 
22.3 2S.9 +3.6 22.0 24.4 .2.4 
40.6 37.0 -3.6 41.8 41.6 -6.2 
JUn:ItIC4I COUIITY TOrN. 
1980 I 1990 I , 
19819 3~019 .76.$ 
22894 41096 +19.$ 
12.2 14.0 +1.1 
8.6 10.0 +1.4 
10.6 9.6 -1.0 
32~069 336764 +3.9 
~20~28 ~2017~ -0.0 
142411 160400 +12.6 
(43.3) (41.61 (.3.81 
24.1 26.2 +2.1 
48.9 42.8 -6.1 
co 
CO 
3. Eva1uating Neighborhood Revita1ization using 
Home Mortgage Disc10sure Act Data 
In compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act of 
1977 and the Horne Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, the St. 
Louis Federal Reserve Branch releases on an annual basis data 
that show horne mortgage lending patterns down to the census 
tract level within Jefferson County. This data goes back to 
1981 with the most recent set of data released in 1994. It 
was hypothesized that if EZ incentives had led to neighborhood 
revitalization in targeted areas, then one would find that 
horne mortgage lending rates for the EZ areas would at least 
match if not exceed those in the control communities, and that 
the average dollar amounts for such loans would at least be 
equal to those in the control communities. If EZ communities 
were blighted and needed a massive rebuilding effort, then the 
data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve District should show 
that horne building and construction should have taken off 
after KRS 154.45 was passed in 1982. Two of the goals of the 
legislation and the incentives embodied in KRS 154.45 were to 
"[I]mprove the quality of life of individuals that reside 
within an enterprise zone by providing employment 
opportunities, job training, and neighborhood improvement 
programs" and to "[E]1iminate b1ighted and deteriorated areas 
within an enterprise zone that feature chronic abandonment or 
demo1ition of residentia1 or commercia1 structures or 
property" (KRS 154.45, p. 412, emphasis added). 
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1981 198 2 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 19 88 1989 1990 1991 1992 19 93 1994 
I--e-ez -+- contro1 ~bg jtown ---A-county ---*-cnty\ez I 
Figure 5 
Figure 5 shows that from 1981 to 1994, all the EZ 
communities taken together (ez), or the full-size EZ, were 
behind the control and comparison areas (Newburg or control; 
Bluegrass and Jeffersontown or bg jtown; the county; and the 
county outside of the EZ or cnty\ez ) when it came to home 
mortgage lending as a percentage of total home mortgage loans 
in millions. The volume of loans for the full-size EZ did 
increase over this time period, but so did the volume for all 
the comparison areas. This last point is underscored by Figure 
6 where it is revealed that even though lending rates did 
accelerate for the full-size EZ (ez) during this time, the 
growth rates of mortgage lending for the comparison areas were 
90 
somewhat larger . 
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-a-ez -+- contro1 ~bg jtown --/r-county ~cnty\ez 
Fi.gure 6 
Next, Figure 7 shows that when comparing the average 
loan amount within the EZ, the ratio of average home mortgage 
loan values in the full-size or current EZ to average home 
mortgage loan values in the comparison areas falls below 1.0 
for most of the years between 1981 and 1994. The exception to 
this is 1983 when the average loan in the EZ exceed the 
average value of a loan in the Newburg area (cg). Other than 
that, the current EZ (established in 1986) saw less home 
mortgage dollars on average than did the county outside of the 
EZ (ez/balcnty) as well as the county as a whole (ez/all 
cnty). Only with the Newburg area does the full-size EZ come 
close to matching average home loan values. 
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RATIO OF AVG. LOAN IN CURRENT EZ 
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Figure 7 
-f}-ez/cg ratio 
-1-- ez / bg-jtown 
~ez/a11 cnty 
~ez/balcnty 
Just as with the Census data, these results do not show 
the EZ catching up with or surpassing the control (Newburg) or 
comparison communities when it comes to rates of housing 
investment or value of investment. The three figures show 
that lending patterns generally varied to the same degree in 
the EZ as it did in the comparison communities, but that the 
amount of investment in the EZ never came close to what was 
being invested in Newburg, other parts of Jefferson County, or 
the county as a whole. 
The Census data showed the EZ communities to be behind 
the comparison communities in regard to housing stock value, 
housing occupancy and new housing units. Any improvement in 
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this situation would have required a dramatic amount of 
investment in new housing or housing rehabilitation during the 
1980s and early 1990s. The rate of investment would probably 
have had to be much greater than what these three charts show. 
Such a low housing investment rate raises the question of 
whether the neighborhood improvement component of the EZ 
legislation was ever taken seriously by state and local 
economic development officials. 
4. Eva1uating Neighborhood Revita1ization using 
County Property Va1uation Administration Records 
Information obtained from Jefferson County's PVA office 
allowed calculating increases or decreases in tax assessment 
values of homes in the EZ areas and the control areas 
(Newburg, Jefferson County outside of the EZ, and Jefferson 
County as a whole). Tax assessment values are not the same as 
the fair market values of housing used in the Census data. 
However, if one assumes a high correlation between assessment 
values and fair market values for housing in general in any 
given neighborhood, then any increases or decreases in 
assessment values from one point in time to another may 
indicate a rise or fall in the fair market values of housing 
for a particular area. 
The local PVA office was able to provide computerized 
assessment data for the years 1992 through 1996. There are no 
computerized records before 1992. However, a look at changes 
in assessment values from 1992 to 1996 would provide the 
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opportunity to examine assessment, and indirectly, home value 
appreciation in the EZ and control areas beyond the 1980 and 
1990 Census data. The previous section showed that this type 
of revitalization was apparently not significant between 1980 
and 1990. Perhaps there are lagged effects with regard to EZ 
incentives that could not have shown neighborhood 
revitalization taking place by 1990. 
Before going further, it should be noted that PVA 
records are not kept according to either zip code or census 
tract. Instead, the local PVA office has its own geographic 
configuration of neighborhoods in order to do its job of 
regularly re-assessing and taxing property values. These 
neighborhoods are not necessarily defined in the same sense as 
one may conceive of neighborhoods in general. How.residents 
see their neighborhood may be different from how the PVA 
defines their neighborhood. Because the PVA is interested in 
administering and collecting taxes in a cost efficient and 
effective manner, PVA neighborhoods are mostly clusters of 
very similar housing within a geographic area. 
The average of the assessments for each PVA neighborhood 
for the five years 1992 to 1996 was averaged. PVA 
neighborhoods were combined to closely mirror those areas in 
the EZ and the control areas and to take the average of the 
average of the assessments for each assigned neighborhood. 
Using averages is somewhat flawed because of the risk of a 
skewed distribution of assessment values within a particular 
neighborhood. However, median assessment values were not 
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available. 
PVA records indicate that for the neighborhoods taken in 
by the original EZ, the average of the mean values of PVA 
neighborhood housing assessments in that area rose from 
$16,787 in 1992 to $18,793 in 1996. This was an increase of 
11.9%. 
In those neighborhoods taken in by the first EZ 
expansion and added to the original EZ neighborhoods (which 
together constituted Figure 2, the Intermediate Enterprise 
Zone), the average of the mean values of PVA assessments rose 
from roughly $32,727 in 1992 to $41,246 in 1996 for an 
increase of 26.03%. Meanwhile, in those neighborhoods taken 
in by the second EZ expansion in 1986, the average of the mean 
values of assessments rose from approximately $32,239 in 1992 
to $39,892 in 1996 for an increase of 23.74%. Finally, for 
the total or full-size EZ, the average of the neighborhood 
means rose from $30,437 in 1992 to $37,550 in 1996 for a 
23.37% increase in average values. Clearly, the EZ areas 
outside of the original EZ as well as the full-size EZ saw a 
much greater increase over the five year period in homeowner's 
wealth if one assumes a correlation between assessment values 
and fair market values. 
For the Newburg area, Jefferson County outside of the 
EZ, and for Jefferson County as a whole, average neighborhood 
horne assessment values also rose between 1992 and 1996. In 
Newburg, the average assessment rose from $38,439 in 1992 to 
$50,667 in 1996. This was an increase of 31.8% and was the 
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largest increase for all areas examined. The area of the 
county outside of the EZ saw the average of mean values of 
assessments rise from $62,944 in 1992 to $75,543 in 1996 for a 
20.02% increase. During the same time period, PVA records 
indicate that all of Jefferson County saw the average of the 
means of home assessment values for all PVA neighborhoods rise 
from $60,156 to $70,767. This was a 17.64% increase in 
average assessment values. 
What does one conclude from this analysis? First, if 
assessment values are adequately correlated with fair market 
values, the poorest part of the EZ, the original EZ, saw 
homeowner's wealth increase the least. This is in stark 
contrast to one of the poorest areas of the county outside of 
the EZ, the Newburg area. This area saw the largest average 
increase in its residential wealth, yet received none of the 
economic development stimulus or incentives provided by EZ 
legislation. The Newburg area received no comparable economic 
development assistance during this time period. Perhaps new 
subdivisions were started in this area during this time 
period. This may explain such a large rise in average 
assessments. However, even this explan~tion underscores the 
problems of the original EZ: a lack of new housing 
development large enough to offset housing stock losses; 
outward migration; and high unemployment (see Tables 2, 4, and 
5). If EZ incentives are working in the original zone area, 
then they are having a minimal impact at best. 
In fairness to the EZ area, the full-size EZ as well as 
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those areas in the EZ outside of the original zone, did 
slightly outperform Jefferson County and Jefferson County 
outside of the EZ when it came to increases in average 
assessment values. This could be due to a renewal of housing 
development in the southwestern part of Jefferson County 
(Stahl, 1997). During the 1970s and 1980s, southern and 
southwestern Jefferson County saw little if any new housing 
communities develop. Most new development during this time 
period took place in southeastern and eastern Jefferson 
County, although these areas continue to see robust 
residential housing development (Stahl, 1997). 
However, one cannot say whether EZ incentives played a 
key role, if any role, in the increase in new housing 
development throughout most of the full-size EZ. Based upon 
three February 19, 1997 Courier Journal articles by Linda 
Stahl, the 1990s have seen a housing boom throughout all of 
Jefferson County. The fastest growing area was the 40299 zip 
code (which includes Jeffersontown and a large part of 
southeastern Jefferson County), but data based upon-new home 
permits issued from 1992 to 1996 showed that almost every zip 
code in the county saw an increase in permits taken out for 
new home construction that was greater than the rate of 
permits issued in the 1980s (p Al and CJ Neighborhoods 
section, p. 1). 
The reasons given for the housing boom included a 
revival in the demand for lower middle income and middle 
income housing as well as the opening of a major highway, the 
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Gene Snyder Freeway. The Snyder was credited with opening up 
mostly rural-like undeveloped land throughout the outlying 
areas of Jefferson County. Since a housing boom has been 
taking place throughout most of Jefferson County throughout 
the 1990s, it is difficult to make the argument that EZ 
incentives played a role in higher average assessment values 
from 1992 to 1996 in the EZ area outside of the original zone. 
In fact, trends in the full-size EZ seem to be merely 
reflecting county-wide trends. 
5. Summary 
Based upon the preceding analysis and discussion, it 
seems that EZ incentives did very little if anything to 
encourage neighborhood revitalization within targeted areas. 
The first goal of KRS 154.45 was to improve the quality of 
life of EZ residents through job training programs and 
neighborhood redevelopment programs. With the exception of 
the original EZ area, neighborhood growth and development 
within the EZ did not generally differ that much from the rest 
of the county outside of the EZ or Jefferson County as a 
whole. Improving EZ neighborhoods apparently vanished as a 
goal as the EZ program became a general economic development 
tool and lost its focus on alleviating urban problems. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Louisvi11e EZ Performance Eva1uation: 
Job Creation and Retention 
1. Overview 
Two broad goals of KRS 154.45 (Subchapter 45: Enterprise 
Zone Development) were to "Improve the quality of life of 
individuals that reside within an enterprise zone by providing 
employment opportunities, ... " and to "Encourage economic 
activity by assisting and maintaining existing business within 
an enterprise zone." (Kentucky Revised Statutes, p. 412).9 
These goals were obviously aimed at job creation and 
retention, usually the most important goals of most if not all 
enterprise zones (Green, 1991). Whether new jobs were created 
and/or retained by EZ incentives, and whether the number of 
new jobs created and/or retained by EZ incentives were 
significant are the issues to be addressed in this part of the 
evaluation. 
According to the Louisville and Jefferson County Office 
for Economic Development (OED), the Louisville EZ is 
responsible for creating approximately 18,000 new jobs between 
its inception in 1983 and June 30, 1996. 10 As noted 
9 See the appendix for the full text of KRS 154.45, Subchapter 
45: Enterprise Zone Development. 
10 The figure 18,000 is from a quote by OED spokesperson Bill 
Pettison in an August 14, 1996 Courier-Journal article 
(Sheldon Shafer, p. E1). However, if OED annual figures of 
jobs created are summed, then the number of new jobs created 
by the EZ from 1983 to June 30, 1996 is 19,664. OED 
attributes this discrepancy to changes made in record-keeping 
in 1992. 
A survey of EZ certified firms done by the University of 
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previously, the accuracy of OED numbers has been called into 
question. This chapter will attempt to check the accuracy and 
plausibility of these numbers using shift-share analysis and 
survey results. 
First, an example is necessary to illustrate one of the 
methods--shift-share analysis--used to evaluate job creation. 
Tables 7 through 9 (see next several pages) compare Jefferson 
County's economic growth and changes in its industrial 
structure to national economic growth and changes in national 
industrial structure from 1981 to 1994. These tables are the 
results of a shift-share analysis, a technique used in urban 
and regional economics to see how much of a region's growth 
Louisville's Urban Studies Institute projected a different 
amount for jobs created--5,760. However, respondents also 
credited the EZ incentives with saving 3,152 jobs and creating 
or saving 6,333 jobs. Without regard to incentives, the 851 
companies surveyed (out of the approximately 1,200 certified 
firms) indicated that their workforce had grown by a net of 
13,271 employees since the companies had acquired EZ 
certification. However, not all 851 companies had been 
certified at the time that the zone had corne into existence. 
Some companies had been certified since 1983 whereas others 
had only been certified for a couple of years. 
Unfortunately, United Parcel Service (UPS) was not 
interviewed. According. to a phone conversation in October 
1996 that I had with Ken Shapero of UPS's Public Relations 
Office, in 1981 UPS employed 900 workers. As noted earlier in 
this paper, UPS became part of the EZ in 1986. Ten years 
later, Shapero reported that UPS employed around 14,000 
people, 80% of whom are part-time workers. Adding 14,000 to 
the 13,271 jobs that respondents reported would greatly boost 
the number of jobs created within the EZ without regard to 
incentives. 
Since there does not appear to be any firm estimate of 
the number of jobs created due to EZ incentives, this paper 
will use OED's figure of 18,000 new jobs created between 1983 
and 1996. This gives OED the benefit of the doubt when it 
comes to establishing a hard number on the jobs created within 
the EZ from 1983 to 1996. Also, these are the only official 




Jefferson County and United States Economy 
Years 1981 to 1994 
Employment Change, 1981-94 
1981 1994 Absolute 
Percent 
Nation 
Agricultural services, etc. 302694 586069 283375 93.62 
Mining 1107726 607721 -500005 -45.14 
Contract Construction 4286069 4709379 423310 9.88 
Manufacturing 20428330 18098123 -2330207 -11.41 
TPU 4613030 5713515 1100485 23.86 
Wholesale Trade 5260928 6365973 1105045 21. 00 
Retail Trade 15039998 20320266 5280268 35.11 
F/I/RE 5409780 7002431 1592651 29.44 
Services 17814081 33253032 15438951 86.67 
Other 587766 76791 -510975 -86.94 
TOTAL 74850402 96733300 21882898 29.24 
Employment Change 1981-94 
1981 1994 Absolute 
Percent 
Jefferson County 
Agricultural services, etc. 1210 1508 298 24.63 
Mining 479 252 -227 -47.39 
Contract Construction 15428 18803 3375 21. 88 
Manufacturing 88922 65021 -23901 -26.88 
TPU 16677 27183 10506 63.00 
Wholesale Trade 22771 27838 5067 22.25 
Retail Trade 56494 74706 18212 32.24 
FIIIRE 20100 26002 5902 29.36 
Services 67842 122811 54969 81. 03 
Other 1775 183 -1592 -89.69 
TOTAL 291698 364307 72609 24.89 
Source: 1981 and 1994 Ky. 




National Growth Effect, Jefferson Co. 1981-94 
Industry Employment 
1981 *N R *R-N 
sM+S 
Agricultural services, etc. 1210 354 298 -56 
Mining 479 140 -227 -367 
Contract Construction 15428 4511 3375 -1136 
Manufacturing 88922 26001 -23901 -49902 
TPU 16677 4876 10506 5630 
Wholesale Trade 22771 6658 5067 -1591 
Retail Trade 56494 16519 18212 1693 
F/I1RE 20100 5877 5902 25 
Services 67842 19837 54969 35132 
Other 1775 519 -1592 -2111 
TOTAL 291698 85292 72609 -12683 
*N - 1981 County Employment X Nat'l Growth Rate of 29.24' 
*R - N = M + S is the Net Relative Change to be explained by shift-share. 
Industry Mix Effect, Jefferson County 1981-94 
Industry 1981 Jobs, % Industry Growth 
breakdown: minus 
Nation Jefferson Nat'l Growth 
County (%) Emp.,1981 *M 
Agricultural services, etc. 0.40 0.41 64.38 1210 779 
Mining 1. 48 0.16 -74.38 479 -356 
Contract Construction 5.73 5.29 -19.36 15428 -2987 
Manufacturing 27.29 30.48 -40.65 88921 -36143 
TPU 6.16 5.72 -5.38 16667 -897 
Wholesale Trade 7.03 7.81 -8.24 22771 -1875 
Retail Trade 20.09 19.37 5.87 56494 3315 
F/I/RE 7.23 6.89 0.20 20100 40 
Services 23.80 23.26 57.43 67842 38960 
Other 0.79 0.61 -116.18 1775 -2062 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 291687 -1228 
*M = Product of previous two columns. 
is due to national and industry-specific trends as opposed to 
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possible local trends, local initiatives and local competitive 
advantages. If a region generates more jobs than what 
national economic and industry-specific (or, industry-mix) 
growth rates would indicate, then that region could be said to 
possibly have a competitive advantage within certain 
industrial sectors (if not all sectors) relative to the rest 
of the nation (Hoover and Giarratani, 1984, pp. 398-401; and 
Bendavid-Val, 1991, pp. 67-72). All the data come from the 
Table 9 
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Jefferson Co. , 
1981-94 
1981 1994 RN M *S 
Industry 
Agricultural services, etc. 1210 1764 298 354 779 -835 
Mining 479 254 -227 140 -356 -11 
Contract Construction 15428 16742 3375 4511 -2987 1851 
Manufacturing 88922 62608 -23901 26001 -36143 -13759 
TPU 16677 26375 10506 4876 -897 6527 
Wholesale Trade 22771 27147 5067 6658 -1875 284 
Retail Trade 56494 71715 18212 16519 3315 -1622 
F/IIRE 20100 26288 5902 5877 40 -15 
Services 67842 119417 54969 19837 38960 -3828 
Other 1775 102 -1592 519 -2062 -49 
TOTAL 291698 352412 72609 85292 -1228 -11455 
*S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive 
component. 
S=R -N - M 
1981 and 1994 U. s. and Kentucky County Business Patterns 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1981 and 1994). Table 7 shows 
that national employment grew 29.24% between 1981 to 1994. 
However, within major industrial sectors, growth rates varied 
from a high of 93.62% in agricultural services, forestry, 
fisheries, and food processing to a negative growth rate of 
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-45.14% in mining. All other categories had positive growth 
rates except for manufacturing (-11.41%) and other 
establishments that were not classified (-86.94%) .11 
Meanwhile, Jefferson County had an overall employment 
growth rate of 24.89% during this time period with 72,609 jobs 
being added to payrolls. Jefferson County job creation 
closely resembled the nation's when it came to the areas of 
mining, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, insurance and 
real estate (F/I/RE), and services. On the other hand, 
Jefferson County had over double the growth in the number of 
jobs created in the area of transportation and public 
utilities (TPU) than did the nation and had nearly two and a 
one-half times the number of jobs lost in manufacturing than 
did the nation (-26.88% for Jefferson County versus -11.41% 
for the U. S.). Finally, Jefferson County experienced an 
increase in jobs in agricultural services, etc. (24.63%), but 
this did not come close to national job growth (93.62%). 
The top portion of Table 8 shows that if each major 
industrial sector within Jefferson County grew at the national 
growth rate of 29.24% between 1981 and 1994, then the county 
would have seen 85,292 new jobs generated. This number is 
designated as "Nil, the employment that would have resulted if 
national trends had been duplicated in the locality during the 
time period under consideration. The number of jobs that 
11 The reason for the dramatic drop in the Other category is 
straightforward. Between 1981 and 1993, the Census Bureau 
adopted a new Standard Industrial Code (SIC) which created new 
classifications for businesses. This allowed for 
establishments previously not classified to be put into a 
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existed in 1981 is used as a base for calculating N. "R" is 
the actual number of jobs created in each sector from 1981 to 
1994 (see Table 7). Since this number is 72,609, Jefferson 
County generated 12,683 fewer jobs than what national trends 
would have produced (see last column, top half of table 8). 
This difference of 12,683 is called the "net relative change" 
that shift-share analysis must explain. In other words, the 
analysis must explain what industry-specific and local factors 
prevented Jefferson County from producing jobs at the same 
rate as the national economy. 
The bottom half of Table 8 shows what would be the 
effects of industry-specific trends and growth rates less or 
"minus" the overall national growth rate of 29.24% on local 
industrial development. In other words, the percentage 
national growth rates for each industry (see top half of Table 
7, last column) less the overall U. S. growth rate of 29.24% 
gives the percentages shown in the fourth column of the bottom 
half of Table 8. These percentages are then multiplied by the 
level of employment within each industry in Jefferson County 
for 1981 to yield "M", the industry mix effect, that shows the 
number of jobs that should have been produced had 
industry-specific growth rates (less the national growth rate) 
been duplicated in Jefferson County. In total, Jefferson 
County produced 1,228 fewer jobs than what national industrial 
trends would have produced had those same trends been 
duplicated in the county. 
major industrial category. 
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Finally, Table 9 decomposes the effects of national and 
industry-specific effects on Jefferson County job growth from 
1981 to 1994. "SH is the Local Share Effect or the 
competitive component of shift-share analysis. The 
competitive component is possibly the job creation in a region 
due to any local competitive advantages that may exist in that 
region which would cause job growth in that region to b~ 
higher than what would be expected given national and 
industry-specific growth trends. The reverse could also be 
true. If "S" is negative, then the region could have a 
negative competitive component given national and industry-
specific trends. 
It should be noted, however, that the reasons why a 
locality may have a positive or negative competitive component 
cannot be explained by shift-share analysis (MIT Dictionary of 
Modern Economics, 1989, p. 386; Blair, 1995, pp. 148-149). 
This is because S is a residua1 number. It is the result of 
subtracting Nand M from R (the actual job growth within the 
locality). As Table 9 shows, when Nand M are subtracted from 
R, Jefferson County had a negative competitive component 
relative to the rest of the nation when it came to job 
creation from 1981 to 1994. Jefferson County should have 
produced 11,455 more jobs than it actually did. That is, if 
national and industry-specific trends had been duplicated in 
Jefferson County from 1981 to 1994, then an even greater 
number of jobs would have been created--11,455 more than the 
72,609 produced. Despite job gains in agricultural services, 
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TPU, construction, wholesale trade and F/I/RE, these gains 
were not enough to offset losses in other industrial 
categories, especially in manufacturing, where local 
conditions are assumed to possibly account for the loss of 
13,759 (see column "3") out of the 23,901 actual manufacturing 
jobs lost (see column "R") between 1981 to 1994. 12 As Blair 
(1995, p. 146) writes, "Growth differentials due to the nature 
of the local environment are termed the competitive component. 
The mix and competitive components account for regional growth 
that differs from the national level." 
Now that shift-share analysis has been illustrated and 
explained, the method will now be applied in comparing EZ job 
growth to job growth in Jefferson County for the periods 1980 
to 1990 and from 1981 to 1994. Both the original-size EZ and 
the current or "full-size" EZ will be compared to Jefferson 
County job growth. Because the area that comprised the first 
expansion of the original EZ was so short-lived (a little over 
one year) and because this area later became part of the 
larger full-size EZ, an evaluation of this version of the EZ 
12 These results are interesting because it is during this 
time period that local governments took on most, if not all, 
the tasks of economic development because of declining support 
from the federal government. The results may indicate that 
creating and then enlarging the EZ, selling economic 
development bonds and industrial revenue bonds and pursuing 
other economic development policies (e.g., recruitment of 
businesses into the local area) may have had little effect on 
local economic growth. Or, if these economic development 
policies did have some positive impact, perhaps they were not 
enough to offset areas where Jefferson County suffered a 
comparative disadvantage relative to other regions of the 
country (e.g., inferior schools and universities, an unskilled 
workforce, etc.). 
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will be skipped. The following analysis is similar to that 
followed by Dowall (1996) in his evaluation of California's 
Enterprise Zones. 
As mentioned earlier, census tracts form the foundation 
of the Louisville EZ. All tracts must be contiguous and must 
be in an area that is on average an economically depressed and 
blighted area. The difficulty in doing a shift-share analysis 
at a level within the county boundaries lies in the fact that 
County Business Patterns does not collect firm and employment 
data at the census tract level. Likewise, the 1980 and 1990 
Censuses of Housing and Population do not collect firm and 
employment data at the tract level. Yet, even though County 
Business Patterns does not have data at the census tract 
level, it does have data at the zip code level going back to 
1981 (Dowall, 1996). Using a method where zip code areas are 
matched as closely as possible to areas within the EZ (Dowall, 
1996), one could use data from 1981 to 1994 (the most recent 
data available at the time of the writing of this study) in a 
shift-share analysis of the EZ. This would provide a 14 year 
time period for a pre- and post-test analysis with the EZ 
being in existence for nearly 11 of those 14 years. Also, a 
recent report prepared for Jefferson County Government 
estimated the location and number of jobs by census tract for 
both 1980 and 1990 census boundaries (Coomes and Price, 1994). 
Using these numbers, a shift-share analysis comparing both 
versions of the EZ to Jefferson County job creation at the 
tract level is possible. As the following tables show, both 
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data sources indicate the same trends and support each other. 
Shift-share analysis dictates that a sub-region of a 
larger area be compared to the larger area (as in comparing 
Jefferson County to the U. S.) (Bendavid-Val, 1991; Blair, 
1995, pp. 145-149). This chapter will compare both EZs (the 
original and the full-size) to Jefferson County job growth 
rates over two different time periods. Shift-share analysis 
would not allow a comparison between either version of the EZ 
to either the Newburg or Bluegrass Industrial Park areas (the 
control communities) because all of these areas are sub-
regions of Jefferson County. The county must be used as a 
point of reference if shift-share analysis is to be done 
properly. Therefore, the control communities' and the 
Louisville airport's rate of job growth will be compared to 
that of Jefferson County's rate in the next chapter. In that 
way, inferences can be made as to how well the EZ (in its 
original and current sizes) did in comparison not only to 
Jefferson County but also in comparison to these other two 
areas. In this chapter as well as the next, it is assumed 
that if EZ incentives were working, then one would expect job 
creation and retention in the EZ communities and the airport 
to at least match and/or exceed the rate of job creation and 
retention in Jefferson County, as well as the Bluegrass and 
Newburg areas. 
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2. Job Creation in the Origina1 EZ versus the County, 
1980 to 1990 and 1981 to 1994 
As noted earlier, the original EZ was 3.75 square miles 
of commercial and residential property west of Louisville's 
CBD. The following evaluation of the original EZ's capacity 
to create jobs covers two parallel time periods because of the 
use of two different data sources: estimates based on the 
1980 and 1990 Censuses of Housing and Population (Coomes and 
Price) and 1981 and 1994 County Business Patterns data at the 
zip code level (U. S. Commerce Department, 1981 and 1994). 
The same two data sources and corresponding time periods will 
be used throughout the rest of this section of the study while 
comparing different sub-regions of Jefferson County to the 
county as a whole. 
On the following pages, Tables 10 through 12 compare the 
original EZ to Jefferson County using data from the 1980 and 
1990 Censuses and 1980 and 1990 County Business Patterns (CBP) 
data for all of Jefferson County.13 The top half of Table 10 
shows jobs by major industry classification according to the 
1980 and 1990 CBPs for the County. Because of the Coomes and 
Price method (1994), some major industry categories have been 
combined (e.g., Agricultural Services and Mining, TPU and 
Wholesale Trade, and Services and Government) .14 
13 Aggregate numbers for the county could have derived from 
the 1980 and 1990 Census data. However, in order to make all 
tables comparable, the top half of each table will have data 
from County Business Patterns. . 
14 Actually, County Business Patterns (CBP) does not disclose 
the number of jobs in the government sector of our economy. 
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Between 1980 and 1990, Jefferson County added 37,913 
jobs to its jobs base, an increase of 12.78%. Meanwhile, the 
second part of Table 10 shows that those census tracts that 
composed the original EZ lost 6,890 jobs between 1980 and 
1990, a decrease of -26.12%. At the end of 1990, EZ 
incentives would have been in effect for at least six and a 
half years. Clearly the job losses estimated in the original 
EZ from 1980 to 1990 do not do much to support the argument 
that incentives helped to "[I]mprove the quality of life of 
individuals that reside within an enterprise zone by providing 
employment opportunities ... " or to "[E]ncourage economic 
activity by stimulating the influx of new business 




Comparison of Original EZ to Jefferson County, 1980-1990 
Employment Employment Change, 1980-90 
Jefferson County 1980 1990 
Absolute Percent 
Ag. & Mining 1154 2011 857 74.26 
Contract Construction 16331 17571 1240 7.59 
Manufacturing 90643 68569 -22074 -24.35 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 40948 42168 1220 2.98 
Retail Trade 59633 67948 8315 13.94 
F/I/RE 20718 26361 5643 27.24 
Services & Gov't 67250 109962 42712 63.51 
TOTAL 296677 334590 37913 12.78 
Source: 1980 and 1990 CBPs 
The numbers for "Services and Gov' t" in the top half of Table 
10 and subsequent similar tables are a combination of jobs from 
the CBP's "Services" and "Other Establishments Not-Classified" 
industrial categories. While not the same as "Services and 
Gov't", this is the best approximation possible given data 
constraints. 
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TABLE 10, CONTINUED. 
Original Enterprise Zone Area 
Ag. & Mining 
Contract Construction 
Manufacturing 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
F/r/RE 





















Source: 1980 and 1990 Censuses of Housing and Population. 


















In fact the first part of Table 11, column 3, shows that 
if job growth in the original EZ had been the same as the 
county during this period, the EZ would have gained 3,371 
jobs. On the other hand, looking at the last column of the 
TABLE 11 
Jefferson Co. Growth Effect for original EZ, 1980-90 
Industry 
Ag. & Mining 
Contract Construction 
Manufacturing 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
F/r/RE 













N .. Employment R R-N 
1980 X =M+S 
County Growth 
Rate(12.78%1 
17 -92 -109 
95 35 -60 
1897 -5089 -6986 
748 -2793 -3541 
186 -9 -195 
29 167 138 
399 891 492 
3371 -6890 -10261 
TABLE 11, CONT'D 
Industry ~x Effect, Enterprise Zone, 1980-90 
Qistribution of Total 
1980 Employment C%) 
Industry County EZ 
Agricultural services, etc. 0.39 0.52 
Contract Construction 5.50 2.80 
Manufacturing 30.55 56.27 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 13.80 22.18 
Retail Trade 20.10 5.51 
F/IIRE 6.98 0.87 
Services & Gov't 22.67 11.84 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 
*M '" Product of previous 2 
columns. 
TABLE 12 




Ag. & Mining 136 44 
Contract Construction 740 775 
Manufacturing 14846 9757 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 5853 3060 
Retail Trade 1454 1445 
F/I/RE 229 396 
Services & Gov't 3125 4016 
TOTAL 26383 19493 
S is Local Share Effect-are.'s competitive component. 
S .. R - N - M 
Industry 
Growth Rata Ent. 
minus Zone 
Co. Growth ElDp. , 
Rata C%) 1980 *M 
61. 48 136 84 
-5.19 740 -38 
-37.13 14846 -5513 
-9.80 5853 -574 
1.16 1454 17 
14.46 229 33 
50.73 3125 1585 
26383 -4406 
R N M s 
-92 17 84 -193 
35 95 -38 -22 
-5089 1897 -5513 -1473 
-2793 748 -574 -2967 
-9 186 17 -212 
167 29 33 105 
891 399 1585 -1093 
-6890 3371 -4406 -5855 
second part of Table 11, the EZ should have lost 4,406 jobs 
due to industry-specific trends that existed in the county 
during this time. On net, the original EZ still should have 
only lost 1,035 (=3,371-4,406) jobs. The fact that it lost 
around six times this number in addition to failing to 
generate 3,371 jobs is reflected by the -5,855 figure in the 
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last column of Table 12. 15 The -5,855 is the original EZ's 
competitive component relative to the rest of Jefferson 
County. Of the 6,890 jobs lost in this area between 1980 and 
1990, 5,855 of these jobs were lost possibly due to some 
attribute{s) that the EZ had that the rest of Jefferson County 
did not have or had to a lesser degree (e.g., higher crime 
rates, a high number of unskilled workers, etc.). Another 
reason why this area may have been especially hard hit is that 
when one looks at column 3 of the bottom half of Table 11 one 
notices that the original EZ had almost twice the percentage 
of its workforce in manufacturing than did the rest of the 
county in 1980. Deindustrialization not only hit Jefferson 
County hard in general, but may have hit certain areas within 
the county harder than others. 
Tables 13 through 15 compare the original EZ to 
Jefferson County using zip code level data from the U. S. 
Commerce Department's 1981 and 1994 County Business Patterns 
(CBP). According to Dowall (1996, p. 365), since 1981 the 
Census Bureau has been keeping zip code level CBP data for the 
entire U. S. The data for firms are presented according to 
zip code within each county at the four-digit SIC level. That 
is, for a given zip code, the total number of firms in a four-
digit SIC classification is noted along with a breakdown of 
how many firms in that classification fall into different size 
categories {e.g., 1 to 4 ~mployees, 5 to 9 employees, 10 to 19 
employees, etc., up to those firms with 1000 or more 
15 -5855=-6890 - 3371 - -4406, or S = R - N - M. 
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employees). The data files do not show how many people are 
employed within each 4-digit SIC category within each zip, but 
this number can be estimated by using state-wide or county-
wide level data. 
For the purposes of this study, Dowall's methodology for 
evaluating the 13 California EZs was adapted by aggregating 
"the establishment tabulations to the 2-digit level from the 
4-digit level of aggregation (4-digit is based on a more 
TABLE 13 
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS 
Comparison of Original EZ to Jefferson County, 1981-1994 
Employment 
1981 1994 
Agricultural services, etc. 1210 1508 
Mining 479 252 
Contract Construction 15428 18803 
Manufacturing 88922 65021 
TPU 16677 27183 
Wholesale Trade 22771 27838 
Retail Trade 56494 74706 
F/I/RE 20100 26002 
Services 67842 122811 
Other 1775 183 
TOTAL 291698 364307 
Original EZ 
Agricultural services 4 0 
Mining 35 21 
Contract Construction 333 588 
Manufacturing 15258 10748 
TPU 1320 1918 
Wholesale Trade 1492 1452 
Retail Trade 1210 1195 
F/I/RE 259 339 
Services 2641 3034 
Other 55 2 
TOTAL 22607 19297 


























specific breakdown of economic activity than 2-digit)U and by 
estimating "average employment for each establishment size 
category by 2-digit SIC category.u (p. 365). The estimation 
of average employment for each establishment size category in 
this study was done by using County Business Patterns total 
number of firms and employment state-wide by 2-digit SIC and 
TABLE 14 
county Growth Effect, Original EZ, 1981-94 
Industry Employment, 1981 *N R R-N=M+S 
Agricultural services, etc. 4 1 -4 -5 
Mining 35 9 -14 -23 
Contract Construction 333 83 255 172 
Manufacturing 15258 3798 -4510 -8308 
TPU l320 329 598 269 
Wholesale Trade 1492 371 -40 -411 
Retail Trade 1210 301 -15 -316 
F/I/RE 259 64 80 16 
Services 2641 657 393 -264 
Other 55 14 -53 -67 
TOTAL 22607 5627 -3310 -8937 
*N - 1981 Original EZ employment X county growth rate of 24.89%. 
*R - N = M + S: Net relative change to be explained by shift-share analysis. 





County EZ ('II) EZ Emp. M 
Agricultural services, etc. 0.41 0.02 -0.26 4 0 
Mining 0.16 0.15 -72.28 35 -25 
Contract Construction 5.29 1. 47 -3.01 333 -10 
Manufacturing 30.48 67.49 -51.77 15258 -7899 
TPU 5.72 5.84 38.11 1320 503 
Wholesale Trade 7.81 6.60 -2.64 1492 -39 
Retail Trade 19.37 5.35 7.35 1210 89 
F/I/RE 6.89 1.15 4.47 259 12 
Services 23.26 11.68 56.14 2641 1483 
Other 0.61 0.24 -114.58 55 -63 
TOTAL 100 100.00 22607 -5951 
Source: 1981 and 1994 CBPs. 
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by size of firm (Tables Ib and lc of Kentucky CBPs) . 
These estimates of average firm employment using statewide 
data are then applied to the number of firms identified with 
each 2-digit SIC and firm size within each zip code within 
Jefferson County. 
Following Dowall (pp. 365-366), I used the estimates of 
average employment for each firm size category to calculate 
the average employment for all size of establishment 
categories for each 2-digit level SIC industry within 
Jefferson County. Then, similar to Dowall, I estimated 
employment by size category for each 2-digit SIC category for 
each zip code within Jefferson County. The estimates were 
determined by multiplying the average employment estimate of a 
specific size and 2-digit SIC category by the number of firms 
in those categories for all 2 digit SIC categories, for all 
firm sizes and for all zip codes. When total number of jobs 
for each zip code was summed, the estimates were only off by 
1,636 jobs for 1981 and 2,014 jobs for 1994 when compared to 
CBP totals for Jefferson County for those years. 
Tables 13, 14, and 15 pretty much reinforce and parallel 
the findings of the shift-share analysis of the 1980 and 1990 
Census data. Just as with the 1980 to 1990 time period, the 
original EZ 16 experienced negative growth between 1981 and 
1994 (-15%) whereas the county experienced a growth rate of 
16 The original EZ census tracts closely correspond to the 
western half of the area covered by the County's 40203 zip code 
and all of the 40210 zip code. There have been no changes in 
zip boundaries wi thin Jefferson County over the fourteen year 
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24.89%. The original EZ, therefore, did not generate a net 
gain of jobs over this time frame and did not meet two of the 
objectives of KRS 154.45--job and business creation and 
retention. 
TABLE 13 
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Original EZ 1981-1994 
1981 1994 R N M S* 
Industry 
Agricultural services, etc. 4 0 -4 1 0 -5 
Mining 35 21 -14 9 -25 3 
Contract Construction 333 588 255 83 -10 182 
Manufacturing 15258 10748 -4510 3798 -7899 -409 
TPU 1320 1918 598 329 503 -234 
Wholesale Trade 1492 1452 -40 371 -39 -372 
Retail Trade 1210 1195 -15 301 89 -405 
F/I/RE 259 339 80 64 12 4 
Services 2641 3034 393 657 1483 -1747 
Other 55 2 -53 14 -63 -4 
TOTAL 22607 19297 -3310 5627 -5951 -2986 
*S=R -N - M 
Source: 1981 and 1994 CBPs. 
Table 14 shows that had the county's growth trend been 
achieved in the original EZ, 5,627 jobs would have been 
created (see top half, third column, "N"). On the other hand, 
given industry-specific trends, the EZ should have lost 5,951 
jobs (see bottom half, last column, "M"). The net effect 
would have been a job loss of 324, yet this area actually lost 
3,310 jobs. Table 15, Column "S" implies that this difference 
period 1981-1994. 
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of 2,986 (=3310 - 324) is possibly due to some competitive 
disadvantage(s) that the original EZ had relative to the 
county. As with the Census data, one can assume the same 
possible causes of such a disadvantage. 
3. Job Creation in the Fu11-size EZ versus the County, 
1980 to 1990 and 1981 to 1994 
The next few pages compare the current 45.7 square-mile 
EZ, "Full-size EZ", to Jefferson County job creation using the 
1980 and 1990 Census data as well as 1980 and 1990 CBP data. 
Table 16 shows that the full-size EZ17 suffered a small 
decline in job numbers--l,126 jobs lost, or a 1.09% drop. 
Table 17 indicates that had the full-size EZ grown at the 
county's growth rate, the EZ should have generated 13,226 
jobs. Since -the industry mix effect shows that the full-size 
EZ should have lost 3,387 jobs (see last column, bottom of 
table) the full-size EZ, according,to shift-share analysis, 
should have generated a net of 9,839 jobs. But since the EZ 
failed to generate this.number of jobs, and instead lost 1,126 
jobs, the EZ has a negative competitive component relative to 
the county. In fact, Column "S" of Table 18 shows that the 
full-size EZ had a competitive component of 10,965 jobs that 
"should" have been retained or created. Again, shift-share 
analysis cannot pinpoint "causality" or explain why the full-
17 This is composed of those census tracts in the original EZ 
as well as those census tracts added in 1986. 
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size EZ suffered from a negative competitive component. One 
can speculate that perhaps this area suffered from high crime, 
poor infrastructure, deindustrialization, etc., although maybe 
not to the same degree as the original EZ. 
TABLE 16 
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS 
Comparison of Full-size EZ to Jefferson County, 1980-1990 
Employment Change, 1980-90 
1980 1990 Absolute Percent 
Jefferson County 
Ag. & Mining 1154 2011 857 74.26 
Contract Construction 16331 17571 1240 7.59 
Manufacturing 90643 68569 -22074 -24.35 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 40948 42168 1220 2.98 
Retail Trade 59633 67948 8315 13.94 
F/I/RE 20718 26361 5643 27.24 
Services & Gov't 67250 109962 42712 63.51 
TOTAL 296677 334590 37913 12.78 
Source: 1980 and 1990 CBPs 
Employment Change 1980-90 
1980 1990 Absolute Percent 
Full-size EZ 
Ag. & Mining 613 687 74 12.07 
Contract Construction 5180 5722 542 10.46 
Manufacturing 40546 33155 -7391 -18.23 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 17885 17783 -102 -0.57 
Retail Trade 11731 13331 1600 13.64 
F/I/RE 2184 2759 575 26.33 
Services & Gov't 25352 28928 3576 14.11 
TOTAL 103491 102365 -1126 -1.09 
Source: 1980 and 1990 Censuses. 
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TABLE 17 
Jefferson Co. Growth Effect for Full-size EZ 1980-90 
Industry Employment 
1980 N R R-M=M+S 
Ag. & Mining 613 78 74 -4 
Contract Construction 5180 662 542 -120 
Manufacturing 40546 5182 -7391 -12573 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 17885 2286 -102 -2388 
Retail Trade 11731 1499 1600 101 
F/I/RE 2184 279 575 296 
Services & Gov't 25352 3240 3576 336 
TOTAL 103491 13226 -1126 -14352 
Industry Mix Effect, Full-size Enterprise Zone, 1980-90 
Distribution of Total 





County EZ County Growth EZ M 
Rate (%) Emp. , 
1980 
Agricultural services, 0.39 0.59 61. 48 613 377 
etc. 
Contract Construction 5.50 5.01 -5.19 5180 -269 
Manufacturing 30.55 39.18 -37.13 40546 -15056 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 13.80 17.28 -9.80 17885 -1753 
Retail Trade 20.10 11.34 1.16 11731 137 
F/I/RE 6.98 2.11 14.46 2184 316 
Services & Gov't 22.67 24.50 50.73 25352 12862 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 103491 -3387 




Employment and Components of Employment Change, Full-size Enterprise Zone, 1980-90 
1980 1990 R N M S 
Industry 
Ag. & Mining 613 687 74 78 377 -381 
Contract Construction 5180 5722 542 662 -269 149 
Manufacturing 40546 33155 -7391 5182 -15056 2483 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 17885 17783 -102 2286 -1753 -635 
Retail Trade 11731 13331 1600 1499 137 -36 
F/I/RE 2184 2759 575 279 316 -20 
Services & Gov't 25352 28928 3576 3240 12862 -12526 
TOTAL 103491 102365 -1126 13226 -3387 -10965 
S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive component. 
S=R-N-M 
The same two areas are compared in Tables 19 through 
21 using 1981 and 1994 CBP zip code data. 18 Table 19 
indicates that at best the full-size EZ experienced minor 
economic growth over the fourteen year period (+3.46%). Given 
the previous analysis of these two areas, one can reasonably 
conclude that economic growth in the full-size EZ during the 
18 Job figures for the full-size EZ were estimated by using the 
Dowall method. Specifically, job estimates for Jefferson County 
zip codes that fell entirely wi thin EZ boundaries were not 
truncated, whereas zip codes that partially overlapped EZ 
boundaries were truncated by one-half or by whatever amount 
seemed reasonable given comparisons between zip code and census 
tract maps of the county. This is a crude but necessary 
adjustment as acknowledged by Dowall (p. 366) because it 
assumes that all businesses are equally spaced throughout a 
geographic area. 
Specifically, for the purposes of shift share analysis, 
the full-size EZ took in all of the 40210, 40209, 40219, 40221 
(Louisville International Airport) and 40292 (University of 
Louisville) zip codes. It also took in one-half of zip codes 
40203, 40204, 40211, 40212, 40213, 40214, 40216, 40217, and 
40258. Finally, one-fourth of zip 40272 was included since a 




Comparison of Full-size EZ to Jefferson County, 1981-1994 
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5942 41. 29 
92 2.88 
7724 53.55 
-339 -91. 37 
3090 3.46 
1980s and early 1990s was pretty much non-existent or stagnant 
despite EZ incentives being introduced in 1983 and then 
expanded in 1986. Looking at the top half, third column of 
Table 20, the full-size EZ should have created 22,245 jobs had 
it grown at the same rate as the county (24.89%). At the same 
123 
time, the EZ should have lost 9,726 jobs due to the 
TABLE 20 
county Growth Effect, Full-size EZ, 1981-94 
Industry N R R-NmM+S 
Employment 
1981 
Agricultural services, etc. 280 70 -35 -105 
Mining 95 24 -74 -98 
Contract Construction 4909 1222 3 -1219 
Manufacturing 39265 9773 -13455 -23228 
TPU 5581 1389 2925 1536 
Wholesale Trade 6858 1707 307 -1400 
Retail Trade 14390 3582 5942 2360 
F/I/RE 3199 796 92 -704 
Services 14424 3590 7724 4134 
Other 371 92 -339 -431 
TOTAL 89372 22245 3090 -19155 
Industry Mix Effect, Full-size EZ 1981-1994 
Distribution of Total 
1981 Employment (%) 
Industry Industry Growth 
Rata minus 
County EZ County Growth Rate Emp. , M 
(%) 1981 
Agricultural services, etc. 0.41 0.31 -0.26 280 -1 
Mining 0.16 0.11 -72.28 95 -69 
Contract Construction 5.29 5.49 -3.01 4909 -148 
Manufacturing 30.48 43.93 -51.77 39265 -20327 
TPU 5.72 6.24 38.11 5581 2127 
Wholesale Trade 7.81 7.67 -2.64 6858 -181 
Retail Trade 19.37 16.10 7.35 14390 1057 
F/I/RE 6.89 3.58 4.47 3199 143 
Services 23.26 16.14 56.14 14424 8097 
Other 0.61 0.42 -114.58 371 -425 
TOTAL 100 100.00 89372 -9726 
Source: 1981 and 1994 CBPs. 
industry mix effect (bottom half, last column of Table 20) . 
Therefore, the EZ should have seen the creation of at least a 
net of 12,519 jobs given county and industry mix trends. 
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TABLE 21 
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Full-size EZ 1981-1994 
1981 1994 R N M S* 
Industry 
Agricultural services, etc. 280 245 -35 70 -1 -104 
Mining 95 21 -74 24 -69 -29 
Contract Construction 4909 4912 3 1222 -148 -1071 
Manufacturing 39265 25810 -13455 9773 -20327 -2901 
TPU 5581 8506 2925 1389 2127 -591 
Wholesale Trade 6858 7165 307 1707 -181 -1219 
Retail Trade 14390 20332 5942 3582 1057 1303 
F/r/RE 3199 3291 92 796 143 -847 
Services 14424 22148 7724 3590 8097 -3963 
Other 371 32 -339 92 -425 -6 
TOTAL 89372 92462 3090 22245 -9726 -9428 
S is Local Share Effect--
area competitive component. 
*S=R -N - M 
However, since this area only saw 3,090 new jobs 
created, the full-size EZ fell short of what job growth trends 
would have predicted by 9,428 jobs (see Column "S", Table 21) 
Again, the inference is that the full-size EZ had some type, 
or several types, of disadvantages that may have held it back 
when compared to the county's record of job creation. Once 
again, both data sets indicate that EZ incentives do not seem 
to have offset the negative competitive components that this 
area faced relative to the county. 
4. Job Creation in the Airport area versus the County, 
1980 to 1990 and 1981 to 1994 
In order to control for any stimulus that EZ incentives 
had on the growth of Louisville's airport that may have caused 
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it to grow faster than the rest of the full-size EZ, the 
following tables were created. 
TABLE 22 
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS 




Ag. & Mining 1154 2011 
Contract Construction 16331 17571 
Manufacturing 90643 68569 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 40948 42168 
Retail Trade 59633 67948 
F/IIRE 20718 26361 
Services & Gov't 67250 109962 
TOTAL 296677 334590 
Source: 1980 and 1990 CBPs 
Employment 
1980 1990 
Louisville Airport Area 
Ag. & Mining 126 218 
Contract Construction 1230 1507 
Manufacturing 4775 3688 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 3440 7293 
Retail Trade 1479 2604 
F/I/RE 221 516 
Services & Gov't 2558 4395 
TOTAL 13829 20221 























Because the airport is somewhat like an industrial park, 
it was believed that EZ incentives may have had a greater 
effect on this area than on other EZ areas. The Census data 
in Table 22 show the airport growing at a much faster rate 
than the rest of Jefferson County. This is due in large part 
to jobs created in TPU and wholesale trade. There were also 
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large percentage increases in Ag. and Mining, F/I/RE and 
Services and Gov't, but nearly half of the new jobs created 
were in TPU and Wholesale Trade. 
TABLE 23 
Jefferson Co. Growth Effect for Louisville Airport Area 1980-90 
Industry Employment N R R-N"'M+S 
1980 
Ag. & Mining 126 16 92 76 
Contract Construction 1230 157 277 120 
Manufacturing 4775 610 -1087 -1697 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 3440 440 3853 3413 
Retail Trade 1479 189 1125 936 
F/I/RE 221 28 295 267 
Services & Gov't 2558 327 1837 1510 
TOTAL 13829 1767 6392 4625 
Industry Mix Effect, Louisville Airport Area, 1980-90 
Distribution of Total 
1980 Employment (%) 
Industry Industry 
Growth -
County Airport County Growth Emp. , M 
(%) 1980 
Agricultural services, etc. 0.39 0.91 61. 48 126 77 
Contract Construction 5.50 8.89 -5.19 1230 -64 
Manufacturing 30.55 34.53 -37.13 4775 -1773 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 13.80 24.88 -9.80 3440 -337 
Retail Trade 20.10 10.69 1.16 1479 17 
F/I/RE 6.98 1. 60 14.46 221 32 
Services & Gov't 22.67 18.50 50.73 2558 1298 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 13829 -750 
Table 23 shows that the airport created jobs across all 
industries (with the exception of manufacturing) at a rate 
greater than the county whereas industry trends show that the 
airport fell short of generating 750 jobs that should have 
been created ("M"). 
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Finally, Table 24 (next page) shows that the airport had 
a positive competitive component relative to the county in 
that 4,486 jobs were created due to the fact that airport job 
growth rates outperformed the overall county average despite 
not outperforming industry growth rates. However, it should 
be pointed out that during this time period of 1980 to 1990, 
the airport underwent massive reconstruction and expansion. 
Millions of dollars from the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and bonds sold by the Commonwealth of Kentucky financed 
the construction of a second runway for the airport. This 
second runway allowed United Parcel Service (UPS) to expand 
its operations from a nearly 1,000 employees in 1981 to nearly 
14,000 by 1994. Therefore, EZ incentives cannot be given full 
credit for this expansion in jobs at Louisville International 
Airport. 
Finally, the Coomes and Price database, which used 1980 
and 1990 Census data, defined the Louisville airport as 
covering four 1990 census tracts: tracts 55, 91.01, 92, and 
119.01. This area is actually slightly larger than the area 
encompassed by the airport itself and so this may cause the 
airport job numbers to be slightly larger than if one used the 
airport's exact boundaries. Perhaps Coomes and Price should 
have labeled this as the "airport area." 
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TABLE 24 
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Louisville Airport Area, 1980-90 
1980 1990 
Industry 
Ag. & Mining 126 218 
Contract Construction 1230 1507 
Manufacturing 4775 3688 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 3440 7293 
Retail Trade 1479 2604 
F/I/RE 221 516 
Services & Gov't 2558 4395 
TOTAL 13829 20221 
S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive component. 
S-R-N-M 
R N M 
92 16 104 
277 157 
-34 
-1087 610 -797 
3853 440 -128 
1125 189 19 
295 28 66 
1837 327 910 










Table 25 uses CBP data at the zip code level to look at 
job growth in the airport. For zip code purposes, Louisville 
International Airport has been classified as zip code 40221 
for at least the last 16 years (Louisville Branch, U. S. Post 
Office) . The zip code boundary more closely reflects the 
airport boundaries than the four census tracts used by Coomes 
and Price. Because of a smaller geographic area covered, 
Table 25 shows no employment in some major industry 
categories. This is to be expected because as one goes from a 
larger area to a smaller area, one expects to find fewer 
firms. Table 25 shows job growth at a rate better than the 
other areas examined under the EZ, but this growth rate is 




Comparison of Louisville Airport to Jefferson County using CBP Zip Coda Data 
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In fact, Table 26 shows the airport should have 
generated 5,941 jobs if it had grown at the county growth 
rate, yet it fell short by 1,020 jobs. Despite very strong 
growth in TPU and wholesale trade, this area lost quite a few 
manufacturing, retail, F/I/RE, and service jobs. I can only 
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TABLE 26 
County Growth Effect, Louisville Airport, 1981-94 
Industry Emp. , 1981 N R R-N-M+S 
Agricultural services, etc. 4 1 -4 -5 
Mining 0 0 0 0 
Contract Construction 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 5311 1322 -5056 -6378 
TPU 3022 752 15943 15191 
Wholesale Trade 1235 307 4991 4684 
Retail Trade 7337 1826 -5258 -7084 
F/IIRE 5816 1448 -4806 -6254 
Services 1021 254 -780 -1034 
Other 123 31 -109 -140 
TOTAL 23869 5941 4921 -1020 
Industry Mix Effect, Airport 
Distribution of Total 
1981 Employment ('Is) Industry 
- Co. Emp. 
Industry County Airport Growth 1981 M 
Agricultural services, etc. 0.41 0.02 -0.26 4 0 
Mining 0.16 0.00 -72.28 0 0 
Contract Construction 5.29 0.00 -3.01 0 0 
Manufacturing 30.48 22.25 -5l. 77 5311 -2750 
TPU 5.72 12.66 38.11 3022 1152 
Wholesale Trade 7.81 5.17 -2.64 1235 -33 
Retail Trade 19.37 30.74 7.35 7337 539 
F/IIRE 6.89 24.37 4.47 5816 260 
Services 23.26 4.28 56.14 1021 573 
Other 0.61 0.52 -114.6 123 -141 
TOTAL 100 100 23869 -399 
speculate that airport expansion may have caused many firms in 
these categories to leave the area. Table 26 also shows that 
the airport carne up short as far as industry mix effects. 
Because employment growth in the airport did not reflect 
industry growth trends, the column M indicates that the 
airport did not see 399 jobs created due to industry trends. 
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Finally, Table 27 implies that the airport had a small 
negative competitive component relative to the county. 
Overall, job generation, if county and industry growth trends 
had been replicated in the 40221 zip code, 621 more jobs 
should have been generated between 1981 and 1994 than was 
actually created. 
TABLE 27 
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Louisville Airport, 1981-1994 
Industry 1981 1994 R N M S* 
Agricultural services, etc. 4 0 -4 1 0 -5 
Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Contract Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 5311 255 -5056 1322 -2750 -3628 
TPU 3022 18965 15943 752 1152 14039 
Wholesale Trade 1235 6226 4991 307 -33 4717 
Retail Trade 7337 2079 -5258 1826 539 -7623 
F/I/RE 5816 1010 -4806 1448 260 -6514 
Services 1021 241 -780 254 573 -1607 
Other 123 14 -109 31 -141 1 
TOTAL 23869 28790 4921 5941 -399 -621 
*S"'R-N-M 
S is "local share effect" showing an area's competitive component. 
It should be noted, however, that job growth in this 
area was very uneven. Probably because of UPS, growth in TPU 
and wholesale trade almost offset job losses in other 
industries. Also, if firms dislocated due to airport 
expansion stayed in an area close to the airport or within the 
EZ, then outcomes from the analysis of airport CBP data may be 
underestimating job growth in this area. 
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5. Summary 
Overall, it does not appear on the surface that EZ 
incentives did a great deal to stimulate job growth in the 
targeted areas (with the possible exception of the airport 
area). One objection that could be raised against this 
speculation is that if it had not been for the EZ incentives, 
then job losses in the EZ (whether in the original EZ or the 
full-size EZ) would have been even worse. There is, of course, 
no direct way to refute this possible outcome. In fact, OED 
claims that EZ incentives helped to create 18,000 new jobs 
between 1983 and 1996. It has never said whether these 18,000 
jobs were "net" of jobs lost. However, OED cannot say that 
these were net jobs gained because the data herein show this 
to be impossible. However, the results above do not appear 
consistent with OED's claim that the EZ is a "$1 Billion 
Success Story" (OED Press Release, 1990). 
Also, if it can be shown that other areas in Jefferson 
County similar to the EZ had attained job growth rates greater 
than the EZ during the same time period, and if these areas 
had done so without any type of government intervention, 
assistance and/or incentives, then the OED claim about success 
would be further questioned. Consistent with the logic of 
quasi-experimentation, such comparisons would be in order. 
The next chapter examines these issues in more detail. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Job Creation in Contro1 and Comparison Communities 
1. Job Creation in the Newburg Area versus Jefferson 
County, 
1980 to 1990 and 1981 to 1994 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 and in the previous chapter, it 
is important to and consistent with the logic of quasi-
experimentation to compare changes in the full-size EZ and its 
component parts to other areas in Jefferson County and to 
Jefferson County as a whole. Since these other areas did not 
receive the economic development stimulus of EZ incentives, it 
is important to establish whether other areas comparable to 
the EZ areas changed similarly over time when compared to the 
EZ. 
For that reason, the Newburg area was chosen as a control 
area to be compared to the EZ because of its socioeconomic and 
demographic similarities to the original EZ. Using 1980 and 
1990 Census data again, Table 28 shows that the Newburg area 
saw mild job loss between 1980 and 1990 (a decline of just 
.31%). This, of course, is far behind the county's overall 
growth rate of 12.78%. But it is better than what the Census 
data show for both the original and full-size EZ during the 
same time period. 19 If job growth in the Newburg area had 
19 Recall that census tracts that comprised the Newburg Area 
were included as a control area to be compared to EZ areas 
because of the socioeconomic profile of the area and because 
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been the same as the county's from 1980 to 1990, then Newburg 
should have gained 4,367 jobs (Table 29, column 3, top half). 
At the same time, the industry mix effect shows that because 
of the Newburg area's industrial composition in 1980, it 
should have lost 5,609 jobs (Table 29, last column, bottom 
half). This is probably due to the high concentration of 
manufacturing jobs within Newburg in 1980: 57.71% of 
Newburg's workforce was in manufacturing whereas the county 
had 30.55% in manufacturing (Table 29, bottom half, columns 2 
and 3). 
Table 30 shows that because Newburg lost only 106 jobs 
when it should have lost a net of 1,242 (=4,367 - 5,609) jobs, 
the area had a positive competitive component of 1,136 (=1,242 
- 106) jobs. Newburg was able to "cut its 10sses H by 
experiencing job growth in all of the other industrial sectors 
outside of manufacturing. In this way, the Newburg area was 
at least able to remain static rather than decline like both 
versions of the EZ. More importantly, it was able to do so 
without any economic development stimulus like EZ incentives. 
the Newburg area received none of the economic development 





Comparison of Newburg Area to Jefferson County, 1980-1990 
Jefferson County 
Industry 
Ag. & Mining 
Contract Construction 
Manufacturing 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
F/r/RE 
Services & Gov't 
TOTAL 
Source: 1980 and 1990 CBPs 
Newburg Area 
Ag. & Mining 
Contract Construction 
Manufacturing 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
F/r/RE 




























































2747 72 .10 
-106 -0.31 
Jefferson Co. Growth Effect for Newburg Area, 1980-90 
Industry Employment 
N .. Emp~oyment 1980 X 
1980 County Growth R 
Rate(12.78%) 
Ag. & Mining 105 13 98 
Contract Construction 1355 173 215 
Manufacturing 19718 2520 -5372 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 4261 545 942 
Retail Trade 3820 488 1162 
F/r/RE 1098 140 102 
Services & Gov't 3810 487 2747 











TABLE 29 , CONTINUED. 
Industry Mix Effect, Newburg Area, 1980-90 
Distribution of Total 
1980 Employment (%) 
Industry 
Industry Growth minus Newburg 
County Growth Emp .. 
County Newburg (%) 1980 
M 
Agricultural services, 0.39 0.31 61. 48 105 65 
etc. 
Contract Construction 5.50 3.97 -5.19 1355 -70 
Manufacturing 30.55 57.71 -37.13 19718 -7322 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 13.80 12.47 -9.80 4261 -418 
Retail Trade 20.10 11.18 1.16 3820 44 
F/I/RE 6.98 3.21 14.46 1098 159 
Services & Gov't 22.67 11.15 50.73 3810 1933 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 34167 -5609 
TABLE 30 
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Newburg Area, 1980-90 
1980 1990 R N M S 
Industry 
Ag. & Mining 105 203 98 13 65 20 
Contract Construction 1355 1570 215 173 -70 112 
Manufacturing 19718 14346 -5372 2520 -7322 -570 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 4261 5203 942 545 -418 815 
Retail Trade 3820 4982 1162 488 44 630 
F/I/RE 1098 1200 102 140 159 -197 
Services & Gov't 3810 6557 2747 487 1933 327 
TOTAL 34167 34061 -106 4367 -5609 1136 
S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive component. 
S=R-N-M 
Tables 31 to 33 show a slightly different story for the 
Newburg Area. Since half of the Newburg area is in zip code 
40218 and the other half is in zip 40219, I divided the number 
of jobs for each industrial sector for each zip code by two 
and then combined the resulting numbers. This is a crude 
method of approximation since it assumes that jobs are equally 
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distributed geographically throughout a zip code, but it is 
the only way to arrive at a rough job estimate for the area. 
Also, the estimate for the total number of jobs for the 
Newburg area shows wide variation between the estimates given 
by CBP zip code data and the Census data. In addition to 
using the step mentioned in the previous paragraph in order to 
arrive at job figures for Newburg, the Dowall method that I 
followed estimated that in 1981 the total number of jobs in 
Newburg was 12,560. For 1980, the Census data show that this 
area had a total of 34,167 jobs. Despite the fact that 1981 
was a recession year, an economic downturn could not explain 
this great of a drop in the number of jobs from one year to 
the next. So far, the two methods have rendered numbers that 
were reasonably close, given that two different data sets are 
being analyzed. With regard to the Newburg area, perhaps the 
Dowall method does not accurately reflect actual job 
conditions in 1981 and 1994 because of the crudeness of having 
to arbitrarily divide zip codes into halves. By arbitrarily 
splitting both zip codes in half, the actual job performance 
of the Newburg area may not be accurately reflected in tables 
31 to 33 since Newburg is only a small portion geographically 
of both zip codes when the two zip codes are combined. 
However, despite the fact that the CBP zip code numbers 
for the Newburg area for 1981 and 1994 do not correspond very 
well with the Census data, there may be some patterns that the 
data show that are worth examination. 2o Interestingly, Table 
20 Also, notice that both the 1981 and 1994 CBP zip code 
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31 shows that between 1981 and 1994 the Newburg area saw the 
development of 2,900 new jobs for a growth rate of 23.09%. 
TABLE 31 
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS 
Comparison of Newburg Area to Jefferson County using CBP Zip Coda Data 
Empl.oyment Change 1981-94 
1981 1994 Absol.ute Percent 
Jefferson County 
Agricultural services, etc. 1210 1508 298 24.63 
Mining 479 252 -227 -47.39 
Contract Construction 15428 18803 3375 21. 88 
Manufacturing 88922 65021 -23901 -26.88 
TPU 16677 27183 10506 63.00 
Wholesale Trade 22771 27838 5067 22.25 
Retail Trade 56494 74706 18212 32.24 
F/IIRE 20100 26002 5902 29.36 
Services 67842 122811 54969 81. 03 
Other 1775 183 -1592 -89.69 
TOTAL 291698 364307 72609 24.89 
Change 1981-94 
Newburg Area--Part 40218 and part 40219 Zip Codas Absol.ute Percent 
Agricultural services, etc. 83 65 -18 -21.69 
Mining 20 0 -20 -100.00 
Contract Construction 935 890 -45 -4.81 
Manufacturing 3122 2555 -567 -18.16 
TPU 661 960 299 45.23 
Wholesale Trade 622 883 261 41.96 
Retail Trade 4023 5695 1672 41. 56 
F/IIRE 702 706 4 0.57 
Services 2347 3701 1354 57.69 
Other 45 5 -40 -88.89 
TOTAL 12560 15460 2900 23.09 
Source: 1981 and 1994 CBPs. 
This growth rate is only slightly below the county's growth 
numbers are less than half those of the Coomes and Price data 
for each year. Therefore, there is at least some 
proportionality when it comes to the discrepancies between the 
data sets. 
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rate of 24.89%. Growth in TPU, wholesale trade, retail trade 
and services more than offset losses in agriculture, mining, 
construction and manufacturing. 
TABLE 32 
County Growth Effect, Newburg Area, 1981-94 
Industry Emp. , 1981 N R R-N=M+S 
Agricultural services, etc. 83 -21 -18 -39 
Mining 20 5 -20 -25 
Contract Construction 935 233 -45 -278 
Manufacturing 3122 777 -567 -1344 
TPU 661 165 299 134 
Wholesale Trade 622 155 261 106 
Retail Trade 4023 1001 1672 671 
F/I/RE 702 175 4 -171 
Services 2347 584 1354 770 
Other 45 11 -40 -51 
TOTAL 12560 3126 2900 -226 
Industry Mix Effect, Newburg Area 
Distribution of Total 
1981 Employment (%) Industry -
County Employment M 
Industry County Newburg Growth(%) 1981 
Agricultural services, etc. 0.41 0.66 -0.26 83 -0.2 
Mining 0.16 0.16 -72.28 20 -14.5 
Contract Construction 5.29 7.44 -3.01 935 -28.1 
Manufacturing 30.48 24.86 -51.77 3122 -1616.3 
TPU 5.72 5.26 38.11 661 251. 9 
Wholesale Trade 7.81 4.95 -2.64 622 -16.4 
Retail Trade 19.37 32.03 7.35 4023 295.7 
F/I/RE 6.89 5.59 4.47 702 31. 4 
Services 23.26 18.69 56.14 2347 1317.6 
Other 0.61 9·36 -114.58 45 -51.6 
TOTAL 100 100 12560 170 
Table 32 shows that had this area grown at the county's 
growth rate, it should have produced 3,126 jobs (third column, 
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top half) . And the industry mix effect shows that it should 
have generated 170 new jobs between 1981 and 1994 (bottom 
half, last column). Finally, Table 33 shows that Newburg 
TABLE 33 
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Newburg Area, 1981-1994 
Industry 1981 1994 
R N M S* 
Agricultural services, etc. 83 65 -18 21 -0.2 -39 
Mining 20 0 -20 5 -14.5 -11 
Contract Construction 935 890 -45 233 -28.1 -250 
Manufacturing 3122 2555 -567 777 -1616.3 272 
TPU 661 960 299 165 251. 9 -118 
Wholesale Trade 622 883 261 155 -16.4 122 
Retail Trade 4023 5695 1672 1001 295.7 375 
F/I/RE 702 706 4 175 31. 4 -202 
Services 2347 3701 1354 584 1317.6 -548 
Other 45 5 -40 11 -51. 6 1 
TOTAL 12560 15460 2900 3127 170 -397 
*S=R-N-M 
S is "local share effect" showing an area's competitive component. 
a negative competitive component relative to the county by 
failing to generate 397 jobs that it should have. This number 
results from the addition of 3,127 and 170 jobs (N and M) 
minus the actual number of jobs created--2,900 ("R"). 
Despite differing numbers and slightly different 
outcomes when it comes to competitive component, I believe 
that Tables 31 through 33 basically show the same thing that 
the Census data show. The Newburg area essentially "held its 
own" during the 1980s and early 1990s. That is, it either came 
close to matching county and industry specific growth rates, 
or Newburg gained just enough new jobs to roughly offset the 
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jobs that it lost. This seems to have occurred despite the 
fact that the type of incentives offered in the EZ were not 
offered in the Newburg area. In fact, there are no economic 
development incentives in place that have targeted the Newburg 
area. This is especially important when comparing Newburg to 
the original EZ. Free market forces seem to have done a 
better job of helping Newburg hold its own than EZ incentives 
did in trying to revitalize the original EZ. 
How then could an area that is one of the poorest in 
Jefferson County (and probably the poorest outside of the City 
of Louisville) outperform the EZ, especially the original EZ? 
Most importantly, is the comparison to Newburg 
methodologically justified? With regard to the first 
question, it should be noted that there are several industrial 
parks in the Newburg area that are located not far from 
Interstate 65 and Louisville International Airport. Also, 
both the CBP zip code data as well as the Census data show 
that retailing and services grew dramatically in this area. 
The Newburg area takes in or is adjacent to major 
thoroughfares such as Bardstown Road, Newburg Road, Poplar 
Level Road, Indian Trail Lane, Preston Highway, Old 
Shephardsville Road and Outer Loop. These roads/highways have 
seen the proliferation of new shopping centers, restaurants, 
and a large shopping mall (Jefferson Mall) over the last 20 
years or so. It is possible that suburban sprawl due to cheap 
and available land is largely responsible for this, despite 
the fact that the Newburg area is a lower middle class to 
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lower income area. However, as Schmenner (1982) points out, 
taxes and regulation are only two of many considerations that 
a business mulls over when it decides on a location. 
With regard to the second question, perhaps the 
accessibility to major roadways and the availability of cheap 
land helped the Newburg area to outperform the EZ. This may 
mean that despite the dour socioeconomic and demographic 
profiles of Newburg, it may not be fair to compare it to the 
EZ, especially the original EZ, because of these possible 
local competitive advantages. However, land is also cheap in 
the original EZ (see the analysis in Chapter 5), and the 
original EZ is close to Louisville's central business district 
as well as major interstate highways and bridges. Therefore, 
there must be other reasons why the EZ did not perform as well 
as Newburg. These reasons will be discussed in the concluding 
chapter of this dissertation. 
2. Job Creation in the Jeffersontown-B1ueqrass 
Industria1 Park Area versus Jefferson County, 
1980 to 1990 and 1981 to 1994 
The Jeffersontown-Bluegrass Industrial Park area was 
included as a comparison/control community because of the 
possible effects that the Louisville airport expansion could 
have on the EZ. Because the Bluegrass area received no 
incentives like the EZ or the airport area, it was chosen as 
a control area to be juxtaposed to the development in the 
airport area. Although the airport is not an industrial park, 
it was the closest comparison area within the EZ to Bluegrass 
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Industrial Park. 
The Bluegrass area shows the strongest generation of job 
growth compared to any area that has been looked at so far, 
including Louisville International Airport. Both data sets 
(Census and CBP data at the zip code level) show that this 
area not only outperformed both versions of the EZ, but also 
outperformed Newburg, Jefferson County as a whole, and the 
U.S. when it came to job growth rates. 
Using Census data, Table 34, next page, shows that total 
job growth in this area was a phenomenal 94.07% between 1980 
and 1990. Every major industrial classification experienced 
significant job growth, including manufacturing (+70.1%). 
This table shows that "Bluegrass" grew at almost 8 times the 
county growth rate and that each industrial sector within the 
Bluegrass area grew faster than each sector for the entire 
county with the exception of agriculture and mining. 
It is not surprising then that the first part of Table 
35 shows that at a county growth rate of 12.78%, the Bluegrass 
area would have been expected to produce only 1,037 jobs 
(column 3). However, this area actually saw a gain of 7,635 
jobs (column 4). Also, according to the industry mix effect, 
Bluegrass should have only gained 139 jobs due to 




Compari.on of Bluegra •• Indu.trial Park Ar.a to Jeff.r.on county, 
1980-1990 
Indu.try 
Ag. & Mining 
Contract Construction 
Manufacturing 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
F/I/RE 
Services & Gov't 
TOTAL 
Sourc.: 1980 and 1990 CBP. 
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Ag. & Mining 
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Manufacturing 
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last column). Finally, Column S of Table 36 shows that the 
Jeffersontown-Bluegrass Industrial Park area's competitive 
component is +6,459 jobs. This can be interpreted to mean 
that of the 7,635 jobs gained in this area between 1980 and 
1990, 6,459 of those jobs were created possibly because of 
some competitive advantage(s) that Bluegrass had over the rest 
of the county. County and industry mix effects can only 
account for 1,176 out of the 7,635 new jobs. From 1980 to 
1990, the workforce in this area almost doubled by growing 
from 8,116 to 15,751 according to the Census data. 
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TABLE 35 
Jefferson Co. Growth Effect for Bluegrass Industrial Park Area 1980-
90 
Industry Employment 
1980 N R R-N 
=M+S 
Ag. & Mining 169 22 59 37 
Contract Construction 649 83 386 303 
Manufacturing 2147 274 1505 1231 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 1304 167 2267 2100 
Retail Trade 1600 204 1371 1167 
F/I/RE 454 58 696 638 
Services & Gov't 1793 229 1351 1122 
TOTAL 8116 1037 7635 6598 
Industry Mix Effect, Bluegrass Industrial Park Area, 1980-90 
Distribution of Total 
1980 Employment (%) 
Industry Industry- 1980 
County Bluegrass County % Emp. M 
Ag. and Mining 0.39 2.08 61. 48 169 104 
Contract Construction 5.50 8.00 -5.19 649 -34 
Manufacturing 30.55 26.45 -37.13 2147 -797 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 13.80 16.07 -9.80 1304 -128 
Retail Trade 20.10 19.71 1.16 1600 19 
F/I/RE 6.98 5.59 14.46 454 66 
Services & Gov't 22.67 22.09 50.73 1793 910 
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 8116 139 
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TABLE 36 
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Bluegrass 
1980 1990 
Industry 
Ag. & Mining 169 228 
Contract Construction 649 1035 
Manufacturing 2147 3652 
TPU & Wholesale Trade 1304 3571 
Retail Trade 1600 2971 
F/I/RE 454 1150 
Services & Gov't 1793 3144 
TOTAL 8116 15751 
S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive component. 
S=R-N-M 
Industrial Park Area 1980-90 
R N M S 
59 22 104 -67 
386 83 -34 337 
1505 274 -797 2028 
2267 167 -128 2228 
1371 204 19 1148 
696 58 66 572 
1351 229 910 212 
7635 1037 139 6459 
Shift-share analysis of the Bluegrass area using CBP zip 
code level data basically corroborates and reinforces the 
analysis using the Census data. Table 37, part 2, shows that 
the area experienced a net gain of 8,005 jobs from 1981 to 
TABLE 37 
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS 
Comparison of Bluegrass Industrial Park Area to Jefferson Co. 




Agricultural services, etc. 1210 1508 
Mining 479 252 
Contract Construction 15428 18803 
Manufacturing 88922 65021 
TPU 16677 27183 
Wholesale Trade 22771 27838 
Retail Trade 56494 74706 
F/I/RE 20100 26002 
Services 67842 122811 
Other 1775 183 












54969 8l. 03 
-1592 -89.69 
72609 24.89 
TABLE 37, CONTINUED. 
Bluegrass Industrial Park Area-Part of 40299 Zip Code Change, 1981-94 
Absolute Percent 
Agricultural Services, etc. 125 114 -11 -8.80 
Mining 0 0 0 0.00 
Contract Construction 1068 1424 356 33.33 
Manufacturing 5706 7598 1892 33.16 
TPU 735 1440 705 95.92 
Wholesale Trade 3386 3596 210 6.20 
Retail Trade 1423 2613 1190 83.63 
F/I/RE 424 650 226 53.30 
Services 1591 5078 3487 219.17 
Other 55 5 -50 -90.91 
Total 14513 22518 8005 55.16 
Source: 1981 and 1994 CBPs. 
1994 for a growth rate of 55.16% (more than twice the county 
growth rate for the same time period) . Using the county 
growth rate of 24.89%, the Bluegrass area should have only 
seen the creation of 3,612 jobs (Table 38, column 3). The 
second part, last column of Table 38 (next page) shows that 
TABLE 38 
County Growth Effect, Bluegrass Industrial Park Area, 1981-94 
Industry 
Employment 
19B1 N R R-N=M+S 
Agricultural Services, etc. 125 31 -11 -42 
Mining 0 0 0 0 
Contract Construction 1068 266 356 90 
Manufacturing 5706 1420 1892 472 
TPU 735 183 705 522 
Wholesale Trade 3386 843 210 -633 
Retail Trade 1423 354 1190 836 
F/I/RE 424 106 226 120 
Services 1591 396 3487 3091 
Other 55 14 -50 -64 
Total 14513 3612 BOOS 4393 
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Table 38, CONTINUED. 
Industry Mix Effect, Bluegrass Industrial Park Area 
Distribution of Total 
1981 Employment (%) Industry-
Industry County Bluegrass County % Emp. , M 
1981 
Agricultural Services, etc. 0.41 0.86 -0.26 125 -0.3 
Mining 0.16 0.00 -72.28 0 0.0 
Contract Construction 5.29 7.36 -3.01 1068 -32.2 
Manufacturing 30.48 39.32 -51.77 5706 -2953.9 
TPU 5.72 5.06 38.11 735 280.1 
Wholesale Trade 7.81 23.33 -2.64 3386 -89.3 
Retail Trade 19.37 9.81 7.35 1423 104.5 
F/IIRE 6.89 2.92 4.47 424 19.0 
Services 23.26 10.96 56.14 1591 893.1 
Other 0.61 0.38 -114.58 55 -63.0 
Total 100 100 14513 -1842 
Source: 1981 and 1994 CBPs. 
the Bluegrass area should have lost 1,842 jobs due to the 
county's industry mix effect. Yet the negative industry mix 
TABLE 39 
Employment and Components of Employment Change, Bluegrass Industrial Park Area, 
1981-94 
Industry 1981 1994 R N M *S 
Agricultural Services, etc. 125 114 -11 31 -0.3 -42 
Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Contract Construction 1068 1424 356 266 -32.2 122 
Manufacturing 5706 7598 1892 l420 -2953.9 3426 
TPU 735 1440 705 183 280.1 242 
Wholesale Trade 3386 3596 210 843 -89.3 -543 
Retail Trade 1423 2613 1190 354 104.5 731 
F/I/RE 424 650 226 106 19 102 
Services 1591 5078 3487 396 893.1 2198 
Other 55 5 -50 14 -63 -1 
Total 14513 22518 8005 3613 -1842 6235 
S is Local Share Effect-area's competitive component. 
*S=R-N-M 
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effect was not enough to slow down growth in the Bluegrass 
area. In seeing 8,005 jobs created between 1981 and 1994, 
Bluegrass could claim that 6,235 of those jobs were created 
due to some possible competitive advantage(s) that it had over 
the county (Column S, Table 39). 
Once again, "S" is only a residual number and there are 
limits as to what can be inferred from its sign (positive or 
negative) and its magnitude. Nevertheless, both data sets are 
saying that after controlling for county growth trends and 
industry-specific trends, for whatever reason, the 
Jeffersontown-Bluegrass Industrial Park area was a net job 
gainer in the 1980s and early 1990s. One could infer from the 
Census data that around 85% (=6,459/7,635 X 100) of the new 
jobs created in this area were possibly due to some unique 
feature(s) special to the area. Almost the same could be 
argued using the CBP data. Around 78% (=6,235/8,005 X 100) of 
the new jobs gained in the Bluegrass area between 1981 and 
1994 could have possibly been gained due to some attributes of 
Bluegrass that made it desirable for job and business growth. 
It seems unlikely that such robust job growth results could 
have been caused by random chance. 
What has caused the Jeffersontown-Bluegrass Industrial 
Park area to grow at such a fast pace over the years? Why did 
it greatly outperform the EZ and the airport, much less 
Jefferson County? As mentioned earlier, Schmenner (1982) and 
others who have studied business site location decisions have 
found that tax incentives and regulatory relief are only two 
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of a long list of factors that businesses consider when making 
decisions. In fact, many firms may be willing to locate to a 
relatively high taxing and regulatory jurisdiction if these 
burdens are offset by such factors as a high amount of local 
amenities, low crime rates, good schools and colleges, and an 
educated, skilled labor force. 
With regard to the Bluegrass area, it must be remembered 
that it did not receive any type of economic development 
stimulus similar to that received by the EZ or the airport. 
It appears reasonable to argue that private market forces had 
a great impact on this area. News reports indicate a 
phenomenal growth in housing in this area over the last two 
decades because of an abundance of undeveloped and available 
land (Stahl, 1997 and Stahl, 1997). Also, one can see rapid 
growth in this area from the Census Bureau data shown in 
Chapter 5. Over the last two decades, the City of 
Jeffersontown, home of Bluegrass Industrial Park, has gone 
from a semi-rural, underdeveloped portion of eastern Jefferson 
County to what would now be called an edge-city. Legally, 
Jeffersontown is a fourth-class city as defined by the 
Kentucky Constitution. It has its own police, fire, 
sanitation and public works departments just like many larger 
cities in the Commonwealth. As with other portions of eastern 
Jefferson County, this area has grown dramatically over the 
last 20 years or so (Coomes and Price, 1994). 
As mentioned in an earlier footnote, OED claims that 
18,000 new jobs were created in Louisville's EZ between July 
151 
1983 and June 1996 (Shafer, 1996). However, if OED figures 
from EZ Annual Reports of jobs created are summed, then the 
number of new jobs created by the EZ from 1983 to June 30, 
1996 is 19,664. OED attributes this discrepancy to changes 
made in record-keeping in 1992. 
------
A survey of EZ certified firms done by the University of 
Louisville's Urban Studies Institute (USI) projected a 
different amount for jobs created--5,760. However, 
respondents also credited the EZ incentives with "saving" 
3,152 jobs and creating or saving 6,333 jobs. Without regard 
to incentives, the 851 companies interviewed indicated that 
their workforce had grown by a net of 13,271 employees since 
the companies had acquired EZ certification. However, not all 
842 companies had been certified at the time that the zone had 
corne into existence. Some companies had been certified since 
1983 whereas others had only been certified for a couple of 
years. 
Unfortunately, United Parcel Service (UPS) was not 
interviewed. According to a phone conversation in October 
1996 that I had with Ken Shapero of UPS's Public Relations 
Office, in 1981 UPS employed 900 workers. As noted earlier in 
this dissertation, UPS became part of the EZ in 1986. Ten 
years later, Shapero reported that UPS employed around 14,000 
people, 80% of whom are part-time workers. Adding 14,000 to 
the 13,271 jobs that respondents reported would greatly boost 
the number of jobs created within the EZ without regard to 
incentives. 
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Since there does not appear to be any firm estimate of 
the number of jobs created due to EZ incentives, this analysis 
will use OED's figure of 18,000 new jobs created between 1983 
and 1996. This gives OED the "benefit of the doubt" when it 
comes to establishing a hard number on the number of jobs 
created within the EZ from 1983 to 1996. Also, these are the 
only official numbers that exist. This number along with 
other possible figures for job creation and/or retention will 
be used in a later chapter that evaluates the cost-
effectiveness of the EZ. 
Finally, according to analysis of the USI survey data, 
only 26.5% of the survey's respondents said that the EZ 
incentives had helped to save jobs, and a little less than 
half of the respondents (48.5%) said that EZ incentives had 
helped to create new jobs. These percentages lend some 
credence to the results that EZ incentives can be credited 
with only creating and/or saving 6,333 jobs. This number 
would only be at best one-third of OED's claim of 18,000 jobs 
created and thousands of more jobs saved (which in 1990 was 
supposed to have been 24,000 jobs (OED Press Release, The 
Louisville Enterprise Zone: Louisville's $1 Billion Success 
Story, 1990)) .21 Certainly, the results of the survey seem to 
21 OED annual reports only gave numbers for jobs saved or 
retained for only a handful of years out of their thirteen 
fiscal year (FY) reports (FYs 1983-84 to 1995-96). For FY 
1987-88, OED claims that EZ incentives helped to retain 11,646 
jobs. For FYs 1989-90, 1992-93, 1994-95, and 1995-96, OED 
claims that EZ incentives helped to retain 6,003, 1,653, 282, 
and 528 jobs, respectively. There are no job numbers given 
for other fiscal years, so there is no hard cumulative number 
for the number of jobs retained due to EZ incentives over the 
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further diminish the claims of success by OED. 
3. Summary 
In looking back at the results of analyses conducted in 
Chapters 5 and 6 as well as this chapter, there are strong and 
reasonable doubts about how well the EZ program did with 
regard to economically revitalizing the full-size EZ or any 
portion of it. Chapter 5 showed that EZ areas, especially the 
original EZ, failed to improve socially and economically at a 
rate better than the Newburg area. Chapter 6 showed that, 
with the exception of the Louisville airport, not even strong 
job growth throughout Jefferson County was enough to pull most 
of the EZ area beyond a stagnant level of job growth at best. 
And in regard to the airport, there were probably important 
factors other than EZ incentives that helped it to grow. 
Finally, this chapter showed that two areas which did not 
receive EZ incentives at least matched or outperformed EZ 
counterparts when it came to job growth, thus suggesting that 
market forces might have been as effective, if not more 
effective, than any type of economic development policy 
intervention. 
With this in mind, the issue of the cost-effectiveness 
of the EZ program must be analyzed. For even if program goals 
were not completely met, perhaps program costs could be 
justified for whatever small gains were made in the EZ when 
fourteen year period. 
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compared to program benefits. That is to say, if one argues 
that things could have been worse in the EZ area from 1983 to 
1996 without the intervention of EZ incentives, then the 
program could be called a modest success, especially if 
program benefits outweighed program costs. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Costs and Benefits of the EZ and an Ana1ysis 
of How We11 it He1ped Disadvantaged Workers 
1. Introduction 
At the heart of program evaluation is an assessment of 
the cost-effectiveness of any policy intervention (Gramlich, 
1981; Haveman and Margolis, 1983; Rossi and Freeman, 1983, Ch. 
8; Stiglitz, 1988, Ch. 10; Schofield, 1987; and Weimer and 
Vining, 1992, Ch. 9). This chapter examines the costs and 
benefits associated with the Louisville and Jefferson County 
EZ program when it comes to job creation and retention and 
capital investment. Monitoring and evaluation are important 
components in the program planning process. Outcomes should 
be measured against costs to see if the program is performing 
efficiently and effectively. High costs that indicate program 
inefficiency can lead to either relevant changes, or to the 
formulation of a completely different program if costs are 
deemed too high for given outcomes. 
One problem consistently noted in the literature on the 
analysis of program cost-effectiveness is the difficulty of 
measuring outcomes in governmental and non-profit programs. 
There are issues of program externalities, shadow-pricing, 
opportunity costs and equity to name but a few (Stiglitz, 
1988). For instance, the direct benefits to recipients and 
costs of many government welfare programs such as AFDC are 
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well-documented. But it is much more difficult to measure the 
gain to society as a whole for such a program. In fact, the 
belief by many that welfare programs yield fewer benefits to 
society, if any, than was previously believed when these 
programs were first created, has led to a movement to 
drastically curtail these programs and their funding. 
Therefore, cost-effectiveness analysis outside of the private 
sector can be a very complicated and politicized undertaking. 
With regard to the Louisville and Jefferson County EZ 
program, the problems of weighing program costs and benefits 
are compounded by the lack of monitoring and data collection 
done by EZ authorities. The lack of monitoring provisions 
were discussed in detail earlier in Chapter 3. Because 
monitoring and data collection were not fully and adequately 
undertaken until mid-1992, data for all but four of the total 
years considered in this study are either not available or 
incomplete. For these reasons, many assumptions and estimates 
had to made in order to corne up with the dollar amounts used 
in the cost-effectiveness analysis presented in this chapter. 
Finally, since perhaps the biggest reason for creating 
EZs was to provide jobs for the urban poor (Hall, 1977), the 
ability of the EZ program to generate such jobs will be 
evaluated by looking at that portion of the EZ program that 
granted tax credits for firms that hire "disadvantaged 
workers." These issues were described earlier in Chapters 3 
and 4. 
It appears from the analysis thus far that the EZ 
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program has not been a good generator of net new jobs, with 
perhaps the exception of the Louisville airport. 22 Also, the 
EZ program has not been completely successful with regard to 
the social and economic revitalization of EZ neighborhoods 
when compared to a control community. The rest of this 
chapter will try to establish whether the costs incurred in EZ 
program implementation were at least matched if not offset by 
any benefits derived from the program. 
2. EZ Program Costs 
As outlined in Chapter 3, EZ certified firms were 
granted fee and tax waivers in return for engaging in certain 
hiring practices and/or investment practices. Among the 
incentives were the following: 1) tax exemptions for capital 
gains; 2) special net operating loss write-offs from business 
income taxes; 3) exemptions on state motor vehicle usage 
taxes; 4) waiver of state sales taxes on the purchase of 
building materials, equipment, and machinery; and 5) waiver of 
local government inspections, building and permit fees. 
Table 40 shows the estimated tax revenue losses 
resulting from EZ firms taking advantage of capital gains 
exemptions: $520,310.19. This incentive was eliminated by 
July, 1992. As the table shows, it is estimated that only 
around a half million dollars was lost to this incentive. 
Perhaps this is because 10 years (1983 to 1992) is not enough 
22 Recall that the airport received millions of dollars of 
money from both state and federal sources in order to grow and 
expand. These expenditures were not a part of either the EZ 
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time for a significant amount of capital appreciation in many 
assets. In any event, it was recommended that the incentive 
be dropped because it did not seem to be making a significant 
contribution to capital formation or job creation (LRC 
Memorandum, No. 460, 1991). 
The only definite number for this table was for the 
Fiscal Year (FY) 1987-88 as determined by the Kentucky Revenue 
Cabinet (LRC Memorandum, No. 460). Because records for other 
years were not kept, and since the incentive was abolished by 
the time that better monitoring of the program was in place, 
estimates for other years in Table 40 were determined by 
multiplying the FY 1987-88 amount ($75,957.69) by a GOP 
deflator listed in the 1992 and 1995 editions of the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (U. S. Commerce 
Department, 1992 and 1995) .23 For the first fiscal year after 
FY 1987-88, an estimate for FY 1988-89 was calculated by 
multiplying $75,957.69 by the GOP deflator number for FY 1988-
89. Then $78,966.00 was multiplied by the deflator for the 
next year in order to get the following year's estimated 
amount. This iteration was used up to FY 1991-92. For fiscal 
years before FY 1987-88, an estimate for FY 1986-87 was 
calculated by multiplying $75,957.69 by the GOP deflator for 
that year (FY 1986-87). Then the $75,957.69 was multiplied by 
the deflator for the previous year, and so on until FY 1983-
~rogram or the EZ legislation. 
3 The base year for the deflator is 1987. This, of course, 
assumes that the EZ grew at a rate comparable to real U. S. 
Gross Domestic Product. This was probably not so, but absent 
any other method of estimation, this was the best technique 
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86. Also, as in other similar tables in this chapter, 
estimates for the first three FYs were divided by seven in 
order to reflect the original zone's small size. 24 
TABLE 40 
Estimated taxes 10st to capita1 gains exemptions 



































SOURCES: A do11ar amount for FY 1988-89 was determined by the Legis1ative Research 
Commission with assistance from the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet. Because records for 
other years were not kept, estimates for other years were determined by adjusting 
the FY 1988-89 amount by a GDP def1ator (1995 Statistica1 Abstract of the U. S. and 
1992 Statistica1 Abstract of the U.S.). Because of the zone's sma11 size during the first three 
fisca1 years of its existence, estimates for FYs 1983-84 to 1985-86 were mu1tip1ied by one-
seventh. This was a crude but necessary procedure. 
Table 41 shows the estimated state tax revenues lost due 
to EZ certified businesses being allowed to deduct net 
operating losses (NOL) at full value over the 20 year life of 
available. 
24 This is a crude yet necessary adjustment. As the zone grew 
and became more geographically dispersed, the sheer number of 
businesses eligible to participate in the EZ sky-rocketed. 
Some adjustment had to be made for the first two EZs small 
sizes: 3.75 and 6.75 square miles, respectively. 
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the EZ, that is until the year 2003. For most firms, these 
losses are usually capped and can only be carried forward for 
a certain period of time. Allowing such losses to be matched 
against future net profits was supposed to allow fledgling 
companies a chance to grow and thrive after incurring initial 
net losses. Since most new businesses incur net losses in 
their first few years, this provision of the law was enacted 
to encourage entrepreneurship. 
Like Table 40, the only available and certain dollar 
figure for Net Operating Loss Carryforward was for FY 1987-88. 
Therefore, the same estimation procedures used in Table 40 
were also used in Table 41. 
TABLE 41 
Estimated Net Operating Loss Carryforward (write-offs) 
(incentive was eliminated in 1992) 
Fiscal 
Year Amount GDP Deflator 
1983-84 $725,607.02 0.88 
1984-85 $750,343.61 0.91 
1985-86 $775,080.23 0.94 
1986-87 $5,598,717.80 0.97 
1987-88 $5,771,874.00 1. 00 Base 
1988-89 $6,002,749.00 1. 04 
1989-90 $6,291,342,.70 1. 09 
1990-91 $6,579,936.40 1.14 
1991-92 $7,041,686.30 1.22 
TOTAL $39,537,337.06 
year 
SOURCE: Estimates based upon Kentucky Revenue Cabinet and Legislative Research 
Commission disclosed amount for FY 1988-89. 
Other years were estimated by using a GDP deflator with a base year of 1987 on the 
FY 1988-89 dollar amount (1995 Statistical Abstra9t of the United States, Table 771, 
p. 505 and 1992 Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table 752, p. 481). 
~so, for the first three fiscal years, estimates were reduced by one-seventh 
because of the zone's original small size. No records existed for other years, 
so this method was employed. 
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Estimated tax revenues lost due to this provision of the 
EZ law were considerable: $39,537,337.06 over a 9 year 
period. Despite the fact that this incentive was originally 
seen as encouraging small business formation, it too was 
eliminated as a tax incentive at the end of FY 1991-1992. The 
Kentucky State Legislature's subcommittee looking into the 
state EZ program felt that while this aspect of the EZ law may 
have been helping small business formation, there was also the 
possibility and some evidence in the local press (Heath, 1991) 
to suggest that large, already well-established corporations 
were taking advantage of this incentive. It was also felt 
that there was no direct way to link the costs of this 
incentive with actual job creation (LRC Memorandum, No. 460). 
Table 42 shows the estimated costs of motor vehicle 
taxes foregone by the state because of EZ incentives. Because 
the Kentucky Revenue Cabinet only had the actual dollar 
amounts and the number of vehicles exempted for FY 1988-89 and 
FYs 1991-92 to 1994-95, it was necessary to estimate the data 
and dollar values for other years by first calculating the 
approximate percentage that EZ vehicles were of all vehicles 
registered in Jefferson County for the years for which we had 
solid numbers. For the years given, the average was 
approximately .33% of 1/3 of 1%. The number of vehicles 
exempted from either full or partial motor vehicle usage 
taxation for the years for which we had no number of vehicles 
was then estimated by multiplying .0033 by the total number of 
registered motor vehicles in Jefferson County for those years 
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(Source: 1985, 1990 and 1994 Kentucky Handbook of Economic 
Statistics). Because of poor EZ administration and data 
collection, this was a crude but necessary method of 
estimation. 
Once the number of exempted EZ vehicles were estimated 
(see Number of Vehic1es) the amount of taxes lost per vehicle 
was calculate (Taxes 10st per Vehic1e). Using the actual 
number of vehicles for the four years for which there were 
data (FYs 1991-95), taxes lost per vehicle for those four 
years was calculated by dividing the actual amount of taxes 
foregone by the number of vehicles. Next, an amount for the 
taxes lost per vehicle was estimated for FY 1990-91 by 
dividing taxes lost per vehicle for FY 1991-92. For FY 1989-
90 the same was done but the resulting number was multiplied 
by 5/6. This was done because state sales taxes were raised 
from 5 cents per dollar to 6 cents per dollar on July 1, 1990. 
Therefore, an adjustment had to be made because there was a 
change in tax rates. 
Taxes lost per vehicle for FY 1989-90 were then adjusted 
downward by 1.08 in order to arrive at a value for 1988-89. 
This method was repeated for each year until FY 1985-86 and 
before. For these periods, each number calculated was divided 
by 7 in order to adjust for the size of the EZ during this 
time period. 
Finally, the Taxes Foregone for each FY in Table 42 were 
derived by multiplying the Number of Vehic1es by Taxes 10st 
per Vehic1e. Next, these amounts were summed to arrive at 
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$13,911,208.60. Recall from Chapter 3 that this provision of 
the EZ law was amended so that beginning in July 1992 only the 
first $20,000 of passenger vehicle (e.g., sedans, station 
wagons, etc.) values were exempted from the tax. This was 
done because some business owners in the EZ had registered 
high priced luxury cars for their personal use in the name of 
their business and had not been paying any taxes on these cars 
(Heath, 1991). In that case, and if such abuses of the law 
were widespread, then the dollar amounts estimated for the 
years prior to 1991 may actually be higher. 
Estimated Motor Vehicle Usage 
Taxes Foregone 
Fiscal Number of Taxes Foregone 
Year Vehicles 
1983-84 217 $87,212.30 
1984-85 208 $90,700.48 
1985-86 211 $98,912.58 
1986-87 1486 $752,346.94 
1987-88 1504 $822,387.20 
1988-89 1538 $908,440.00 
1989-90 1555 $991,623.50 
1990-91 1528 $1,262,892.00 
1991-92 1882 $1,679,835.00 
1992-93 1590 $1,521,022.00 
1993-94 1613 $1,635,806.00 
1994-95 1447 $1,915,507.00 
1995-96* 1500 $2,144,523.60 
TOTAL $13,911,208.60 
TABLE 42 


































Source: Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Ky. Handbook of Economic 
Statistics. 
The next table shows the estimated amount of sales taxes 
lost due to exemptions on the purchase of building materials, 
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equipment, and machinery. The Kentucky Revenue Cabinet' 
provided dollar amounts for actual sales taxes lost for FYs 
1991-92, 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95. There were no records 
for other years. 
As an approximation of the taxes lost for other years, 
the following method was used. First, the amount of actual 
taxes lost for each of the four years was divided by the 
amount of sales taxes collected for Jefferson County for each 
of those same four years (Source: Kentucky Revenue Cabinet's 
Annual Report). When averaged, sales taxes lost each year due 
to EZ incentives as a percentage of all Jefferson County sales 
taxes was around 3.05%. 
Next, sales taxes lost for other years were calculated 
by multiplying .0305 by the total sales taxes collected in 
Jefferson County for those years. The only year for which an 
amount was not reported was for FY 1987-88. Taxes for this 
year were estimated by averaging sales tax collections for FYs 
1986-87 and 1988-89. Finally, sales taxes lost for FY 1995-96 
was estimated by averaging the sales taxes lost for the four 
previous fiscal years. Total sales tax revenues for Jefferson 
County for FY 1996-96 were arrived at by dividing this 
estimate of sales taxes lost ($10,218,415.00) by .0305. When 
added, the total amount of taxes foregone due to sales tax 
waivers from FY 1983-84 to FY 1995-96 was estimated at 
$91,218,145.39. 
The methodology employed to arrive at the numbers 
displayed in Table 43 was a crude but necessary ohe given the 
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sparse data collected by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It 
should also be noted that this incentive was the only original 
incentive to remain unchanged since 1982. 
TABLE 43 
Estimated Sales Taxes lost due to exemptions on the purchase of 
building materials, equipment and machinery. 
Fiscal Sales taxes lost Total state sales taxes 
Year in Ent. Zone for Jefferson Co. 
1983-84 $749,989.02 $172,128,628.00 
1984-85 $830,037.40 $190,500,386.00 
1985-86 $947,012.10 $217,347,040.00 
1986-87 $6,754,709.83 $221,465,896.00 
1987-88* $7,095,013.70 $232,623,400.00 
1988-89 $7,435,317.63 $243,780,906.00 
1989-90 $8,105,150.73 $265,742,647.00 
1990-91** $8,208,727.97 $269,138,622.00 
1991-92 $ll, 852, 997.00 $338,036,253.00 
1992-93 $12,490,748.00 $344,800,879.00 
1993-94 $6,976,430.00 $352,045,658.00 
1994-95 $9,553,597.00 $311,555,144.00 
1995-96 $10,218,415.00 $335,030,000.00 
Total $91,218,145.39 
Taxes lost 
as % of total 
taxes 






Source: Kentucky Revenue Cabinet and estimates based on Rev. Cabinet data. 
*No data for sales taxes collected in Jefferson Co. for FY 87-88 was ever 
compiled according to Gene Brown of Rev. Cabinet. 
Dollar values are estimates. 
**Sales tax rate raised from 5 cents to 6 cents per dollar 
on July 1, 1990. 
Besides these incentives, the state was also doing 
things in the Louisville EZ which may have had an impact upon 
local economic development. Table 44 shows a listing of 
Kentucky Economic Development Bonds issued by the state which 
were for projects located in the EZ. Although not part of the 
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EZ program, these bonds must be considered as a possible 
stimulus to EZ job creation and retention. Therefore, they 
should be added to the costs of job creation and retention 
within the EZ. By the same token, the airport project funded 
by these bonds could be considered an overall public good or 
asset. 
TABLE 44 































Riverport Industrial Part 
Riverport Industrial Park 
Washington Apparel Group 
Henry Vogt Machine Co. 
Louisville Airport 
Monfort, Inc. 
B. F. Goodrich Co. 
Kroger 
Kroger 
Ford Motor Co. 
Hillerich and Bradsby 
Source: Dan Jacovitch, Kentucky Legislative Research Commission. 
Unfortunately, despite repeated attempts to collect data 
from the LRC and other state agencies on the amount of 
interest paid on these bonds as well as attempts to determine 
which amounts had been retired and which were still 
outstanding, I had to settle upon the face value of the bonds 
as an economic development cost. Therefore, these figures can 
be considered a low estimate. 
Notice that $60,500,000 of the $70,795,000 in bonds 
issued was devoted to the development of Louisville 
International Airport. Along with millions of dollars of 
Federal Aviation Administration funding, such an infusion of 
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money enabled the airport to add an extra runway and other new 
facilities. Referring back to the shift-share analysis of 
Chapter 6, this probably provides an explanation of why the 
airport did better than the rest of the EZ when it came to job 
creation. Also, the addition of this runway allowed UPS to 
expand and hire more workers. It is doubtful that EZ 
incentives alone would have been enough to allow UPS to grow 
from roughly 1,000 employees in 1981, to 8,412 in 1990, and to 
nearly 14,000 by September 1996, approximately one year after 
the second runway was opened (interview with UPS public 
relations, 10/7/96). In fact, UPS's decision to stay and hire 
more workers in the Louisville area was primarily based on the 
condition that Louisville's airport was to be expanded and 
enhanced (interview, 1996). 
Finally, it should be noted that in addition to EZ 
incentives and development bonds, the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
also has various other incentives at its disposal in order to 
recruit new firms to the state or to help existing firms in 
the state. The Kentucky Industrial Development Act and the 
Kentucky Job Development Act were passed by the 1992 General 
Assembly. These acts contained incentives that allowed 
companies payroll tax credits for workers hired. However, 
according to Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development 
records, out of the millions of dollars authorized for 
companies to take the tax credit, only a little over $3,000 in 
credits have been claimed to date. Perhaps many firms are 
waiting to take the tax credits when earnings become higher, 
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but this is only speculation. 
In addition to state incentives, KRS 154.45 allowed each 
EZ designated area a certain amount of latitude in offering 
their own local incentives. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
City of Louisville and Jefferson County waive or discount 
inspections, permits and license fees for certified EZ firms. 
Table 45 shows estimates of what the city has foregone in fee 
revenues over the years: $569,194.94. 
TABLE 45 







































Source: City of Louisville Department of Inspections, Permits and Licenses (IPL) provided 
dollar amounts for FYs 1990-91 to 1995-96. Other years were estimated using GDP deflator 
numbers used in Tables 8-1 and 8-2. Once again, the estimates for the first three years 
of the EZ were divided by seven to reflect the small size of the original EZ. 
The total estimated amount of $569,199.08 is probably close to being correct because Paul 
Nicholson of IPL said in a June 1996 interview that EZ permit fee waivers and discounts 
had cost IPL about $40,000 to $50,000 per year on average since the EZ began in 1983. 
Because of a lack of diligent record-keeping, actual 
dollar amounts for revenues foregone are only known for FYs 
1990-91 to 1995-96. The other figures listed in Table 45 are 
estimates based upon the GOP deflator used in previous tables. 
The amount for FY 1990-91 was divided by 1.09 to arrive at 
$25,902.49 for FY 1989-90. Then the estimated amount for FY 
1989-90 was divided by the GOP deflator for the previous year 
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in order to arrive at the estimated amount of fees foregone 
for FY 1988-89. The same process was repeated until an 
estimate was created for FY 1986-87. Then the estimated 
amount for FY 1987-88 was multiplied by the GOP deflator of 
.97. 25 Then this amount was multiplied by the previous year's 
deflator in order to arrive at the previous fiscal year's 
estimate, and so on, until FY 1983-84. As with other tables, 
the estimates for the first three fiscal years were lowered by 
dividing the estimates by 7. Again, this was done to reflect 
the small size of the EZ during its first 3 years. 
As can be seen, the amount of revenues and fees lost due 
to this incentive have not been very large when compared to 
the costs of other incentives. In fact, in an interview with 
Paul Nicholson of the Louisville and Jefferson County 
Department of Inspections, Permits and Licenses, very few 
certified firms within the EZ take advantage of this 
incentive. He could not speculate as to why this was so 
(interview, June, 1996). The estimated total amount of fees 
foregone, $569,199.08, also seems consistent with Nicholson's 
estimate that EZ incentives have cost the Department of 
Inspections, Permits, and Licenses anywhere from $40,000 to 
$50,000 per year on average. 
Table 46 takes information from the previous tables in 
this chapter as well as other data and gives the total 
25 When calculating back in time, numbers for years after the 
base year have to be divided by GOP deflator numbers. After 
the base year is reached, estimates are then multiplied by GOP 
deflator numbers that are less than 1.00 in order to discount 
values. 
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estimated costs associated with EZ economic development. The 
accuracy of such estimates are questionable because of a lack 
of data and cooperation provided by state and local officials. 
However, these figures represent the best estimates possible 
based upon records available. 
Before going further, some of the amounts in Table 46 
need elaboration. By looking at City of Louisville budget 
documents, it was estimated that $532,725 had been spent on 
TABLE 46 
Estimated Total Enterprise Zone Costs, 1983-96 
Expenditures and/or Revenues Foregone 
Administration and Overhead 
Economic Development Bonds 
Inspection, Permit and License Fees foregone 
Sales Taxes lost due to exemptions on the purchase 
of building materials, equipment, and 
machinery 
Motor Vehicle Usage Taxes foregone 
Net Operating Loss Carryforward 
Taxes lost due to Capital Gains exemptions 
Taxes Foregone on exempted interest income earned 
from loans to other businesses in the EZ 













administration and overhead for the EZ. This is a very low 
amount given the size of the zone, but it is a reasonable 
estimate because the staffing of the Louisville EZ program has 
mostly consisted of just two people over the past 14 years. 
Such a small staff probably accounts for the lack of record-
keeping and attention to detail that was necessary to 
adequately monitor the EZ program. 
The category Taxes foregone on exempted interest income 
earned from loans to other businesses in the EZ shows a zero 
amount because, according to all records reviewed, this 
incentive never was used. Apparently, there was no lending of 
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money from one EZ firm to another. 
Finally, the amount of $46,015 for Tax Credits for 
hiring disadvantaged workers came directly from Kentucky 
Revenue Cabinet reports. This incentive was started in July, 
1992, and was intended for the EZ program to put a greater 
emphasis on job creation for the long-term unemployed or for 
those who had been on some type of public welfare for at least 
90 days. Despite the fact that the original 1982 legislation 
was supposed to help such workers, a specific incentive to 
hire such workers was not implemented until 10 years later. 
This incentive consists of a $1,500 tax credit per 
disadvantaged worker hired. This tax credit can be taken at 
any time within a 5 year period after the worker is hired. 
The amount $217,129,936.18 was estimated to be the total 
costs of EZ economic development incentives. One could 
question whether the amount for economic development bonds 
should be included in this list because capital expenditures 
via bonds are not called for in the EZ enabling legislation. 
However, to ignore the effects of these economic development 
bonds would be to ignore the effects of job creation and 
retention through government expenditure policies. One must 
control for the impact of these expenditures. Therefore, it 
was decided to include the face value of the bonds as an EZ 
cost. 26 
26 In looking at municipal budgets showing bond issues and 
expenditures by the City of Louisville and Jefferson County 
during this same time period, I could find no evidence of 
either of the two governments issuing debt or spending money 
for local economic development projects. Instead, both 
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If, according to OED estimates, approximately 18,000 new 
jobs were created due to EZ incentives (Shafer, 1996); and if 
around 24,000 jobs were retained due to the EZ from 1983 to 
1990 (1990 OED Press Release); and if 21,193 jobs were 
retained due to EZ incentives from 1989 to 1994 (1995 OED 
Press Release), then getting a firm number for the total 
number of new jobs created as well as jobs saved from these 
sources is problematic. 
Table 47 shows that if one totals up all the new jobs 
created according to OED Annual Reports from 1983 to 1996, 
then that number is 19,664, not 18,000. Also, OED has never 
clarified how much overlap there exists between the number of 
jobs saved between 1983 and 1990 (24,000) and the number of 
jobs saved between 1989 and 1994 (21,193). However, OED's 
1995 Press Release did claim that the total number of jobs 
created and/or saved was 32,981 from 1989 to 1994 (1995 OED 
Press Release, p. 2). This figure was composed of 11,788 jobs 
created and 21,193 jobs saved. If one were to add 6,212 jobs 
to the 11,788 jobs cited, this would bring the total amount of 
jobs created to the 18,000 cited in a Courier Journal article 
(Shafer, 1996). Adding 6,212 to 32,981 to bring the total 
number of jobs created and/or saved due to EZ incentives to 
39,193. This would also mean that the costs per job created 
and/or saved would be roughly $5,540(=$217,129,936.18/39,193). 
Is this cost too high or too low? The best way to gauge this 
is to compare it to the benefits per job created and/or saved. 
governments' capital expenditures were mostly focused upon 
173 
3. EZ Program Benefits 
Table 47 provides an estimate of the possible tax 
revenues generated by new jobs created by EZ incentives. As 
pointed out in an earlier chapter, OED claims that roughly 
18,000 jobs were created due to the EZ program. However, 
Table 47 shows that when one uses OED annual reports and sums 
the number of reported jobs created in each of those annual 
reports, the number of new jobs is 19,664. Nevertheless, I 
will use the 19,664 number in order to estimate EZ financial 
TABLE 47 
Enterprise Zone Job Creation and 
Retention 
Fiscal Jobs Created Est. 
Hourly 
Year (new to Zone) Wage * 
1983-84 606 $7.50 
1984-85 542 $7.50 
1985-86 323 $7.50 
1986-87 927 $7.50 
1987-88 2413 $7.50 
1988-89 3312 $7.50 
1989-90 1999 $7.50 
1990-91 2613 $7.50 
1991-92 999 $7.50 
1992-93 1807 $7.50 
1993-94 1250 $7.50 
1994-95 860 $7.50 
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Taxes paid from Taxes paid from 
jobs saved jobs saved and 















*Assumes $7.50/hour because 1995 OED report stated that this was avq. wage across all 
industries. Ky. Revenue Cabinet reported that avq. hourly wage for FY 93-94 and FY 94-95 
were only $7.63 and $8.00, respectively. 
**These are the only years for which OED gave numbers for jobs 
retained. The TOTAL number, however, is close to a 1990 OED report 
which claims that between 1983 and 1990, EZ incentives had helped to 
retain 24,000 jobs. In 1995, OED issued a report claiming that the EZ 
had helped to save around 21,000 between 1989 and 1994. However, 
neither of these two reports listed jobs retained by fiscal year. 
Source: Louisville and Jefferson Co. Office for Economic Development 
(OED) . 
benefi tS. 27 
Table 47 assumes that each job created was full-time, 
year-round, and paid $7~50 per hour. OED claims that on 
average EZ wages are $7.50 per hour, although the presence in 
the EZ of some high paying firms such as Ford Motor Company 
may skew this number upward. OED also claims that all of the 
27 The discrepancy between the two numbers is probably due to 
either some firms being de-certified between the time of the 
last OED annual report and the time of OED spokesperson 
Pettison's proclamation that the EZ should be credited with 
creating 18,000 jobs or due to revisions made for previous 
years. 
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jobs it counts are full-time and year-round (interview with 
Paul McGowan of OED, 9/96). According to surveys of firms by 
USI, it is estimated that around 95% of all their workers are 
full-time. The surveys did not ask about average pay. 
Therefore, OED claims were used to obtain the estimates in 
Table 47. 
Making generous assumptions based upon the information 
above (that is, that each worker worked 40 hours per week, 52 
weeks per year, and earned $7.50 per hour) this means that the 
typical EZ worker earned $15,600 per year from 1983 to 1996. 
According to Coomes and Kornstein (1996, p.28), these annual 
earnings are far below what typical Louisville metro area non-
manufacturing and manufacturing jobs paid in 1993: 
approximately $23,000 for non-manufacturing and roughly 
$38,000 for manufacturing. Even though OED may claim that EZ 
incentives helped to create around 18,000 new jobs, the 
quality of pay for these new jobs may be debatable when 
compared to how well others are paid throughout the 
metropolitan area. In fact, by today's standards, one who 
earns $15,600 per year would be living at or below the poverty 
line if he or she had any non-working dependents. 
The typical EZ worker like all workers in Jefferson 
County would have to pay city, county, and Jefferson County 
Public School occupational taxes of 2.2%. Such a person would 
also probably be in Kentucky's lowest income tax bracket of 4% 
and would qualify for the state's low income tax credit. 
Kentucky state sales taxes of 6 cents on the dollar would also 
176 
hit this person hard. However, if one assumes that a person 
at this income level spends a large portion of his or her 
budget on food, then the sales tax burden is probably not as 
onerous since food is not taxed. With all this in mind, Table 
47 assumes that each person employed due to EZ incentives paid 
to the state and local governments approximately 10% of his or 
her income in taxes. 
In cumulative terms, Table 47 shows that given jobs 
created and retained, state and local governments should have 
received $435,761,040 in taxes from EZ workers from 1983 to 
1996. Taking this amount and dividing by the estimated number 
of jobs created and/or retained, one obtains a benefit per job 
of around $11,118. This is a little more than double the 
amount calculated for the cost per job created and/or 
retained--$5,540. On the basis of this cost per job to 
benefit per job comparison, one could conclude that the EZ 
program was a success. Benefits appear to outweigh costs by 
over two to one. The program appears cost-effective using 
this simple criteria. 
Table 48 shows the amount of private capital investment 
that OED claims that EZ incentives helped to attract (1983 to 
1996 OED Annual Reports). The dollar amounts suggest an 
extraordinary amount of business investment in the EZ from 
1983 to 1996. If one were to compute EZ costs per dollar of 
investment, then only $0.14 (=$217,129,936.18 /$1,545,248,477) 
was spent or foregone in tax revenues due to EZ incentives in 
order to attract this volume of capital. This is a very small 
177 
amount. 
If all of this capital investment resulted in net job 
creation (i.e., more jobs were created by capital than 
replaced or supplanted by capital investment), and if all of 
this investment helped increased the profitability of EZ 
firms, then the state would have received even more taxes paid 
on business profits and wages than if EZ incentives had not 
been in place. There exists no data to either support or 
refute this claim. However, if business tax receipts were 
increased, then the EZ benefits in Table 47 would be even 
larger in dollar value. Also, if any of this investment was 
taxable property, then property tax receipts would also be 
expected to rise, thereby boosting the total amount of EZ 
benefits in dollar terms. 
































SOURCE: Louisville and Jefferson County Office for Economic Development Annua~ 
Reports. 
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It should be noted that the greatest portion of private 
capital investment listed in Table 48 occurred through FYs 
1987-88 to 1990-91. This time period roughly corresponds to 
the time period when Louisville's airport was undergoing a 
massive expansion. Along with this expansion, UPS expanded 
its operating facilities on the airport's premises. This may 
account for the large dollar amounts of private capital 
investment during this time period. If so, it would seem that 
the airport received a disproportionate amount of both private 
and public investment dollars relative to the EZ.2B 
4. Caveats on EZ Job Creation and Retention 
as we11 as EZ Capita1 Investment 
The preceding cost-benefit analysis can be criticized on 
several grounds. In a survey done by USI during the summer of 
1996, around 67% of all EZ certified firms were interviewed 
regarding EZ incentives and the usefulness of these incentives 
to the firms. Table 49 gives a brief synopsis of survey 
findings. As mentioned at the close of Chapter 7, when it 
came to hiring practices, survey respondents indicated that 
incentives had only directly helped to create 5,760 new jobs. 
Also, respondents credited the EZ incentives with "saving" 
just 3,152 jobs and creating or saving 6,333 jobs. Without 
regard to incentives, the 851 firms interviewed indicated that 
their workforce had grown by a net of 13,271 employees since 
the companies had acquired EZ certification. To repeat a 
28 Unfortunately, OED does not keep summary records of where 
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caveat from Chapter 7, it should be remembered that not all 
firms interviewed had been certified at the time that the zone 
had come into existence. Some companies had been certified 
since mid-1983 whereas others had only been certified for a 
couple of years. 
With regard to capital investment, on average 77% of the 
firms interviewed said that they would have undertaken capital 
investment regardless of EZ incentives. Therefore, some 
Table 49 
USI Survey Results of 851 EZ certified firms*. 
Jobs Would have created or saved jobs without incentives? 
Jobs Saved 
Jobs Created 












Investment Would have done investment anyway? 
Yes No 
New or used equipment 569 (81%) 137 (19%) 
Motor Vehicles 393 (77%) 116 (23% ) 
Construction and Buildings 389 (75% ) 132 (25%) 
Total and Average 1,351 (77'k) 385 (23'k) 
of "Yes" and "No' 
Answers 
*Note: Survey number do not always add to 842 because not all firms interviewed used all 
incentives available. 
portion of the $1.5 billion in investment in Table 48 might 
have been carried out any way. However, it is possible that 
the average of 23% of the respondents who said that one or 
more incentives made a difference in investment decisions may 
investment occurs within the EZ. 
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have made the bulk of the $1.5 billion in investment. There 
is no way to know for sure how much of this investment is due 
to what portion of the EZ certified firms. But, just as with 
business location, Schmenner (1981), Blair (1995) and others 
point out that tax considerations are only one of many 
considerations in capital investment decisions. Investment 
decisions are generally made with regard to future 
expectations about long-term firm profitability, adequate 
financing, changes in technology, etc. As mentioned 
previously, United Parcel Service (UPS) was not interviewed. 
If one adds UPS's 14,000 jobs to the 13,271 jobs that 
respondents reported, this would greatly boost the number of 
jobs created within the EZ without regard to incentives. 
However, it should be remembered that more than half of UPS's 
positions are part-time. Also, probably not all UPS employees 
live within the EZ. If these jobs have been counted by OED as 
jobs created and/or retained within the EZ, then the benefits 
suggested by Table 47 would be significantly diminished. 
The USI survey also suggests other problems with Table 
47. Table 49 shows that only 26.5% of the survey's 
respondents said that the EZ incentives had helped to save 
jobs, and just 48.5% said that EZ incentives had helped to 
create new jobs. If these percentages are reflective of the 
over 1,200 EZ certified firms, then the benefits indicated in 
Table 47 could be further diluted. That is, a good portion of 
the number of jobs created and/or saved could be overstated. 
Respondents indicated that EZ incentives were responsible for 
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creating and/or saving 6,333 jobs. These firms apparently 
created only a third of the 18,000 new jobs created. Without 
interviewing the other 400 or more EZ certified firms, there 
is no way to know whether there could be more jobs to add to 
the 6,333 job figure. 
Next, there is the problem in survey research of 
respondents often not being candid in their answers to 
questions no matter how hard the researcher tries to control 
for this possibility. There could be a portion of respondents 
(e.g., a portion of the 48.5% of those firms interviewed who 
said that incentives had made a difference in hiring new 
workers) who intentionally overstated the EZ program's impact 
out of their fear of possibly losing EZ tax benefits. If this 
is true, then claims regarding EZ job creation and retention 
as well as capital investment could be further deflated. 
Additionally, some of the assumptions made in Table 47 
may have been far too generous. To assume that all the jobs 
created were full-time and year-round is probably an 
overstatement, especially because of UPS's presence in the EZ. 
Also, even if the jobs mentioned in Table 47 were year-round 
and full-time, the amount of taxes paid by the typical worker 
earning the average $15,600 salary may be overstated. If a 
taxpayer can itemize deductions, then occupational taxes and 
other local payroll taxes withheld are deductible from one's 
state income tax. If many of these workers were able to 
itemize, then the amount that they would have paid in state 
income taxes would have been reduced. More importantly, if 
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most of these workers had dependents or any other forms of 
deductions, their tax liability would have been reduced 
substantially. In fact, if one considers all of the possible 
deductions, exemptions and tax credits available to such low-
income taxpayers, then many of these workers may have received 
from the state a complete or nearly complete tax refund on all 
taxes withheld during the year. This possibility would also 
greatly reduce the amount of benefits, in terms of taxes paid 
to the state, due to the EZ program. 
In fairness to the EZ program, it could be argued that, 
even if EZ benefits are overstated in Table 47, creating and 
saving jobs probably prevented many workers from having to 
rely upon social welfare programs which may have cost the 
state more than the costs associated with the EZ program. 
However, given the average low pay of the EZ jobs, the EZ 
program cannot exactly claim to have moved many people into 
the ranks of the middle class. Instead, the average salary of 
$15,600 per year would generally be considered a pay level for 
the working poor. Certain1y this wou1d not have been enough 
to he1p those in the origina1 EZ neighborhoods for whom KRS 
154.45 was origina11y intended. 
More importantly, recall Tables 10 and 13 regarding the 
original EZ, and Tables 16 and 19 regarding the full-size EZ. 
Using Coomes and Price data, Table 10 showed a dec1ine in the 
number of jobs in the original EZ between 1980 and 1990. 
Table 13, using CBP zip code level data, also showed a decline 
between 1981 and 1994 for the same area. For the full-size 
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EZ, Table 16, based on Coomes and Price data, showed a small 
decline in employment from 1980 to 1990 whereas Table 19 using 
CBP data showed a small increase in employment from 1981 to 
1994. Considering the data in these four tables, one can only 
conclude that jobs created by EZ incentives were jobs that 
merely offset job losses within the full-size EZ. The 
original EZ did not even do that well. Ironically, it was the 
original EZ that most closely resembled the type of areas 
targeted for EZ incentives in KRS 154.45. 
The tables in Chapter 5 also question the benefits 
indicated in Tables 47 and 48. Those tables showed all·EZ 
communities losing population and workers. Was a sizable 
portion of the new jobs created and/or saved in the EZ given 
to residents outside of the EZ? Was any new business 
investment undertaken in the EZ barely enough to offset 
disinvestment within the EZ? These tables raise that 
possibility. If this is true, then several of the original 
goals of KRS 154.45 were not met regardless of how one weighs 
program costs and benefits. 
Additionally, the tables in chapters 5, 6 and 7 indicate 
that not one segment of the EZ grew at rates comparable to the 
control areas. Even if program benefits did outweigh program 
costs, EZ growth and quality of life did not match growth and 
quality of life in areas that did not receive the same 
economic development stimulus. One must then question what 
factors led these others areas to grow faster than the EZ 
despite these areas not receiving EZ incentives. Could the 
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over $217 million in incentives have been better spent? I 
will have more to say on this in the next chapter. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that federal dollars 
used to expand and rebuild Louisville's airport were not 
included in the costs of the EZ program. However, one could 
argue that, just as with state funds, these costs should be 
taken into account since these funds were used in an area that 
was part of the EZ. Just as with state expenditures, federal 
expenditures probably provided an economic stimulus to the 
airport area that EZ incentives could not match. According to 
a March 23, 1997 Courier-Journal article, total costs for the 
expansion and enhancement of the airport will probably total 
$676 million when the project is completed (Howington, 1997). 
This is more than double the original projected costs that 
were forecasted in 1988. According to the article, many 
construction expenditures have gone over budget in order to 
accommodate UPS and neighborhoods affected by UPS and airport 
operations. The Kentucky Air National Guard base headquarters 
had to be moved from one part of the airport grounds to 
another; and a greater number of area residents had to be 
removed and relocated than was originally anticipated. All of 
this was done because of increased traffic volume due to a 
second runway and more UPS shipping flights (Howington, 1997). 
To be fair to UPS, the article noted that UPS had 
contributed $54 million to airport expansion and renovation. 
Also, according to state and local officials, the airport 
expansion has generated around $85 million a year in economic 
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benefits, including state and local taxes. It is also pointed 
out in the article that UPS's growth has helped Louisville and 
Jefferson County attract businesses that rely upon UPS's fast 
shipping abilities. However, if one adds several hundred 
million dollars in federal aid to the list of EZ costs in 
Table 46, then EZ costs of job creation would at least equal 
if not exceed EZ job creation benefits (Table 47). These 
additional dollars would also greatly increase the ratio of EZ 
costs to private capital investment as well. Perhaps the 
ratio would rise from fourteen cents on the dollar to nearly 
50 cents on the dollar. 
For example, adding an additional $600 million29 to the 
total costs of Table 46 of roughly $217 million brings total 
EZ costs up to approximately $817 million. Dividing this 
number by the estimated 39,193 jobs saved and created yields a 
cost of $20,846 per job created and saved. This is 
approximately $9,000 more than the benefit per job saved or 
created that was calculated above. Also, this means that the 
cost of each job saved and/or created was greater than what 
the typical job in the EZ annually paid: $15,600. Clearly, 
this outcome would not indicate a good return on either 
federal or state taxpayers dollars. 
29 Recall that $60.5 million in state bonds have been 
accounted for in Table 46. Adding $600 million to the total 
derived in Table 46 would still leave out approximately $16 
million of the projected total airport costs of $676 million. 
This has been done so as to be cautious in estimating the 
final costs of airport expansion. 
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S. The EZ and Disadvantaged Workers 
Table 46 showed that between FYs 1992-93 and 1995-96, 
only $46,015 in tax credits for hiring disadvantaged workers 
had been claimed by EZ companies. EZ certified firms can 
receive a tax credit of 10% of a disadvantaged worker's annual 
salary, up to $1,500, for each disadvantaged worker hired and 
can carry forward such credits for up to five years. A tax 
credit is more desirable than a tax deduction because tax 
credits can be taken directly off tax bills whereas a 
deduction simply lowers a firm's gross income before taxes are 
assessed. 
In KRS 154.45, one of the three possible conditions of 
becoming an EZ certified firm was to have at least 25% of a 
firm's workforce consist of workers who were previously 
categorized as "disadvantagedH (see Chapter 3 for definition) . 
The 1992 General Assembly did not consider this adequate, so 
it amended KRS 154.45 to provide businesses with direct tax 
credits for hiring disadvantaged workers (KRS 154.45, p. 421). 
Whether this change in the law worked is either 
questionable or unknown. If the maximum of $1,500 per worker 
is used, then the amount of $46,015 indicates that only about 
30 workers have been hired over the previous four fiscal years 
under this provision of the law. Either that is the case, or 
many firms have not yet claimed credits for disadvantaged 
workers that they have hired. Or, they have only claimed a 
portion of the credits. Businesses do have up to five years 
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to take the full tax credit. 
Another possibility is that since this provision of the 
EZ law is relatively new, perhaps many firms are not yet aware 
of it. If this is true, then it would indicate that OED has 
done a poor job of promoting this EZ incentive. On the other 
hand, perhaps many firms are not interested in hiring these 
types of workers because they have a lack of work experience 
or skills. If that is the case, then these tax credits would 
only be used by low-skill, low-wage employers. Using this 
logic, the small amount of $46,015 would possibly indicate 
that many of these low-skilled, disadvantaged workers are not 
being hired. Ironica11y, these are the very peop1e for whom 
EZ incentives are supposed to he1p. 
In any event, this incentive may see greater usage over 
the next few years, but for now it does not seem to be working 
that well, especially for residents of the original EZ. 
Previous chapters have shown very little progress made in 
alleviating poverty and unemployment in this area. Creating 
job opportunities for residents in the original EZ also seems 
to have been an unfulfilled goal of KRS 154.45. Instead, the 
tables in Chapter 5 show this area to still be an area of 
urban poverty. The $46,015 in tax credits given for hiring 
disadvantaged workers may have been better used for something 
else, such as training people with low job skill levels in 
order to make them more employable. 
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6. S~~ 
The results of EZ cost-effectiveness analysis done by 
comparing benefits per job to costs per job, and costs per 
capital investment must be interpreted cautiously. The 
caveats mentioned above dilute OED arguments of total EZ 
success. Most of all, the people for whom the program was 
supposed to benefit the most--disadvantaged workers--seem to 
have benefited very little if at all from EZ program 
initiatives. Also, as pointed out in previous chapters and in 
this chapter, the area that was originally targeted for EZ 
incentives and the most hard-pressed for neighborhood 
revitalization and job creation has shown the least amount of 
improvement in its social and economic climate. 
This especially diminishes OED claims of complete EZ 
success when one considers what has happened in the control 
community of Newburg. Although similar in social and economic 
conditions, Newburg, without EZ incentives, at least was 
stable during the same time period as the original EZ was 
still undergoing decline. 
The next and final .chapter summarizes the findings of 
all previous chapters and the implications that these findings 
have for future policy consideration. A thorough critique of 
EZ program efficacy will be given. It will be shown that the 
EZ program had many shortcomings because of its failure to 
plan for and remain focused on its original goals: solving 
urban blight, poverty and outward migration. 
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CHAPTER IX 
1. Review of Findings: Implications for Research, Theory, 
and Public Policy 
Summary of Findings 
The preceding chapters have made the case that 
Louisville and Jefferson County's Enterprise Zone (EZ) cannot 
be considered a total success. EZ proponents can claim mixed 
results overall, but results vary widely according to which 
parts of the EZ are examined and according to the financial 
conclusions one draws about the cost-effectiveness of the 
entire program. 
The Original EZ 
Through the use of Census Data, HMDA data, and PVA data, 
the analysis showed that the original EZ continued to suffer 
from poverty, poor housing conditions, outward migration and 
low property values, as well as sluggish lending activity, 
despite EZ incentives. The original EZ did show an increase 
in educational levels and overall household earnings, but 
these levels were still lower than those of the control area. 
A shift-share analysis using two different data bases, showed 
poor job creation performance in the original EZ. To the 
chagrin of EZ proponents, the community juxtaposed to the 
original EZ for comparison purposes (Newburg) did quite well 
in the shift-share analysis presented in Chapter 7 when 
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compared to the original EZ. It also faired better than the 
original EZ despite receiving no economic development 
assistance. 
The outcome measurements showed the original EZ losing 
residents and jobs whereas a similar area, Newburg, roughly 
retained its original level of residents and jobs. This was 
true no matter which time period was used to examine the two 
areas. What is especially noteworthy is that the Newburg area 
received no type of economic development stimulus and/or 
program assistance during any of the time periods considered. 
Either a single factor or a combination of factors could 
explain Newburg's stability and the original EZ's stagnation. 
One can speculate that, even though in 1980 Newburg was 
roughly similar to the original EZ with regard to social, 
economic and demographic characteristics, there were events 
taking place in the original EZ which made it a less desirable 
place in which to live, work, and invest, in comparison to 
Newburg. A higher crime rate and/or a higher level of 
environmental problems (e.g., brownfields) in the original EZ 
when compared to Newburg would surely make the original EZ 
less attractive. Until a locality can solve its problems of 
high crime and environmental pollution, no amount of tax 
incentives can generate neighborhood business and job 
development. Tax incentives alone probably cannot make up for 
the risks that business firms would incur if they located in a 
crime-ridden and environmentally hazardous area. 
Another possible explanation, which is tied to the 
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previous one, is that despite the pre-Enterprise Zone program 
similarities between Newburg and the original EZ, there were 
and still are problems in the original EZ that only large 
amounts of government spending, along with tax incentives for 
businesses, could have solved. 
When one looks at KRS 154.45 and the original 3.75 
square mile area targeted for EZ program assistance, then the 
program did not appear to assist those in this impoverished 
and blighted area to the extent desired in the enabling 
legislation. This would be a narrow interpretation of the EZ 
program's efficacy, but it is justified because the original 
goals and objectives of Kentucky's EZ legislation were 
intended for economically depressed, urban areas. 
Areas outside of the Original EZ and the Full-size EZ 
Looking at the tables in Chapter 5, the full-size EZ 
showed modest gains in many social and economic conditions, 
but it still lagged behind the rest of Jefferson County and 
the Jefferson County as a whole. In the full-size EZ, job 
generation was at least static, showing no big losses or 
gains. The exception within the full-size EZ was the airport 
area. This area showed robust job growth, although as pointed 
out in other chapters, this job growth may not have occurred 
solely due to EZ incentives. Finally, Bluegrass Industrial 
Park also did at least as well as Louisville's airport, and 
yet Bluegrass received no economic development aid. 
It appears that the EZ incentives may have worked to 
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some degree in EZ areas outside of the original EZ and the 
airport. In these areas, it could be claimed that EZ 
incentives may have played a small but important role in 
keeping lower middle income areas from sliding into lower 
class status. Although there is no direct proof, EZ 
incentives may have helped these areas "hold their own" 
socially and economically by keeping viable such areas as 
Rubbertown, Riverport, and the Strawberry Lane industrial 
area. If this is the case, then perhaps EZ incentives work 
best in areas which are neither impoverished or wealthy. 
Perhaps EZ incentives work best in areas which are on the 
verge of economic decline, but are above the very lowest 
levels of poverty and economic deprivation. 
When it comes to Louisville's airport, EZ incentives 
probably only played a very minor and perhaps unimportant 
role. Instead, it appears that the nearly $676 million that 
has been and/or will be invested in this area has been a major 
catalyst for job creation. Without building a second runway 
and new facilities as well as removing several nearby 
neighborhoods, UPS would not have expanded its operations in 
Louisville. In fact, the company probably would have 
relocated to another airport. While UPS has become Jefferson 
County's largest employer, it must be remembered that most of 
its nearly 14,000 workers are part-time and earn $8.00 per 
hour (Howington, 1997). 
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Cost-Effectiveness 
The EZ program, whether small in size or large, appeared 
to be a financially cost-effective program over the years when 
one uses the only real data kept by an agency since the EZ 
began. Using OED data, and the most cautious assumptions 
possible, EZ incentives may not have helped firms to create 
and retain, on average, the best-paying jobs in the metro 
area, but at least the costs of job creation was outweighed by 
job benefits. Nevertheless, the caveats introduced cast some 
reasonable doubts about the cost-effectiveness of the EZ 
program, especially when one introduces what possible effects 
that federal and state spending had on creating jobs in the 
Louisville airport area. 
Summarizing the research findings, it appears that local 
economic development officials cannot make the claim that the 
EZ program was completely and absolutely successful. At best, 
the evidence shows that job growth in the full-size EZ, with 
the exception of the airport area, was stagnant during the 
time periods covered in the analysis. The evidence suggests 
that local officials can only claim that their estimate of 
18,000 new jobs created is a gross number and not a net 
figure. The same is true for their claim that the EZ 
incentives retained around 24,000 jobs. Finally, the evidence 
also strongly suggests that EZ incentives cannot take full 
credit for airport job growth. There is little doubt that 
federal and state public investment played a major role, if 
not perhaps the biggest role, in airport job growth. , 
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The evidence and arguments presented in this study also 
suggest that the original EZ probably saw further decline, 
despite EZ incentives, for another major reason besides those 
mentioned above. By expanding the EZ beyond a geographically 
limited area, the EZ program probably lost its focus as an 
urban, anti-poverty program and instead became a catch-all 
economic development program for most of the City of 
Louisville and for parts of Jefferson County. When 
interviewed by a Wall Street Journal reporter, EZ proponent 
and theorist Stuart Butler was dismayed at how large 
Louisville's EZ had become since its beginning (Davidson, 
1992). Butler said that EZs were never meant to encompass 
such large geographic areas because to do so would cause an EZ 
program to lose its urban emphasis. Within just a few years 
of its inception, Louisville's EZ program completely changed 
direction without any mandate from state government and 
without any consideration given to the residents of the 
original EZ. According to the Wall Street Journal article, 
the EZ was allowed to expand by Kentucky's Enterprise Zone 
Authority without much deliberation or planning, if any, with 
regard to the consequences of such action. The EZ was allowed 
to expand so as to include UPS and Louisville's airport, as 
well as to make possible the City-County Compact signed in 
1986. It appears that the goals and objectives of KRS 154.45 
were conveniently overlooked or glossed over in order to 
pursue other goals and objectives unrelated to urban poverty 
or blight. 
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As indicated in Chapter 3, there never was any real 
monitoring of EZ program performance until 1992. Adequate 
planning and program assessment cannot be done without 
monitoring program outcomes (Rossi and Freeman, 1983; 
Schofield, 1987). And with regard to program outcomes, the 
broad goals and objectives of KRS 154.45 were never 
sufficiently monitored at the local level in order to 
accurately measure program results. Had local economic 
development officials identified specific goals to be achieved 
in the original EZ, perhaps this area's needs would not have 
become overlooked in the various expansions that occurred 
after 1983. A specific goal for the original EZ area, for 
example, might have been to reduce its unemployment by one-
half over the zone's 20 year life span. But nothing so 
explicit was ever established with regard to the original EZ. 
The abandonment of the original EZ appears to have been a 
failure in planning. In this regard, this dissertation 
confirms much of what Rubin and Wilder (1996) found in their 
studies of EZs throughout the U. S. There are few solid 
conclusions about the efficacy of many EZs throughout the U. 
S. because so many of them failed to specify program goals and 
objectives when they were started. Many programs were 
conceived with little planning, and very little attention was 
given to monitoring program outcomes, if any outcomes were 
specified by programs. This is why there appears to be, 
paraphrasing Rubin and Wilder, a gap between the EZ rhetoric 
of accomplishments and the EZ reality of accomplishments. 
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2. Contributions of the Research to Economic Development 
Theory and Public Policy 
Limitations of this Study and Methodological Caveats 
Before making any further policy observations and 
recommendations, it should be stressed that there were many 
gaps in the data used in this study. Due to the lack of 
monitoring of the EZ program by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
many estimates and assumptions had to be made in the cost-
benefit analysis appearing in Chapter 8. At all times, 
however, estimates were made cautiously by giving OED the 
benefit of the doubt, and using their data alone, estimates of 
EZ program costs and benefits look very good. However, in 
order to give balance to the analysis, caveats and other 
considerations were included in Chapter 8 to give the reader a 
better perspective on the costs and benefits of the EZ 
program. Based on the evidence in Chapter 8, it appears that 
the EZ program was not nearly as cost-effective as one would 
initially conclude using only OED numbers and data. 
Likewise, the shift-share method and data used in 
Chapters 6 and 7 is not without limitations. As stated 
before, shift-share analysis cannot explain why an area may 
have a competitive advantage or disadvantage relative to 
another area. The number of jobs calculated for "s" (the 
local share effect) is also only a residual number that is 
left after county and industry-specific job forecasts are 
subtracted from the actual number of jobs gained in an area 
over a specific time period. Just because "s" may be a 
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positive number does not guarantee that an area has a 
competitive advantage relative to another. Random chance, 
luck, or the selection of a certain beginning and ending year 
(like 1981 and 1994), may playa role in "S" yielding a 
certain value. The choice of two other years used in a shift-
share analysis comparing two regions could yield different 
results than two other years chosen. A researcher is not 
always in a position to explain why or under what economic 
circumstances "S" indicates some type of possible competitive 
advantage or disadvantage that an area may have relative to 
another. 
Additionally with regard to the analysis presented in 
Chapters 6 and 7, there is the problem of arbitrarily dividing 
zip codes either in half, or by some fraction in order to 
arrive at job estimates within certain areas of Jefferson 
County. The weakness of doing this is the implicit assumption 
that business firms are evenly and uniformly spread out over a 
given area. This, of course, is not generally true. Again, 
this was a crude, yet necessary method, and has been used in 
other studies. 
Finally, the Census data used in Chapter 5 deserve a 
word of caution. The data appearing in Tables 1 to 6 
represent only two years: 1980 and 1990. If data for each 
year from 1980 to 1990 had been available, it is possible that 
the results of 1990 Census data may have been misleading. 
That is, for example, perhaps the original EZ was actually 
doing quite well up through and including 1989, and then 
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things took a turn for a worse. Although very improbable, 
this is always possible when comparing cross-sectional data at 
two different points in time, especially over a ten year 
period. 
Nevertheless, the methods used in this study were 
basically sound and the best ones available. The fact that 
shift-share analysis using two different data bases and two 
different points in time (1980 to 1990 versus 1981 to 1994) 
showed pretty much the same trends lend credence to the idea 
that one can assume an area has a competitive advantage or 
disadvantage relative to another. Also, the other data 
sources and methods generally showed the same trends. Through 
using various analytic methods, there was direct and indirect 
confirmation of the conclusions made in this study. More 
importantly, the multiple methods and data sources showed 
consistent patterns and trends, thus reinforcing the 
conclusions reached. 
I would argue that the support garnered for the 
conclusions of this dissertation through a multi-method 
approach make this study a unique contribution to the study 
and evaluation of enterprise zones. This characteristic, 
along with the comprehensive nature of the study, make it 
different from others conducted so far. The literature on EZs 
mostly show just one method applied in an EZ evaluation in 
order to assess one outcome-either job creation, investment, 
or some other objective. This dissertation has looked at 
every possible aspect of the Louisville EZ and has tried to 
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judge its efficacy by using more than one method and one 
outcome measurement. The findings and methods used improve 
both our understanding of EZs and how to study them. 
Po1icy Imp1ications and Prob1ems 
Since the Louisville and Jefferson County EZ program was 
and probably still is a program without a clear focus, and 
since its performance has been mixed, all things considered, 
it must be asked: What could have been done to make the 
program better, provided that it was possible to have made it 
better? Even if implemented correctly, there is always the 
possibility that the EZ program would not have been enough to 
do the job KRS 154.45 intended it to do. Based on the results 
of my research, the following policy recommendations appear 
warranted. 
First, for the program to at least have had a chance to 
work, I believe that the size of the EZ should not have been 
changed. The targeted area should have remained 
geographically small, urban, and in desperate need of economic 
assistance. The communities included in the EZ after its 
start in 1983 were not as bad off socially and economically as 
the original, targeted area. This fact probably diverted 
attention from the initial target of EZ incentives. However, 
retaining the focus on the original geographic area may not 
have been enough for the goals and objectives of KRS 154.45 to 
have been realized. As mentioned before, tax incentives and 
regulations are only one part of a whole group of 
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considerations that businesses contemplate when making hiring, 
investment, and location decisions (Schmenner, 1982; and 
Blair, 1995). In order to revitalize an area like the 
original EZ, high-paying jobs would have had to have been 
created in the area. These jobs usually require high skill 
and educational levels, things that the original EZ still 
lacks to this day. Therefore, it is doubtful that, even if 
the boundaries of the original EZ had not changed, the EZ 
program would have been successful. 
Making business costs as low as possible would certainly 
have been advantageous to the original EZ. In fact, if local 
economic development officials really wanted to take a supply-
side approach to developing the original EZ, then one possible 
incentive may have been to eliminate all state and local taxes 
on EZ certified firms, including taxes on business profits. 
But, once again, making an area attractive based upon 
low costs of doing business is not enough to encourage 
economic growth. If this were true, then Mississippi would be 
the fastest growing state in the U. S. Yet it is well known 
that it is one of the poorest states in the country. Thus, 
one policy implication of this study is that tax incentives 
and/or low tax rates alone are not enough to revitalize an 
impoverished area. This has been known for quite some time 
(Schmenner, 1982), but local economic development officials, 
in their rush to start an EZ program, ignored this important 
principle of economic development. 
Instead, other things must be done to make an area ready 
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for economic growth. An educated and skilled workforce is an 
advantage, as well as amenities that make the quality of life 
in an area good. To have accomplished this in the original 
EZ, innovative educational policies and crime prevention 
programs would be necessary, and these programs would probably 
have been very costly. It would also have meant cultivating a 
workforce in an area where a generation of adults have grown 
up without steady work, if any work at all. In this type of 
environment, creating a quality workforce would have been a 
very expensive and a long-run undertaking with no certainty of 
success. To have pursued such policies in the 1980s and the 
1990s may have also proven politically unfeasible, undoubtedly 
reminding many people of the controversial programs of the 
1960s and 1970s. 
Interestingly in Britain, enterprise zone policy has 
changed dramatically. Midway through the Thatcher 
administration, EZ designated areas were not only granted tax 
and regulatory relief, but were also given Urban Development 
Grants (UDGs) in order to help localities refurbish 
infrastructure, rebuild roads and sewers, and build workforce 
development centers. Ironically, UDGs appeared in Britain as 
UDAGS were being eliminated in the United States (Hambleton, 
1996). In the U. S., Empowerment Zones and Enterprise 
Communities (EZ/EC) have been introduced as a replacement for 
the Reagan era EZ programs for urban areas. The EZ/EC concept 
is the first real federal urban policy initiative undertaken 
by the federal government since the 1970s. However, it is 
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very modest in its size and goals when compared to the urban 
initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s. Only selected cities get 
to participate in the program. One of the selling points of 
the EZ/EC program is that it creates partnerships between 
federal and local governments in carrying out EZ/EC policy, a 
partnership that was missing from previous federal programs 
where it was felt that Washington had too much control over 
urban policy. Like British policy, the EZ/EC initiative 
relies upon a mixture of tax relief and federal expenditures 
in order to try to revitalize distressed areas (Hambleton, 
1996). So far, there is little known about how well the EZ/EC 
programs are working. Because it is limited to only a certain 
number of cities, not all of urban America is benefiting-a 
major criticism of the program. 
One of the implications of studying Louisville and 
Jefferson County's Enterprise Zone is that state and local 
leaders have not done a very good job with regard to economic 
development and to the removal of urban poverty and blight. 
According to Rubin and Wilder (1996), this has not been an 
uncommon experience with EZs across the U. S. Poor planning, 
monitoring, and implementation of EZs caused Rubin and Wilder 
to conclude that no definite statement can be made as to 
whether EZs have been successful throughout the U. S. over the 
past two decades. This dissertation adds to their conclusion 
by confirming that many problems that plagued other EZs in the 
U. S. also caused difficulties for Louisville's EZ. 
So it seems that both federal and local government 
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initiatives to solve urban problems have been criticized for 
coming up short on solutions to poverty and urban 
deterioration. If the federal initiatives of the 1960s and 
1970s did not work, and if the local government policies of 
the 1980s and early 1990s did not assist urban areas, then one 
cannot expect too much from the Clinton administration's EZ/EC 
program because it attempts to use both levels of government 
in only selected cities to address urban issues. At best it 
appears to be a half-hearted attempt to redevelop the most 
economically depressed areas within cities. 
Policy Recommendations and Suggestions for Further Research 
I would like to put forth a simple yet bold proposal to 
help Louisville and other U. S. cities help the urban 
underclass. Instead of creating programs that are targeted 
toward areas and localities, perhaps the focus should be on 
creating programs that are targeted toward certain groups of 
people. The tax incentives given by and the tax revenues 
foregone by Louisville's EZ program may have been better spent 
by creating a negative income tax for the poor. In fact, 
perhaps all local and federal government programs would be 
more effective if this change in emphasis was considered 
seriously. Despite the controversy surrounding its current 
and future funding, no one can deny that Social Security has 
been a success in that the elderly now constitute the smallest 
percentage of those living in poverty. As far as an anti-
poverty program goes, Social Security has thus far been a 
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success whereas other anti-poverty programs have not. This is 
probably because Social Security is targeted toward a 
specified segment of the population rather than a specified 
area or region of the country. 
The idea of a federal negative income tax has been 
around for some time (Samuelson, 1973, pp. 810-812). It has 
supporters who span the political and economic philosophical 
spectrum: from the likes of Keynesian economist James Tobin 
to the libertarian and Monetarist economist Milton Friedman. 
Other supporters have included Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon 
and George McGovern. It has and still is used in various 
European nations. Instead of a negative income tax, some have 
suggested that it be called an "incentive-guaranteed-income H 
plan (p. 811). The closest thing to a negative income tax 
that exists now is the earned-income tax credit (EITC). 
However, negative income tax (NIT) proponents argue that the 
EITC does not go far enough. 
How would a negative income tax program work? Those 
individuals or families with no income receive a guaranteed 
minimum income that is pre-determined. Individuals or 
households with an income level below some break-even level 
receive payments, with the level of payment being related to 
their level of income. They are not taxed on their earnings, 
but instead receive transfer payments to get them up to the 
guaranteed minimum income level. After an individual or a 
family begins to earn income above their guaranteed minimum 
income, they only then begin to make tax payments on their 
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income, although the tax is progressive (i.e., to pay a great 
amount of taxes they would have to earn a great deal more) . 
For example, let us assume that the federal government 
establishes that the guaranteed minimum income for a family of 
four is $18,000 per year. A family of four with no income 
would receive $1,500 per month. A family of four with an 
income of $9,000 per year would receive a negative income tax 
payment of $750 per month. Once a family of four begins to 
earn more than $18,000 a year, each dollar earned over $18,000 
would be taxed at a tax bracket appropriate for that level of 
income .. 
Nobel-prize winning economist Paul Samuelson (1973) 
writes: 
"Yet how can these aids be given them [the poor] 
so as not to deter their efforts and incentives? 
Here is where the negative income tax provides a 
great improvement over those welfare programs that 
deprive people of all assistance the moment they 
even get a poor job. (And, of course, those on 
assistance know this very well and are thus 
deterred from trying to improve their position.) 
..... [T] he formula for the negative income tax 
is gauged to leave the poor with more income 
after they have used their own efforts to raise 
their private earnings by a thousand dollars, 
or even by a dollar .... 
The paramount advantages of the negative income 
tax are many. 
1. It can replace much of present welfare 
assistance that destroys incentives. 
2. It can help to equalize minimum levels 
of well-being over all the diverse regions 
of the United States. 
3. It is less demeaning to the poor. 
4. It can be simply administered by the 
Internal Revenue Service." 
(pp . 8 11-12) . 
A guaranteed income and NIT plan could be paid for by 
either reallocating money from current urban programs and 
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anti-poverty programs to a NIT program, or by a modest 
increase in gasoline taxes, or by doing both. 3D This could be 
done without increasing the federal budget deficit. It would 
be a fairer and more humane way of changing urban assistance 
than by sticking to the old way of doing welfare (which was 
abolished in 1996), or by handing over welfare programs to 
state governments. I cite the welfare debate because of its 
importance to urban constituents. 
The NIT would also do more to help the urban poor and 
underclass than CDBGs, UDAGs, public housing, mass transit 
systems or other programs which require state and local 
middlemen to implement the policies of the federal government. 
Bureaucratic "overhead" consumes a large portion of the costs 
of these policies. It is also a better alternative to 
alleviating urban poverty than what some advocates think that 
a national industrial policy would yield (Leigh, 1994). Such 
a policy would never work in the U. S. just as it has not 
worked in various other nations. Finally, if state and local 
governments cannot do economic development correctly, what 
makes one think that they can adequately provide assistance to 
the urban underclass? 
The NIT proposal has been criticized on many grounds. 
30 American economists are quick to point out that Americans 
pay very little for gasoline compared to their European 
counterparts. When Presidential candidate Bob Dole proposed 
reducing federal gasoline taxes, most economists retorted that 
our gasoline taxes were in fact too low. Although a somewhat 
regressive tax, a gasoline tax increase would generate a huge 
amount of revenues in a short time period because short-run 
demand (several years) for gasoline is very price inelastic 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1995, pp. 32-37). 
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To defend it in detail and to outline a plan for its 
implementation would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, with modern technology, computer monitoring, and bank 
debit cards, it seems that now is the time that new research 
should be done on the practical implementation of the NIT. 
New pilot projects would be in order. Some would argue that 
the NIT proposal would make the IRS too large. But the IRS 
would only grow in proportion to, maybe perhaps less than in 
proportion to, the amount by which other government agencies, 
such as welfare programs, the Economic Development 
Administration, HUD, etc., would shrink. 
Even at the state level, the NIT could do much to help 
Kentucky's urban poor and working poor in general. Kentucky 
now ranks number one as far as its tax burden on the poor 
(Hawpe, 1996). Poor people are taxed at a higher rate in 
Kentucky than in any other state (Multistate Tax Commission, 
cited in Hawpe, 1996). No wonder there is so little incentive 
to work for those people with low skills and low educational 
levels. Instead of experimenting with EZs, perhaps Kentucky 
and other states with income taxes should try pilot NIT 
programs. 
If one took the roughly $217 million used in Chapter 8 
as the conservative cost estimate for EZ program costs and 
divided this amount by 13 (for FYs 1983-84 to 1995-96), an 
average of $16,692,308 per year could have been paid to 
qualified, low-income households in the original EZ. These 
are the households that were supposed to have been helped by 
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KRS 154.45, but never really were. According to Table 6, in 
1990, 64.4% of all households in the original EZ were below 
poverty level. This percentage of the total occupied housing 
in the original EZ, 4,173 in Table 2, means that 2,687 (= .644 
x 4,173) households lived below poverty in 1990 in this area. 
Had $16,692,308 been given to these households in the form of 
a negative income tax, then the average income of each 
household would have risen by $6,212, assuming that all 
households were the same and had the same needs. Adjustments 
in NIT payments would have to be made in order to account for 
variations in household size and earnings. This additional 
$6,612 in income to each household would have raised average 
household income in the original EZ from around $11,132 in 
1990 to over $17,000 per household. 
Although this increase in income would not make the 
residents of this area middle class, at least it would give 
them the additional income needed to perhaps stimulate some 
new business activity in the area. Such additional income 
could also be used to take vocational education or community 
college classes. Perhaps it would also allow some families to 
become first-time home buyers. If this occurred, perhaps the 
neighborhood revitalization envisioned in KRS 154.45 would 
finally become a reality . 
• 
Critics can argue that these poor households would not 
know what to do with the additional money, and that the money 
would probably be squandered on drugs, alcohol and other 
illicit activities. My response would be that such socially 
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deviant behavior is already occurring in this area. The extra 
income would be an incentive for those who want to better 
their lives. Those who would use the NIT to engage in illegal 
activities would lose benefits and suffer the consequences of 
their illegal or socially undesirable pursuits. 
Others will say that such a plan is purely 
redistributive and only makes welfare a bigger problem. If 
one considers all the other welfare programs and agencies 
eliminated by adopting a NIT, the costs of welfare could 
actually go down, not up. Also, there are incentives built 
into the program to encourage participants to earn more money. 
This is not to say that the NIT will solve all the 
problems of the urban poor and urban areas. Public safety and 
education will still have to be promoted vigorously in 
Louisville and other urban areas as a way to help solve our 
problems. Better education is important for the urban poor to 
gain upward mobility. However, at least adopting the NIT 
would get the federal, state and local governments out of the 
business of local economic development. The NIT would allow 
state and local governments to concentrate on the services 
that they are supposed to do--public safety, education, 
sanitation, and other basic services. Constitutionally, these 
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gages, leases. assignments. loans. and all other matters relating to ita fie 
nancial operations. Copies of the audit shall be distributed to all memben 
of the board, the Governor, and the Kentucky Legislative Research Com. 
mission and shall be made generally available to the public for inspection. 
(Enact. Acts 1990, ch. lOS, § 18, effective March 20, 1990.) 
Compiler'. Nota. ThiI MCCion wu for· 
medy compileci u KRS 154B.134. 
SUBCHAPTER 45. ENTEIlPRISE ZoNE DEVELOPMENT 
154.45-001. Purpose of Enterprise Zone Program. - The General 
AsIIembly hereby finda and declares that the purpose of the Enterprise Zou 
Program is to revitalize economically depressed areas of the state. It is the 
intent of the General Aaaembly to achieve this purpose -by. adhering to the 
~~lathe quality ofure of individuals that ~ide withm~ -~ 
prise lOne by providing employment opportunities. job training. and neiP· 
borhood improvement programs; 
(2) Encourage economic activity by auiatiDg and maintaining exiIting 
buain .. within an enterprise zone; --", -
(3) Encourage economic activity by stimulating the influx of new bUli-
nIU within an enterprise zone; and 
(4) Eliminate blighted and deteriorated area. within an enterprise zane 
that feature chronic abandonment or demolition of residential or-cammer-
cia1struc:turee or property. (Enact.·Acta 1982, ch. 131. § 1. effective July 
15,1982; 1986, ch. 30, § 1. effective July 15. 1986; 1992, ch. 35t § I, effec. 
tift July 14, 1992.) 
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cbaDPI to VariOUI proviaiona in the enter- fiee did not find that it affected the coDCluaion 
priIe zone .t.awt.el the Attorney General'. of- of anconatitutionality. OAG 92-86. 
154.45-010. Definitions for KRS 154.45-020 to 154.45-110. - Mused 
ill KRS 154.45-020 to 154.45-110, unless the context otherwise requires: 
(1) «Authority" means the Enterprise Zone Authority of Kentucky; 
(2) "Enterprise zone" means an area designated by the authority to be 
eligible for the benefits of KRS 154.45-020 to 154.45-110; 
(3) "Establishment" means a single physical location where business is 
condueted or where services or industrial operations are performed; 
(4) "Existing business" means a person, corporation. or other entity en-
Pled in the active conduct of a trade or business at a location within the 
enterprise zone prior to the date the authority designated the area as an 
eDterprise zone; 
(5) '1..«al government" means a city, county, urban-county government. 
. or charter county government; 
(6) "New business" means a person. corporation. or other entity who wu 
DOt engaged in the active conduct of a trade or buainess in the enterprile 
lODe prior to the date the authority designated the area as an enterprile 
moe. aud who becomes engaged in the active conduct of a trade or buain .. 
within the enterprise zone after the date the authority designated the area 
u an enterprise zone; 
(7) "Qualified business" means an existing business or new business that 
baa been certified by the authority to have at least fifty percent (5~) of its 
employees performing substantially all of their services within an enter-
prise zone and meeting one (1) ot the following ~teria: 
(a) With a new business employing at least twenty-five percent (25..,) of 
the business', employees from the tarpted workforce; or 
(b) With an ezisting busin ... creating new activity within the enterpriIIe 
zaae of not less than a twenty pen:ent (2~) increue in the number of 
employees or by a twenty percent (2~) increase in capital investment 
within eighteen (18) months from the date of application for certification as 
a qualified business. Busineaaea that are certified baaed upon an iDcreue 
in employees ahall employ at least twenty-five percent (25..,) of the new 
employees from the targeted workforce . 
. (8) "Qualified employee" means an employee of a qualified buain8ll; aud 
(9) "Targeted workforce" means Kentucky residenta: 
raj Who re&ldi WltbiJi an enterpnae zone; or--
(b) Who have been unemployed for at least ninety (90) days or who have 
received public asaiatance benefits, baaed on need and intended to alleviate 
poverty, for at least ninety (90) days prior to employment with a qualified 
business. 
(e) For the purpoae of this 8UbsectiOn. "Kentucky resident" meaJii -a 'per-
IOD who has resided in the Commonwealth for at least ninety (90) days. 
(Enact. Acta 1982, ch. 131, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 30, f 2, 
effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, § 2, efrec:tive July 14, 1992.) 
eo.piIer'a Note.. Th1a ..aioD WU . (or-
IDIriy c:oaqriled u KRS 154.8515. 
Kaaacky 1.. .. JoanaaL Kentucky Law 
Saner, Wbit.I8ida, Tau&ioa. 71 Ky. L.J. 479 
(1182-83), 
Opmioaa of AUonI~ Geaenl. Public'. 
w... in IDODitoriDi the .aiviti .. of Enter-
pn. 1.0118 Authority to cIetenDiu iCdIe buR· 
~ cmifiacl for the _ qaalily Cor the 
beaefitl received by virtu of tbair ~ 
meaia and the number of joba they claim to 
a.a. ouPNilba thaae blip- II' uu... 
in 1DAiD&a.iDiDc the confiden&iality of iDfar.. 
ma&ioD relatiq to capital intW'D!1Db aDd 
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employment figures for buailUllMS located in quiremenca for cenification under "Ib .. ~ 
ent.erprile zona therefore. to the enent that (5) (now (7» of thia ledion. such infonnauea 
the requated information doe. not relate to sboald properly be dilCloeed under I\I.bdhi. 
the buain .... ' penonal financial data. but liOll UXa) of KBS 61.878. OAG 91.1015. 
awnly reflec:&l their compliance with the re-
154.45-020. Application for designation as enterprise zone - m. 
terloca1 governmental agreement - Application to amend bo1lDd-
aries of existing zone - Joint applications. - (1) A local gDVe!'llDlellt 
may, by act of the local legislative body. designate an area within itsjuria. 
diction to be an economically depressed area. The local government IDa, 
then make written application to the authority to Jiave the area declared to . 
be an enterprise zone. The application shall include a description of tba 
location of the area and other information the authority may require. 
(2) Two (2) or more local governments may. by an act of each reapecti .. 
legislative body. designate an area within their collective jurisdictiou to be 
an economically depreued area. After each local government baa RiMd..,. 
the proper ordinances designating the area to be economically dept II if.' 
the purpoae of applying to the authority for designation sa an &ntezpz"'" 
zone, each legislative body shall enter into an interlocal govemmental 
agreement. The agreement ahall be governed by the provisions of the IDt,e. 
local Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300, and shall include: 
(a) The establishment of a joint board to administer the enterprise ".. ~ 
that shall be comprised of repte&6ntatives from each local govemment; 
(b) A statement establiahing the joint board for the life of the en~ 
mae; . .. ... .' I . . .... 
(e) A statement establiabing u.nifortD local incentives that ahall be ~ 
fered by each local government; ",". 
(d) A ltatement establishing financial aupport by each local govemJIIeDt 
for the administration of the joint board; and . 
(e) Other requirements that may be establiahed by the authority. . .. 
(3) A local government with an existing enterprise zone may apply to tba 
authority to amend the boundaries of the emting zone for the purpose of 
joining with other local governments. A local govermnent applying to craIa ~ 
jurisdictional boundaries to amend the area of an enterprise zcme shall .. 
comply with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section and KBS 
154.45-030. 
(4) Upon approval olthe interlocal governmental agreement pumJallt to 
KBS 65.210 to 65.300, two (2) or more local governments may make writt8Il 
application to the authority to have the area declared an enterprise r.oD8._ 
The application shall include a deacription of the area and other inform&!" 
tion the authority may require. 
(5) Upon receipt of an application, the authority ahall review the applica-
tion to determine if the area described in the application qualifies .to be 
delignated an enterprise zone. . 
(6) The authority shall complete its review within one hundred twmt:r 
(120) days of receipt of the application, but may enend this time period 8D 
additional smy (60) days if neceaaary. If the authority denies the applica-
tion, it shall inform the local government of the fact in writing along with 
reaIOns for the denial. (Enact. Acta 1982, ch.. 131, § 3, effective July 15, 
1982; 1986, ch. 30, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, § 3, effed:i .. 
July 14, 1992.) ..• 
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dlliPAtad ana hana. 110 Da&aral aDd rea- cbaapI to yarioua ' pr'OYiaioaa, in .&,be ....... 
.-able buia to ~ &bam from other . pn. ... ata&uW &be Att.onIeJ o-aa'. 01· 
..uarlJ aituatad .,..., aDd ai.acI &be ..... fica dicl .. 6ad that it a&cted t.he CODd __ 
la&ioD in queItiaD eumpta certain.u.mcta of an"'MtitatioDa1ity. OAG 82-86.' 
-.. 
1&4.45-030. Boundary changes effective upon written app~ of 
p&hority - Content. of application - Requirement. lor a1liharity'8 
approvaL - (1) A local govemment may make written applicatiOD to the 
authority for purpoaee of amending the bcnmdaries of an aiatiDg 6DteiptUe 
ICIIl8. A bouDd.ary change to an emtiDg enterprise lODe shall ~ become 
eB"ective until after written approval baa beeD granted by the autboriiy. 
(2) A local government applying to the authority far an amendment to 
the boundaries o( an emtiDg enterpriae zone shall certify in WritiDg the 
followiD& information: ~ . ; 
(a) 'l11e propoeecl area (or amendment is contiguous to the uiatiDI lODe; 
(b) The propoeecl area (ar amendment iDdependently meeta the require-
menta eatabliahed. by KBS IM.46-OW; aDd 
(c) A liatmnent documenting the reuon.a the local guftI'DJDeIlt fa ..t-
iDe to amend the boundariea o( ita emtiDg enterpriae zone. A detailed map 
abDwing origiDal boundary liDeI aDd propoeecl boundary !iDe ~ abaD 
be attached to the applicatioD. 
(3) Prior to granting approval for amending the boundariea of an a:iat-
iDg enterprise zone, the authority ahall verify and document in writiq die 
(ollowing: . 
(a) How amending the boundaries o( the eziatiDg zone will comply with 
the goala established pumwlt to KRS 154.45-001; 
(b) The local pvermnent'l commitment and incentives to be o6nd to 
support. the expanded eDierpriae zone; 
(e) If' twa (2) or more local governmenta are involved, that each local 
government baa met the requirementa o( KBS 154.45-020; 
(d) The local government's attempt to utilize available buildiDp aDd 
properties within the eziating zone; and 
(e) Unforeeeen c:ircwnstaDcea or overriding economic Cactora that haft 
occurrecl aiDce the designation o( the original &ODe that neceaaitate .nwnd· 
iDg the boundaries o( the eDating zone. <Enact. Acta 1986, ch. 30, I ., 
effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, § 4, effective July 14, 1992.) 
Coep"1er'. N .... ThJa ..aiaIl .... for. 
..my compiled .. KBS 1501.662. 
Opbaiou of A...., GeaenI. Limita· 
_ of t.he ...... aadar t.he .n ..... 
__ pnIII'Ul to ten ana aeJactad by &be 
.......-_ au&barity'" in IaciClDllllr a 
III*ialIta&Da ... ta-. .,..., deDyiac beDe-
tita..,. NIIIiw to otber~~ ..... 
a&ad; aiaae uaiqaa beal6ta an pr ..... to 
dMj.,..tad ana haw., DO aa&aral aDd n. 
...able buia to diI&iqaiab tbaa tn. .... 
ailailuiylituaad.,..., ad ... the .... 
..... in queaUaa ______ ........ 
fraaa &be .... u-. -.-.1 la ... the .... 
154.45-040 CONSERVATION AND 5rATE DEVELOPMENT - 416 
tatian ia both local and .pec:ial in character. 154.45-090; furthermore. altbouth Boa. , 
and thua violative of aec:tiona 69 and 60 or the BiD 66. (Ada 1992. ch. 35) eDadecl by the 
Conatitution or Kentucky; therefore. the (01· 1992 Geaeral Allembly. mabI DIIme!Iaa 
towing aectiou are UDCOnatitutionai local or clwage. &II YariOUI proYiaiou in the .... 
apec:ial legialatioa in contraventioD or aee- pn. lODe atu_ the Att.omey 0. ......... 01. 
tiona 69 .nd 60 of the .tate conatitution: KRS fiee diel Dot find that it a1fedeci the CODCiIlliaft 
154046-001. 154.45-020. tbia section. or uDCODltitutioDality. OAG 92-86. 
154.45-040. 154.45-050. 154045-070. aud 
154.45-040. Are .. eligible for deaigDation .. enterprise zone. - , 
(1) Any area of a local government may be designated. an enterprise zane 
that: 
(a) Has a continuous bOundary; and ' 
(b) Is an area of pervuive poverty, unemployment, aDd economic m.. 
tress. 
(2) An area meets the requirements ohubsection (l}(b) ofthia section m 
(al Tlie average rate of unemplOyment ill: the area for the moatl'eCellt'-
eighteen (IS) month period Cor which data iI 'available was at least one aDd 
ODe-half Cl..1/I ) times the average national rateoCUDeIIlployment for 'tJau . 
eighteen (IS) month period; and , -
(b) At least seventy percent (70C11) of the residents liviDg in the area haft 
incomes below eighty percent (SOCII) of the mediaD income oCthe·resident. 
of the local government requesting designation of an enterprise Zone; or ,. 
(c) The population of all cenaua tracts in the area dec:reaaed by ten 'per--
cent (1~) or more between 1980 and 1990 and the local go'geI'D!I1eDt I'e-" ' 
questing designation eatabliahea in writing, to the aatiaflction of the au-
thority, that either: 
1. Chronic abandonment or demolition of COIIIIIlercial or reaideDtial 
sinlcturea uiIt in the area, or 
2. Subatantial tax urearaps of COIIIIIlercial or residential 8~ 
ezist in the area. (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 131, t 4, efl'ective July 15, 1982; 
1992, ch. 35, § 6, effective July 14, 1992.) 
Cowpller'. N .... Thla aeccioD wu for-
merly c:oaqIiiecl .. KBS 154.665. 
K-tuetry Law oJoanaaL KaDtucky Law 
Surrey. Whit.aicla. TuaciOD. 71 K,. U. 471 
(l18W3). 
0pIaiaaa 01 ~ a.a..L Limita· 
tiaD of the beMata WIIW the en.."... 
_ PftIII'UIl &II teD .,.. aeJec:gcl by the 
......... _.u&harity doea in fact CDDCer. 
.,.w Ita&u GO theM .,..., deDyiq .... 
fita they reca .. &II other are .. aimilariy lita· 
a. aiDca uDique beaefitl are pnrrided to 
daIipated IntU baYiq DO na&ural and .... 
--we buia &II ~ them freD otMr 
liIDilariy lituatad .,..., and aiDca the lecia-
la&ioD in q..uon eumptI certain d.i.atricta 
rr.. tb8 .... __ fIl.-u lawa, the I.p. -
IaIiaD ia "local and ar-ia1 in .-.-.. 
.. &baa Yialaliwfll ...... 61 and 60 01 &be 
Caaatimaia fIl ltetnrky; tbenCan. &be ... ' 
Iowiac ...... are a",,,,,,,tjtuaonallocal.. ' 
apeaial .I"tim ill camra ...... fIl ~ 
w.. 61 ... 60 fIltba atate couUtut:iaa: KI8 
154Ai-GOl. 154..6020. 154.~ thia ~ 
tioa.l~ 15Y60070 .... 154.6010;· 
Curtherman. alaboqb Houae BiD 68, (Ada 
1992, ch. 35) enact.ecl by the 1992 a-.l 
~y. aaa.. Dum OUI cbuapa to ...... 
o..~iIlthe..."... ........... . 
tbeA~o-..a· .... clicl .. 1ad thal 
it aIiIct.ed the coaduaioD fIl UDcnnrtjtgtiee,L 
ity. OAG 82-86. 
IM.46-050. Number of enterprise zonHlimitecl- Preferred area 
- Effect of revocation - Retention of cerd1lcation and eligibility for " 
tu exemption after removal of daipatiou. - (1) In addition to the 
seven (7) emting state enterprise lOnes, the authority may designate three 
(3) additional state enterprise IOnes by December 31. 1988. In deciding 
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which areas should be designated as enterprise zones the authority shall 
give preference to: • . 
(a) Local governments that have ~ocumented the greatest commitment 
to the goals established pursuant to KRS 154.45-001; 
(b) Areas with the highest levels of poverty, unemployment, and general 
cliJtress; and 
(c) Areas that have the greatest support from the local government seek-
ing designation, the community, residents, local business, and private orga-
nizations, taking into account the resources available to the local govern-
ment. , ' ,' . (2) Designation of an ·area as an enterprise zone shall remain in effect 
during the period beginning on the date of designation and ending on De-
cember 31 of the twentieth year following designation. 
. . (3) The authority shall remove the designation of an area as an enter-
~ zone if the area no longer meets the criteria for designation as lei out 
in KRS 154.45-020 to 154.45-110 or by administrative regulation adopted. 
b1 the authority pursuant to KRS 154.45-020 to 154.~1l0. The authority 
aball establish by administrative regulation a procedure for revocatiOn of 
the designation of an enterprise zone. The authority shall eD.BUnl that local 
. pvemments shall be notified in writing oftbe authority's intent.aDd ra-
IGDI for considering revocation of the designation. The authority ahall .. 
tabliah a reaaonable time frame within which the local government may 
correet the problema cited by the authority to avoid revocation of the enter-
priM zone design8tion. ' , ,c · . " ", 
(4) A local government that baa.had an enterprise zone designation re-
voked shall be prohibited from applying for future enterprise zone dMjIM-
" tiona for at least five (5) years. The authority may, by administrative rep-
lation. ezteDd the time frame that a local government is prohibited. from 
~' participating in the enterprise zone propam. . 
(5) If the authority mobs the designation of an enterprise zcme. it aball 
immediately begin reviewing the applications ofJoca1 govemmenta Illmg 
aD enterpriae zone and designate a new area as an enterprise ZODe U IOOIl 
u pouible. 
;.-, 
(6) If the authority removes the designation of an area as an enterpriee 
mile PUl'lUlUlt to this section. the qualified bUI;n_a. within the area aball 
retain certification and ahall ~ eligible to receive taz eumptiona 
panuant to KRS 154.45-090 until nec.uber 31 of the twentieth year from 
the date of the original deaignation of the area .. an enterpriae rou. 
(Enact. Acta 1982, eh. 131, § 5, eft'ective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 30. t 5, 
effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, § 6, effective July 14, 1992.) 
Coepi""'. N ..... TbJa MCUcm wu for. 
awl,. compiled u KBS 15'-670. 
0pmJ0aa of AtIonae7 a-.L Limita-
tica of &be beae6t1 UDder &be ellt.arprile 
... pnIPUl to .... ana Miect.ed by &be 
.....,n. -- auibarity do. ill fact caaCer a 
.,.w at.atua OIl &h-. ...... d_JiIlC beM-
fila &be)' reclift to othar ana aimilari,.liba-
at.ed; lila UDique beDefitl are pl'D\'ided to 
cleejpagd .... baYiDr DO aaUaraJ ADd rea-
-we buia to dUtiDpiab tbIm &am other 
Ii8iIarIy 1i&aaW ...... ADd aiDce the aep.. 
latioa ill q1I8ItioD euaqXa certaiD m.tric&I 
en. &be opIDtiaD of ..-ralla ... &be aep.. 
latioa is both local ADd apecia1 ill cbancrer, 
aad &hue YioWift oC aecUou 69 aDd 80 fll&ba 
COMCitatioD fll Kaaackr. t.ben6n. &be We 
lCJWiac NCiiau are ~ Ioca1 or 
apecia1 lep,latiaD ill COIltraftDUaD fll .. 
t.iaIla 69 aad 60 fll &be atat.e couaadiaD: KBS 
1N.46-001. 114.46-020, 1IUMIO., 
lM.46-CMO, ta. ...... 15U60070, aad 
114.46-090; furtMnDare. al&baaP I'-
8m 66. (Ada 1992. ch. 351 ....... by die 
1992 GeMnl .A..Dbly, maba D~ 
ct.ac- to ...... prcma.a ill &be .... 
priae ........ dleA~a-.l'.fll-
ft~ did DOt fiDd that it a&ct.ad &be ",or"";" 
o( 1lDiJGiWUluUonaljty. OAG 92-18. 
~'''' '. " i: .. 
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154.45-060. Enterprise Zone, Authority, of Kentucky , - Mem-" 
ship - Terma - Meetings - Compensation - Staff. - (1) For the 
purposes of carrying out the provisions of KRS 154.45-020 to 154."-110 
there is hereby created the Enterprise Zone Authority of Kentucky ~
ing of eleven (11) memben. The authority shall be appointed as folloWl: ou 
(1) member appointed by the Governor from a list of three (3) penou , 
nominated by, the Labor, Management Advisory, Council; one (1) ' member 
appointed by the Governor from a list of three (3) penoll8 nominated by tba 
Kentucky League of Cities; one (1) member appointed by the Giivel:aor 
from a list of three (3) penoll8 nominated by the Kentucky AlIIIOCiatioD of 
Counties; one (1) member appointed b7 ~,' (JOvernor ' who isqnaUfted to 
represent the interesta of Kentucky's .man 'buaineu communitT,' 'em. (1) 
member appointed by the GOvernor from' a Jist of three (3) peI'IIODa ....... 
nated by the AFL-CIO of Kentucky; two (2) ' memben appointed by tb. 
Governor to IeI"Ye at large; one (1) member appointed by the Go~ fmm _ 
a Jist of five ,(5) perions nominated bi. , the eecretary oC the Cub. fair 
Economic DeYelOpment; the eecretary oftbe ~iDet Cor Ec:onomic,~
ment or his desigaee; the I8CI"etary of the Reftnae Cabinet or his deejp.; 
aDd the secretary of the CahinetCot HUDWl ReIourc:eI or. his ,deejPM 
(2) Authority memben sball Ilene a term oCfow (4) yean 8.Dd. eD:ept far-
the secretary of the Cabinet Cor Economic Deftlopmeat., the aec:retUYot'tbt 
Revenue Cabinet. and the eecretary of the CabiDet cOr Human R.ourc., 
aball not be eligible to 8Ucc:eed them-lveL ' ' 
(3) The authority sball meet at leat Ccnir (., times per year. A.~, , 
of the total authority membenhip shall be ~tA; d_pate ail .. u ' " 
ID enterpriae ZOD8 and to certify WeiD ..... u ,quaJjfied basiD Ii 'n. 
authority aball keep olicial mjnutM of' aU meetiDp. AU memben aUJJ 
..... untillUdl time u their IU«IIBOn are quaUfied aDd appointAMl., .. 
member of the authority sball receive one hUDdred cIo1lan ($100), .. to 
uceed twelve hUDdred dollan ($1,200) per calendar year, as c:ompen-tioD 
far attendiDg official meetinp of the authority. Each member oC tba &II-
thority shall be nimbuned for travel expelUlel attnaUy incurred in tba 
dilcbarge of his dutiea on the authority. ' .' , ,' , 
(4) The Cabiilet Cor Eamomic Development Iball aene as staa"fajr tba 
authority and carry out the adminiatrative duties aDd fmu:tiOIl8 U ~
by the authority. (EDact. Ads 1982, ch. 131, f 6, e&c:tmt July 15, 1_ 
1986, ch. 30, f 6, eft'ective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, f 7, etfective JUlj' 14, 
1992.) 
CoapI ..... H .... 1be ~ fill tJU. 
...aoa b)' wiIida tbe .... fill tbe Houe fill 
a. ,tam. aad tbe Pr 'd t Pro T_ 
Oltbe SeDate ............. fill .... ED-
tiJlplWZoMAatIMdy"..decIanG ...... 
~ ill .... '·am a-rcb Comm'a 
... L PratMry. BrowD. eM 8. W.2Il807 (K,. 
11M). 
nat. MCCi.-.. '-'-I, 0IIIDpi1ed u KBS 
116.115. 
KeepmIr.y 1.. • .JoamaL ~'lMr 
Sane" Wbi ...... Taaa... 71 K,. U.4'$ 
(1ta-83). 
l m_ - ... .::"=of..-..... _=== 
;.wJq ....,ciaUOD of COUDU .. mat IUbmit the COQllty office. OAG 82 ... 29. 
~ I . NOTES TO DECISIONS 
,. 
'L Coaautuuoaality. bdee • 1ecWative .ppoiDtmeu wlUcb ill-
.' S&a&U ...... w:h .. thia MC&ion. in which the friDpuD &be npt of &be ao..... to mab 
; ~ of &be HOUle aDd &be PrnideDt· Pro 11ICh . • ppointllleDta. Lepalatift ' ~t· .... of &b. Seaate are DWie members of c:er- Comm'D a nl PratMr Y. Brown. eM 8.WoId t ... """ aN .~~ ~UII .~ ~DIii.- .90'1_ (K~. ~91W). . . .' . . . 
. 114.45-070. ' nudo of authority. - The authority shall administer the 
· . . , ODS of KRS 154.45-020 to 154.45-110, and Ihall: 
· (1) EatabliBh by administrative regulation a proceu to monitor campti. 
!izu:e by l~ governments and qualified buaineuea with the provisiOll8 of 
. tb8 Enterpnae ·Zone Program; : , ....  ' !: . .. :.. ~ . " . . --: , . , ' . . , <~-" .• 
-(2) Initiate contact and fully cooperate with the Revanue.C8biD8t; in the. 
~ection of information to determine the fiacal impact of ent.arpriae ... 
tIS exemptions on state rennuee; . ' . . 
(3) Report. to the Geaeral Auembly no later than October. 1 anm-ny 
~ . . ..... ' 
.: (a) The' authority'. method of moni~-ru:.. the Enterprise Zcme Proiram; 
· . ) Information on the fiacal impact of entarpriae lODe tax eumptioDa on . 
. ' . te revenues; " .. " . ' ... " .". . i , . . .. " 
. (e) The authority'. methad of reriewiDg local.juCeDtive.; : .. l:-.~:.:;.F" .. 
(eI) Information on the number of qualified buIPn3ln. per zau; 
. (e) Information 011 the number of ~ far .amendments to r.aae 
boundaries aDd the. number of amendment. p-anted and dmi~ aDd (0 Recommend.tiDDS requiring state 18lialative action; . 
• ('(4) Revoke designation of an area u an enterprile lODe punuant to th8 . 
• iODS of KRS 154.45-050. 
-(5) Prohibit the certification of buUner_ in an enterprile r.ane if th8 
local government has been notified in ~tiDg by the authority of.the .... 
thority'. intent to revoke the locallOftl'DJD8llt'l desipation u an em.-
prise ZODe. 'n1e prohibition of certific:ation oflmain"_ aball c:oniinue U1Idl 
... &be authority ofticially revokes the locallOftl'lll1J8llt'1 enterprile r.aae ... 
"lpation, or notifies the local pyernment in WI'itiDg that the prilbJ .. 
cited by the authority have been corrected and the enterprile zone deejr-
tion shall not be revoked; . 
(6) Offer technical a.uiataDce aDd job traininga-.... nC8 to localpnrn-
L menta. qualified buaineaaee. and neighborhood enterprise elllOCietian c:aI'I»' 
ratioDB; aDd 
(7) AQreeeively review local incentives and commitments 011 an Innnal 
buia. (Enact. Acta 1982, ch. 131, I 7, e&ctive July 15. 1982; 1986, c:h. SO, 
I 7, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 35, I 8, eft'ective July 14, 1992.) 
Coapiler'. N .... ThIa ....... for.. 
a.iy CIOIIIpiIed .. KBS 154.180. 
~ IAw.JoanaL KeDtacky La. 
Sarony. Whi .... Tuaa.. 71 Ky. U. 471 
(18U-83). 
i. 0pIDi0aa of AUonIet' a-.L Limiia-
Fo· _ of tb8 beaa6ta WIder tb8 en..,... 
__ pnIIrUIl to .. .,... eeJecUd by tb8 
...... pc_ .... utbarity do. ill fact eaa&r. 
'. 
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aDd thaa violative of MCtiona69 and 60 of the lM.~; furthermore. a1&.boqb ~ 
ConatituUon of Kentucky; therefore. the Col· BUI 66. lAcY 1992. ch. 35) eua.t by tbe'. 
Imlll MCtiona are uncolUlt.itutioDal local or 1992 General Auembly. mau. n ..... 
apecial letWation in contraYention of NCo chanpe to varioua proviaiou in the __ 
tiona 69 and 60 of the .tate colUlt.itution: KRS pn. sou ltatutee the Attoney a-u'. at. 
1501,45-001. 1501.46-020. 1M.~. flce did not fiad that it afl'ec:ted the eoachIaiaa 
1501.45-040. 1M.~. t.hiI lICtion. aDd of ulICODItitutionality. OAG 92-86. 
, ~,. ' 
154.45-080. Muter buaineuliceue. - (1) The authority .hall .... 
1iah and design for public display a master buaineaa license that ahal1 cer-
tify that the qualifying bUliness hal obtained all neces.ary state &pDq 
permits, licenaea, certificates, approvals, registrations, chartera, or ..,. 
other form ofpermiaaion required by law to engage in bu.inell in aD ..... 
prise lOne. . : ~ 
(2) The authority .hall provide information and uaiatance to peI_ 
desiring to locate and engage in buainell in an enterpriae zone ~. 
the state liceD", permits, certificates. approvala, registratiODl,~: 
and any other forma ofpermiaaion requjred by law to engage in buri-_I·" ~ 
the Commonwealth. . . ~ . .!. 
. (3) Reaponaibility for determining if requeated liC8Dl8ll, permit.a, ~ I 
cates. approvala, registrations, chartera, or other form of permi .... ; 
quired by law shall be issued to a qnaJjfted. buaines., shall remain with 
&pncy legally authorized to issue the licenae. (Ezuu:t. Acts 1982. ch. 
f 8, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 30, f 8, eft"ective July 15, 1988; 1 
ch. 35, f 9, effective July 14, 1992.) 
.. ' . s 
1~. Tu adftDtag-. credlta, aDd aempdou'or quallfled:J. 
buill .... - (1) A new bnainea. or an uiatiDg buainell certi&Icl . . 
bui.a of employee expansion, shall be eligible to receive the .tax ach"'qj 
provided for in this section if the qualified buain .... maintains 
age of targeted workforce employees required by KBS '&'V"It • .v'"V.&.'Y\. 
eDtire time it is certified as a quaJjfted buainess in the En:t.lllril. 
Program. 
(2) Building materials used in remodeling. rehabilitation, or DeW 
struction within an enterprise lODe aball be eumpt from &aiel 8IIIIl 
tues provided for in KBS Chapter 139. 
(3) New and used equipment and machinery purchued and -.-t-. 
qualified butinea within an enterprise zone aball be uempt from 
use taxes provided for in KBS Chapter 139. Equipment and machinery 1DIl7. 
be moved in and out of an enterprise lODe {or buainess p~ only. lW 1 
addition, it may not become a permanent fi%ture at another locUioa aDd .' 
may be only temporarily located elaewhere {or maintellllDCe. mecheni,...l 
failure, or emergency short term replacement. ; 
(4) ColDlllel'cial vehicles as defined in KBS 186.050, purchaaed aDd 1I.IId 
by a qualified buainellll solely for bu.in .. pm POles. ,hall be eDIDPt. ftam 
the motor vehicle uaage tax impoeed by KRS 138.460. . r .' . ..: .! .. ~ 
(5) Motor vehicles not conaidered commercial vehicles purmuai to KBS 
186.050, pun:haaed and used by a qualified bu.inell solely for bu&_ a, 
purpoeea, aball be eumpt from the motor vehicle usage tax limited. ti 
firIt twenty thouaand dollan ($20,000) oftha "retail price" of the vebicIa u 
defined in KBS 138.450. 
DEVELOPMENT IM.45-100 
"'(6) Motor vehicles or motor trucks purchased by a qualified buaineu for 
the purpose of being leaaed to a cuatomer for a period greater than niDety 
) days shall not be exempt from the motor vehicle uaage taus provided 
tor in KRS 138.460. ./ 
. ,(7) A qualified buaineu ahall be allowed a credit against the tax leVleC1 
pursuant to KRS 141.040 equal to ten percent (10$) of wages paid to each i IIDployee who has been unemployed for at leut niDety (90) days or who hu 
f received public aaai8taDce benefits, buecl on need aDd inteDded to alleviate 
~ ~rty, for at least ninety (90) days prior to employment with the q"eJjfted 
• bulinell. up to fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500) per employee. AAy 1UlUIed 
l:credit may be carried forward for up to five (6) yean. . 
t .. :(8) A local government may, by an act of the loca1legWative body,l~ 
f:1Il .d valorem tax rate of one-tenth of one cent ('.001) upon each ODe 
hQDdred dollars ($100) of value on qualified property within an enterprile 
... ·reprdleu of the rates provided for in KRS Chapter 132. (EJuu:t. Ada 
'1982. ch. 131, § 9, e1fec:tive July" 15~ 1982; 1988, ch. 80,1 9, eft"eetift "ulJ 
~J..6, 1986; 1986, ch. 431~ § 8~eff'ec:tive July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. l18,·f. 'I, 
·effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 35, flO, e1featift July 14, 1992.) 
' :J. " . ~'~pI""l Hoe.. TbIa .... wu .. 
: -" CllllllPiW .. KBS IM.680. f. Eta"'" Beach .. s.. Tobeqte, TU 
• JmpIc& Of KeDtacb'1 ~ CouataI:iGIl 
~VpaDB __ Growdl" Deftlopment, Vol. 
r_ 61. No. a, S ..... 1981· K7. Beada .. 
. ..,21-
~ , ~...., 1... JoanaaL ~ Law' 
~ :8an'I7, Wbltelidla, TUUiaD, 71 K,. U.471 
ft-"""<I). . ~~ of A ...... G....J. LImita· ~_ 01 ita. beaI6ta WIIIIiIr tt. ........ _ 
~ _ pnIII'Ul to *- u.I ...... by &be 
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.,.aalltallll OD &b-. ..... Uayiq .... 
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~ ... a- .... baDI6ta an ptot"'" to 
~ .. hriP'tecI ..-U ... DO IWan1 aDIl ... 
, baIia to cIia&iqaiU thaa !ram otMr 
. ~ . 
c..,.;p,u ... fIll'r*'" tbIn6n, tt. fal. 
............ an. "h" ....... .. 
IpIIiU ..... etMe m 01'" ....... fIl .... 
a.. 68 aDIllOaltbe .... ,a. lip 'h. KI8 
1I&..4WCI1. ~ I ........ 
~ 1KAWIO, 15UIo07O. ........ 
1lldaa;6a~ ......... S-_ ... 
[Ada ~ cb.151 ...... by'" !lao.. 
... A .'Jr ........ rm ........ to 
.... pi ..... iD".' pi ...... .. 
... tt.A**--Jo-.l .... diII .. ... 
tIud. Al ..... U ... 01.... '. al m " 
tIeelit;J. OAO n.II. 
' to 15U1-100. Neighborhood eatequUe ·eegci.tioa COI'pO~ 
: ll&ablilhmeni - CerdflcatioD - Lud oWlMld bY Iiate UId local ' 
trDJll8llia to be ' I.... to c~ - Ta uempdoa. 
'(11 lDdiYiduaJ. residing in am enterprise ZOD8 may .. bUm a DeiPbgr... 
. enterprise UIIOCiation corporation. There ab.a1l be ODe (lj' carporaiiGn\ 
-:Iaf each geographic neighborhood areawhicb Ihall be defined by the iDDDr- . 
. poratiJig relidena " . 
(2) The incorporating residents ahall draft a charter and bylaw. for the 
auoc:iation IUitable for doing bulineu in COl porat.e form. The c:h..arta' aDd 
~., bylan shall deecribe the geographic neighborhood area to which the iDcar-
t poratiDg association applies, the menner in which a 8tock in~ ill ~ 
, corporation shall be offered to each reaident of the neipborhoocl, c:nntam 
provisions for amendment by a maJOrity of'lt«kholden. and .utbarDa .. 
. corporation to engage in btWneu only within the particular zone in wIW:h l the neighborhood ana of the corporatiOlt ' is located. 
l- ~ (3) The incorporating reaidenta ahall een4 to:all...ulents of the COIpGI'f" 
, , tion's neighborhood area: . 
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(a) An explanation of the propoaed new corporation and their rights·in it: 
(b) A copy of the corporate charter and bylaws; and 
(c) An offer of the stock interest to which each particular resident i6 
entitled without charge. 
(4) The board of directors of the corporation may. upon approval of a 
nuQority of the members of the locallegialative body of appropriate jurisdic· 
tion, apply to the authority for certification &8 a neighborhood enterpriae 
IIIOCiation corporation. The authority Ihall not grant the Itatua un1eu the 
. corporation has complied with the requirements of this aeetiOD and other 
requirements &8 may be adopted by the authority by ,dmin;wtrative repla-
tion. Upon granting certification, the authority shall place the COl pota-
tion'. charter and bylaws in a public file. The authority aball have power to 
mob or IU8p8Jld certification, or any of the 18&.181 iuuecl UDder aubuction 
(6) of this aection, if the corporation fails to continue to comply with the 
requirements of this aection. The authority Ihall gift t«hn;cel ,_Renee 
to zone remdents attemptiDg to etart COl poratioDL . 
(6) Ploperty within the neighborhood area of a certified CGqIOl'&tion that 
is owned by the state or a local pV8rmDeDi and that it IUIC in CWieni ue 
by the gOwnmumt Ihall be leued to the COIporation. The tenD of the 1 ... 
aball nat be 1 ... than niDety-DiDe (99) yean and the CuUIJN!U!lt ofremal 
feel under the lease ahall nat em:eed ODe dollar ($1). TIle leae may be 
reaewed upon expiration if the corporation has continuoaaiy complied with 
the requirements of this section. 
(6) A certified corporation ahall be eumpt from state aDA local texaP., 
daring the life of the zone in wIW:h it ia 1ocated.. (Enact. Am 1982, ch. 13L 
t 11. efIicti •• July 16, '1982; 1986, ch. 3D, f 11. e&d:iN July 15, 1988; 
1992, ch. 35, f 11. e&ctive July 14. 1992.) . 
Compl...,. N ..... TbIa .............. 
awIJ ......... u KBS 166.700. 
)[-' r'qr La. JOIUIIaI. .... ...., Law 
) 
Sanwy, Whl"'" Tuaaiaa. 71 K,. L.J. 411 
(1112-83). 
114.41-110. Datie. of Reveaae Cabmet - Report to General J... 
..mJy 08 &cal Impact ofEaterpriM Zone Procram- -(1) The s.. 
Il1I8 CahiDet ahall initiate contact aDd fully cooperate with tba authority.in 
the co11ection of information to det.ermiDe the fual impact of ent&pda 
r.aae tu e:amptiona on state revenues. 
(2) Report to the General Aaembly no later than ~ 1 UDually 
~4b:= c:abinet'. method of maDitoriDg the En~ ;.. Program: 
(b) Infarm.ation on the fual impact of enterprise zone tu uemptiODB on 
state nmmU88; and 
(e) JWmnmeDdationa requiring state legislative acdaa. 
(3) The Revenue Cabinet shall by admiDistrative repletioD amend its 
aeJea and use tu return to collect fiscal information on qulllW buuDMIM 
within au enterprise zone for purpoees of reporting to the a-raI A.uem-
bly. 
(4) The ReveDue Cabinet shall promulgate MmiDistratift replatiOM to 
eatablilh a process for the COllectiOD of to iDCormatiOD relating to enter-
prise zone tu exemptions. (Enact. Acta 1986, ch. 30, f 12, e&ctift July 15. 
1988; 1992, ch. 35, f 12, efrectift July 14, 1992.) 
DEVELOPMENT 
C_piJer'. Noe-. Thla MCUon wu for.. 
;_ ..-l1 coaqIi1ed u KBS lM.70S. 
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1&4.45-120. Cabinet for HWDaD Raoureetl to verify empioymeai.. 
iDformaiioD of qualified buaiDeuee. - 'I1le Cabinet for HUDUUl Be-
IOUf'C8S ahall verify employment information relating to the hiring require-
menta of qualified buaineuee to eelect and maintain employees from tbI 
tarleted workforce. The Cabinet for HUDUUl Reaoun:es ahall fully cooperatl 
with the authority in the development of a IJBt;em to monitor emp1oymem' 
iDformaiion supplied by qualified buaineuee. (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 35;' 
t 13, effective July 14, 1992.) I 
8uBcBAPrD 50. hmUI'I'aAL DavnoPlDN':' -
15UC)0020. Legiel·tive ftDdinp 01 fact - Pa.rpo.e of KBS 
15U0-020 to 15U0-030. - (1) It ia hereby fCJUJUi. det.ermmed. and de-
c:Jared as alegillative finding of fact that the pura1 welfare of the c:itoiaa 
or the Commonwealth ia directly related to the economic and ~
~ aftilable to them, aDd it is the legitimate buain_ of the 
KPiuCkJ atat.e guvemment to pl'VYide to the mazimum at.eDt prwttcehJe, 
die impetus for and uaiItaDce to economic deftlopment in the Com ..... 
.-lth through the provision of monetary uaiItaDce to ;nclutrial eDtiti. 
Car industrial improYemeDt projec:ta which will clireetly aDd pro.j1nateJy 
c:aue the improvement and retention 41 iDduatry and empluymeui in the 
Qmnnonwealth.. " 
(2) It is hereby further fcnmd, det.ermmed. aDd declared as a ..... tm 
fIDeIing of fact that the impro.&WeDi and __ DaD of manufac:tariDa, pr-. 
-mg, aDd • .-mbUng facilitle. wiD pniijmeteJy reeu1t in: 
(a) The c:reatioD or let.eDtion of ~ opportmaitieI; or ' ' 
(b) The c:reation or retention ofta Ib.eua. to the CoIlUllDD..utb. .. a 
taiDg entity, which would DOt be availaWe to the citizeDa of the CoiDman-
.-lth or received by the CollUllDDwealth but for the impIo ...... and 
retention of the facilitle. and which cr-.tiaD or retention of ~
oppGI tunltle. or tax reY6Ilu.. are hereby fouDcI. determined aDd. decIand to 
Clllllliitut.e receipt of n1u by the Common..uth for the mouetaI7 ..... 
tuce which it may provide punnwat to KBS IM.60-020 to IM.60-G30 to 
iDcI1IItriaI entitle. UDcIertaJdng iDdUltrial imptOvemeDt projecta 10catecI in 
thia .tate. 
(3) It ia the ~ of KBS IM.6C).()20 to IM.60-030 to pzomota and 
fOlter the piDfal employment, buain_. aDd economic deftlopmeDi oppiar-
tuDiu. and pnera1 welfare of the citbeDa and residents of the Ccprnnnn.. 
ftIlth which will reault in the alleviation or pretention of ~t
ucI the pural stability of the 6CDDOIDJ oCEeniacky. Thia pQipa. will be 
ICCOIDPHebed by the c:reatioD of the authority to eubl. the ComIl'*"IIwealth 
to provide monetary UIiItaDce to incIuatria1 entiti ... for the iwpto .... t
! ucI reteDtion of iDdUltrial manufacturiDg, pnnujng, or alll8!DbJiD, &ciIi-
tiel in the Commonwealth which, in ream.. will create or retain ......,. 
mst uppoItunitle. for citizeDa of the Comm·DWa.ith or will c:reate arre-
tain tax menueL '!be authority granted by KBS IM.50.020 to 1M.J0.030 
ucI the ParpcI •• to be accompHebed by KRS 1M.60-020 to 1M.60-030 are 
ba'eby declarec1 to be public pui'pOI8I for which public moner ~ be u-
pended. <Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 308, I 2, efFective July 13, 1990.) 
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